

TFT staff report

President Najib has weathered the storm. But the reverberations of the coup will long be felt both in Afghanistan and Pakistan

The ramifications of the failed coup against President Najibullah will not confine themselves to Afghanistan. Pakistan's support for Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and General Tanai has made a shambles of what little there was of Pakistan's Afghan policy, clearly contradicting its demand for a broad-based government in Afghanistan.

Further, the failure of the coup has closed all avenues for the Pakistan-backed anti-Najib forces to topple the present regime, at least for the time being. Having hinted at the possibility of a coup against Najib for the past four months, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who claims all the credit for the coup, has no more cards left to play. Neither have his supporters in Pakistan any alternative to offer. It could have put Dr Najib even more firmly in the saddle in Kabul, although the situation in the rest of Afghanistan remains unclear.

Gen Tanai's coup attempt programme whatsoever, was simply a manifestation of the power-struggle within the PDPA — a struggle which cannot possibly bring peace to Afghanistan. A hardline Khaili, Tanai has destroyed his own credibility by setting fire to Kabul without even offering the least hope of peace. The Khaili faction, obviously, is badly hit.

Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's support to Tanai has also cast a deep shadow of doubt over the latter's commitment to peace in Afghanistan. "Had the coup succeeded, it would only have led to further bloodshed because Tanai and Gulbuddin have virtually nothing in common", says a close observer of the Afghan war. When asked at a press conference why he was supporting a staunch communist, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar said, "Tanai agrees with us". Asked if he had met Tanai since he had landed in Pakistan, Hekmatyar said, "I repeat, he is now back in Afghanistan, commanding the mineurs". Most of those present wondered who he was trying to fool.

The common bond between Tanai and Gulbuddin is ethnic. Both belong to the Ghilzai pushtuns, and hate King Zahir Shah, a Durranis. Had the coup succeeded, it would most likely have served

only to alienate the other ethnic minorities in Afghanistan. A Gulbuddin-Tanai government would have been seen by the ethnic minorities and the Durranis, the other major tribe in Afghanistan, as dominance by the Ghilzais — an eventuality which would have been fiercely resisted by the Durranis. The result would thus have been continued infighting. Throughout the Afghan war, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar has never once tried to approach the ethnic minorities, even though they are opposed to Dr Najib.

The other factor which Tanai and Gulbuddin share is their belief in a highly centralised system of government. This is in contradistinction to Dr Najib's policy, which has offered progressively more autonomy to the minorities based outside Kabul.

On this side of the border a very senior Pakistani defence official reportedly arrived in Peshawar last Friday to discover what role Gulbuddin Hekmatyar had played in the attempted coup.

Some observers feel that Hekmatyar's emphatic support for Tanai, especially when contrasted to the AIG's hostile response, may have eventually harmed the chances of the coup succeeding. The rest of the Mujahideen see it essentially as a tussle between two factions of the PDPA, both communist and both inimical to the resistance forces.

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Najib will now exploit the post-coup scenario. The plotters are closely identified with the fundamentalist wing of the resistance. Gul Agha, the Afghan consul in Peshawar may not be very wrong when he speculates that, "this was the last attempt and the last move available to bring down Dr Najib. He now has more freedom to manoeuvre than ever before."

For Pakistan, the repercussions of the coup will probably be unpleasant. Ms Bhutto's government, having consistently advocated the necessity of a broad-based government in Kabul, has failed to convince the six other mujahidin parties to join the revolutionary council set up im-

mediately following the coup. Gen Beg has apparently also failed to persuade the Iranian government to support the Tanai-Hekmatyar putsch.

The Afghan Interim Government has already collapsed. The promised *Shura* is nowhere in sight. This leaves the smaller mujahidin groups with nothing to fight for. And continued Pakistani support for Hekmatyar would, in effect, mean a policy *voit face* and support for a group which has the narrowest possible base among the faction-ridden Afghan polity.

The Pakistan government's problems have been exacerbated by the silence of its allies regarding the coup. The US, Iran and Saudi Arabia have all refused to come out openly with any meaningful policy statements regarding the coup. Even more worrying is the silence of the Soviet Union. With Najib having lost a number of his generals and airmen, the Soviets are unlikely to stay quiet for long.

The Friday Times 3/15-21



NAJIB ESCAPES BY THE SKIN OF HIS TEETH PT - 3/10

KABUL — Less than 100 feet (30 metres) may have separated victory from defeat in the abortive coup d'état mounted here against the Soviet-backed regime of Najibullah this week.

That is how far away Najibullah was when a MiG-21 jet piloted by a rebel dropped the first bomb on the grounds of the Presidential Palace.

The bomb hit the nearest security tower outside the Gulistan Palace office of Najibullah, who was at that time in radio contact with coup leaders trying to persuade them to give up the attempt, officers said today. He was immediately whisked away from his office, where across the 10-foot (three-metre) high security wall housing the tower, to a safer place, they said.

The tower was reduced to rubble by the bomb, which destroyed a stretch of the security wall.

MiG-21s and SU-22s piloted by rebel officers flew several sorties over the palace during the day and night of heavy fighting which followed the first air raid at 1.30 in the afternoon Tuesday. But they failed to score a direct hit, officers said.

On Friday, journalists who were given a tour of the palace grounds saw cranes and bulldozers at work clearing the rubble and levelling the earth.

Trucks were carrying away debris as workers repaired damaged electricity cables and waterpipes.

"We used special anti-aircraft tactics," a military official said. "We did not allow the planes to come near the President's office. Our anti-aircraft guns were very active."

The vice president's offices, also located on the grounds of the

Presidential Palace complex, suffered very serious damage. The building's glass roof was totally destroyed and at least 17 bombs dropped in the vicinity of the vice president's office building.

Reporters were not allowed to go inside any of the buildings in the palace grounds, most of whose windows were boarded over or the cover shattered glass. President Najibullah has dismissed five leading members of his Politburo on the charges of rebellion.

The Afghan embassy in Moscow has confirmed that the Ambassador, Syed Mohammed Gulabzai, has been expelled from Afghanistan's ruling Communist Party. However, written confirmation of his expulsion is still awaited from Kabul.

This step indicates that President Najibullah has started the reorganisation of his Communist Party following an abortive coup attempt against his government.

All those expelled were members of Khaili group, including the Secretary of Central Committee, Mr. Niaz Mohammed. According to BBC, three leading Generals, who were heading the rebellion, have extended their cooperation to certain groups of Mujahideen.

Afghan Foreign Minister, Mr. Abdul Wakil, in a letter addressed to UN Secretary General Peres de Cuellar, has outlined the causes of the uprising giving details of those involved in this attempted coup.

The situation in Kabul is slowly returning to normal and the shortage of commodities has improved, reports BBC's correspondent in Kabul. Kabul administration's claim that Bagram Airport is fully under its control is doubtful. Fighting near

Jalalabad and Khost has intensified and Mujahideen are exerting more pressure.

Unconfirmed diplomatic reports reveal that Gen. Tanai holds a number of state secrets of Afghanistan. Now it is upto the Mujahideen to utilise these secrets in such a way which could lead to their victory. However, whereabouts of General Tanai and other Politburo members dismissed on Friday are still not known.

With the arrest of the division commander and chief of Khad in Balkh province by the general commander of the northern zone who is pro-Najib, fighting between Khaili and Purcham has erupted in the Balkh province. — March 10, 1990



Afghanistan: bloodshed will not lead to any political solution

NAJIBULLAH has managed to retain his hold over Kabul; Tanai has lost his best chance so far to capture power; Hikmatyar has acquired some trained military officers and officers and a coup de grace to the Afghan Interim Government; Pakistan, USA, and Soviet Union have been left to wonder as to where they go from here and the prospects for a political settlement have become darker than before. This, in sum, seems to be the result of happenings in Afghanistan over the past few days.

It is now possible to have a tentative appreciation of the latest bid to topple the Najibullah regime. The trouble apparently started in autumn 1989 when the PDPA central committee started evolving its strategy to woo neutral elements, exiles, local military commanders and mujahideen factions to promote what it called national reconciliation.

The task was undertaken by the high command without its having ended the feud between the Khalq and Parcham factions that had contributed more than anything else to the prolongation of the conflict in Afghanistan. A powerful Khalq leader, Gen Gulabzoi, had been shifted from Interior Ministry to a foreign assignment in November 1989 and a few months later, in the summer of 1989, another ambitious general, Shahnavaz Tanai, almost lost his job as Defence Minister amidst rumours that a plot to overthrow Najibullah was being uncovered. However, Najib kept trying his balancing act. He brought back Watanay as Prime Minister, rehabilitated Tanai as Defence Minister, and included Babrak Karmal's brother in the cabinet.

Further differences emerged in the central committee on the question of offering concessions to the mujahideen, especially their inclusion in the interim regime. However, Najibullah announced a 21-point plan leading to the establishment of an elected government in the country around mid-November 1989.

One of the differences within PDPA was heard in Peshawar in November when Gulbadin Hikmatyar declared that the mujahideen and generals coming from the Kabul regime could set up a new interim government. By mujahideen obviously meant his own faction, Hezb-i-Islami, only because in his same statement he reiterated his break with Afghan Interim Government (AIG) because it had failed to hold mandatory elections or to receive a vote of confidence from the Shooraa, and declared that the seven-party alliance had become redundant. He also gave indications that he was prepared to accept the leadership of any PDPA faction that could depose Najibullah and join the mujahideen in taking over Kabul, thus deviating from the AIG position that it would not grant PDPA, even minus Najib, any role in the interim arrangement.

Soon afterwards came reports that over a hundred military

officers had been arrested on suspicions of plotting a coup. Western sources asserted that most of those detained had affiliations with the Khalq faction and Khalq alleged that they had links with Hikmatyar. General Tanai's name was mentioned as the leader of the plotters and there were rumours that he too had been placed under house arrest. These rumours were denied by the prime minister and some days later Tanai appeared at a public function and received compliments from Najib himself.

During December 1989 and January 1990 two forces were thus at work in Afghanistan. On the one hand, the Najibullah regime sought to exploit its better control over the cities and highways, and pacification of some guerrilla groups, to step up its campaign for negotiated peace and to whittle down opposition to Najib's continuance in power during the transition. On the other hand, the Tanai-Hikmatyar axis explored possibilities of capturing power in a coup.

As a result, Washington, which had been showing signs of giving up hopes of a military solution and making its policy a little flexible, reverted to its two-track approach. It did not want to be left out in the cold if the Najib regime consolidated itself and won over more elements from the opposition and, therefore, diluted its demand for Najib's removal before any other initiatives could be considered. At the same time, it did not overlook the possibilities offered by new cracks in PDPA. As a consequence, the proposal for a negative symmetry, that is, simultaneous stoppage of arms supplies by the US and USSR to their favoured factions, was shelved. The decision was to defer political solution until the new military officers arrested in the induction of Tanai-Hikmatyar alliance into power—had been tried.

This option was exercised on Tuesday March 6 when Afghan air force started bombing the presidential palace and communication centres in Kabul. It is not clear whether the coup bid materialised in response to any pre-emptive action by Najib against Tanai or whether the latter believed the hour for Najib's ouster had struck. The latter is more likely in view of the fact that the trial of officers arrested in December was about to begin. There may be something in Hikmatyar's declarations that AIG was dead, issued a few days before the coup attempt. Besides, the anti-Najib faction in PDPA must have been alarmed by reports that the US had agreed to Najib's serving as interim head of Kabul regime during the transition and by Mr. Iqbal Akhund's reported remark that Pakistan might go along with Washington on this point.

The exact size of the forces mobilised by Tanai to overthrow Najib is not known but by Tuesday night it was clear that the coup bid had not succeeded. The fact that Tanai, his family, and several well-known associates had fled across the frontier before evening fell was a fair indication that the Hikmatyar lobby in Pakistan

could not have failed to notice, despite announcements to the effect that the mujahideen forces were knocking at the gates of Kabul.

The first reports of the coup bid caused panic and excitement all round. Moscow was rattled but did not try to gloss over its anxiety. Washington too seemed surprised but kept its cool and declined to predict the outcome. Hikmatyar came out into the open in backing Tanai while AIG leaders feebly proclaimed their dissociation with Hikmatyar and their refusal to take sides in the PDPA factional fight.

Although the situation is still quite fluid, a few broad conclusions are possible.

The Najib regime has been wounded. How seriously, one cannot say. The reprieve he has won may be short, or may not be very short; it all depends on how he and his allies regroup themselves. He will most probably try to hush down the remaining dissidents within the party. This will make him weaker in terms of contraction of the party base but also perhaps make the regime more compact. The regime will also try to increase its military capability by arming more party volunteers and by further strengthening the secret service. It is also likely to speed up its efforts to forge agreements with commanders not aligned with the Peshawar-based groups and exiles, a process that could be helped by the new polarisation among Mujahideen ranks and by the latest understanding between Afghanistan and Moscow and the trans-based guerrilla groups and the Najib regime.

Hezb-i-Islami of Hikmatyar has received some strength. Its alliance with Tanai and an undisclosed number of his undisclosed supporters, if the present reading of foreign observers is correct, will increase its potential to harass the Najib regime, reinforcing the position of hawks in the US and elsewhere to resist move towards an all-Afghan dialogue and search for a non-military solution. But Hikmatyar's accession to greater strength will be the cost of AIG's demise. The seven-party alliance will probably collapse. While the factions led by Sayyaf, Muhammad and Khalis may become Hikmatyar's camp-followers for or out of other reasons, the three remaining factions in the alliance will despair of finding a place for themselves in a settlement forced by either side in the Najib-Tanai tussle. They may be forced to rally openly behind Zahir Shah or to seek accommodation with the regime in a settlement forced by either side in the Najib-Tanai tussle. They may be forced to rally openly behind Zahir Shah or to seek accommodation with the regime in a settlement forced by either side in the Najib-Tanai tussle.

That Tanai and Hikmatyar can embrace one another why can't Gallani and Najib do the same? Moreover, past history shows that whenever Hikmatyar has sought to assert as the top chief of the Mujahideen forces the commanders operating inside Afghanistan have tilted the other way. And unless the mujahideen enjoy the confidence of the most other commanders they are unlikely to become strong enough to defeat the Kabul troops in open combat.



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The war between Kabul troops and the Tanai-Hikmatyar force will intensify, adversely affecting the progress of proposals aimed at a negotiated settlement. Many more Afghans will be killed and the agony of non-combatants will be prolonged, the refugees will remain stuck in Pakistan and the strains on the host country's economy will further increase. The pressure on the Bhutto government to reaffirm its single-track policy of backing any anti-Najib forces will mount, but it will yield to such pressures only at grave peril to itself. Its very survival demands continued refusal to be drawn into a matter that concerns the Afghan people alone.

Nobody can predict the outcome of the new military situation in Afghanistan—in the short run in any case. The Kabul troops may still be able to defend the cities. Najib may fail to hold the PDPA and military apparatus together and may be replaced by some other leader, who may be equally unacceptable to the kingmakers or may may reverse Najib's policy of negotiated peace. That will mean continued bloodshed.

The alternative scenario is no less grim. Suppose the Tanai-Hikmatyar forces do succeed in breaking through the Najib

regime's defences, although for this they will have to overcome US reluctance to supply them with means of aerial combat and long-range bombardment, against which it is under warning from the Soviet Union.

An important question is 'How comfortable as bedfellows can Tanai and Hikmatyar or any other Mujahideen leader be?' Gen Tanai is reported to have fallen out with Najib because he stood for total victory over the mujahideen. If he could not get along with Najib and Watanay, how long will he stick with fundamentalists?

Above all, in the new phase, an all-out war has been forced on both sides. The message is that the side that loses will be completely physically liquidated. That is the road to large-scale massacre. Any change that will come about in this orgy of bloodshed will not be durable. It will not solve anything.

The best way anybody can help the Afghan people win peace is to resist the temptation to see too much in the events of the past few days and revert to the basic steps necessary for a political settlement.

PT 3/10

Speakers doubt credentials of Kabul regime, AIG

PESHAWAR, March 21: Some speakers at a seminar on Afghanistan which concluded here Wednesday maintained that both the ruling PDPA in Kabul and the Peshawar-based Afghan Interim Government were part of a new oligarchy with doubtful credentials to represent the Afghans.

The two day seminar was held in memory of Dr. Louis Dupree, an American scholar who was considered an authority on Afghanistan. It was stated in Peshawar University's Area Study Centre (Central Asia) under the auspices of Writers Union of Afghanistan (WUFA) and association of professors of universities of Afghanistan.

The most articulate speaker Wednesday was an Afghan anthropologist Prof. Ashraf Ghani, who teaches at John Hopkins University in the United States. Speaking in a session on the "Impact of foreign aid on state and society", he said nobody had asked the Afghans whether they reposed confidence in the two sets of leadership which had entrenched itself in Kabul and Peshawar. He pointed out that the PDPA regime was first propped up by 115,000 Soviet troops and was now being sustained in power by massive assistance by Moscow. Same was true, he stressed, of the resistance leadership which had imposed itself on the Afghan people. "An engineering college dropout, junior lecturers posing as professors, a small time shopkeeper doubling as a Mullah, an imam of a mosque in Denmark -- have ordained the right for themselves to lead the Afghans", remarked the outspoken anthropologist.

While highlighting the need for greater cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan, Ashraf Ghani cautioned Islamabad not to attempt to impose its will in Kabul. He said Pakistan should consider "Afghanistan's sovereignty as a basis of cooperation in line with the late President Ayub Khan's stress on 'Friends not Masters' which

formed title of his book. He felt instability in either of the two neighbouring Islamic countries would affect the other.

Ashraf Ghani proposed that a new Marshall Plan for reconstruction of war ravaged Afghanistan should also include Pakistan since their economies were inter-linked and could be made more beneficial through closer cooperation. He remarked that Durand Line ought to be a zone of cooperation rather than being a line of separation. He thought Afghanistan's potential as producer of hydroelectric power could help in overcoming Pakistan's chronic energy crisis while a new road-rail link between Karachi and Kabul and beyond would open up a big trade route to Central Asia. Moreover, he said the two countries could coordinate efforts to fight drug abuse.

The Afghan anthropologist demanded that five per cent of the foreign aid for Afghanistan's reconstruction should be set aside for Kabul University while three to four per cent should be earmarked to develop a free Press. He also called for inputs to ensure the growth and autonomy of the country's judiciary and banking sectors. He also laid stress on providing equal rights to Afghan women and ensuring proper development of the countryside. "Ordinary Afghans too should become beneficiaries of foreign aid instead of doing out funds to the oligarchy", stressed Ashraf Ghani.

Well known Pakistani journalist, M.B. Naqvi also said that PDPA and AIG were not acceptable to the large majority of Afghans. He said PDPA by offering to share power with the Opposition conceded its shortcomings but the AIG was not even ready to admit this fact and kept demanding absolute power. He thought all armed parties to the Afghan conflict may already have missed the peace bus since Mujahideen commanders posing as warlords were now beginning to

call the shots and were likely to reject all agreements concluded without their consent. He suggested that Australian Premier Bob Hawke's peace formula for Kampuchea could also be applied to Afghanistan provided the three to four billion dollars needed for the upkeep of UN Peace Force and holding elections were made available.

Austrian Relief Committee's Engineer Nasim Jawad cautioned that Afghans would have to struggle even longer to free themselves of dependency on foreign aid than they did to oust the Soviets from Afghanistan. He said foreign donors should be inspired by the idea to "help the Afghans help themselves" as any other motive or too much stress on expatriate aid workers would prove counter productive. He lamented that the Afghan war had pushed Afghanistan backward by several decades as seven million Afghans were displaced, its economy was shattered, literacy rate had dropped, and dependence on foreign aid, especially among refugees, had grown.

Prof. Nancy Tapper of the University of London contended that women had taken an active part in income generation activities even though their contribution was not quantified.

A United Nations official, Michael Keating said his organisation had a difficult job on its hands due to the complexities of ethnic and tribal contradictions in Afghanistan. He however said that UN by providing assistance in areas controlled by both sides in the Afghan conflict was performing a rare task. He said complaints of UN aid being slow in forthcoming should be viewed in context of the unsettled conditions in Afghanistan due to an ongoing war.

Dr. Thomas Eighmy of USIS, Islamabad - estimated Afghanistan's present population at more than 12 million after conducting exhaustive research. He remarked that Afghanistan re-

mained the world's biggest demographic enigma as correct data about it was difficult to obtain in the absence of a census. Erika Knabe from West Germany and Margaret Mills from the United States also spoke in this session.

Other speakers Wednesday were Fidaullah Sahrani, Micheline Gentile, Abdul Wazir Nader, Saaduddin Shpoon, Berni Glazer, Haider Raza, Hameed Kounenberg, Mohammad Nazif Mohmand, and Nazif Shahrani.

THE MUSLIM

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By MAQBOOL MALIK

Abdul Wassay Najimi, while speaking on the occasion spoke at length on the plight of archaeological sites in Afghanistan. He noted that many historical antiquities were feared shipped to the Soviet Union during the past 11 years of war. The remaining sites are in danger owing to the devastating war. He said that Kandahar province besides other sites in different parts of Afghanistan has totally been destroyed. He pointed out that Pakistan had emerged the major market of the Afghan antiquities brought for selling by mujahideen from bordering provinces of Afghanistan. An historical remain in Nooristan was demolished by the mujahideen and assets were disposed off there.

He stressed the need for educating the Afghan people about the value of their heritage. United Nations and other international agencies should make efforts to preserve and maintain the historic remains of Afghanistan.

A Pakistani archaeologist Professor Fidaullah Sahrani noted that the 12-year of war in Afghanistan had totally destroyed the cultural history of Afghanistan. He argued that Afghanistan's cultural history was more rich and vital than its political history.

Yet another Afghan Professor Nazir Shahrani dwelt at length on the Islamic movement in Afghanistan in relations to with cultural history. Professor Shahrani noted that the Afghan society underwent a sharp contradiction in its relationship with the state prior to the contracted war. He argued that previously there existed a fragile relationship between the society and the state but the status quo was broken in 1978, when a serious question arose as to how legitimate was the state. After constant contemplation jihad was the focal point against the alien values imposed on the Afghan nation, he maintained. He substantiated that religiously educated cadres in colleges and universities in Afghanistan started jihad for the Islamic laws.

U.S., USSR to rationalise policies on Afghanistan

By MAQBOOL MALIK

In their bid to contain global resurgence of Islam, both the United States and the Soviet Union are likely to reach an understanding to rationalise their policies towards Afghanistan during the forthcoming superpowers summit in Washington in June.

These observations were made by a leading columnist and renowned writer, Mr. Mushahid Hus-

sain, during his presentation at a two-day seminar on "social and cultural prospects for Afghanistan" opened in Peshawar on Tuesday.

He said two glaring mistakes Pakistan had committed over a period of one year. He recalled that Pakistan made a political blunder when the Soviet Union wished to deal with it on Afghanistan issue and it was when Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze visited

Pakistan in February last year, just before the Soviet troops withdrawal from Afghanistan.

The second mistake according to Mushahid Hussain, Pakistan made over the period of one year was the manipulated formation of Afghan interim government, he observed was understood as a non-starter. The recent mistake Pakistan made was biased projection of the coup attempt in Kabul by the Pakistani media, Mushahid

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
The bloody hands of Afghan resistance

Long after Soviet troops withdrew from Afghanistan, the United States continued to condemn human rights violations by the Afghan government. The thrust of its criticism was on the Soviet Union's continued supply of arms to the Kabul regime — arms that, according to US officials, were being used in 'indiscriminate attacks on civilians' in areas under the Resistance's control. However, the Bush administration completely ignored the human rights violations by the Resistance. According to a report of the Human Rights Watch released on January 4, abuses by the Resistance include summary execution of prisoners, politically motivated killings of relief workers and refugees, intellectuals, and indiscriminate attacks on civilians in government-controlled areas.

Tracing the human rights violations by the Resistance, the HRW report says that despite proddings from the Bush administration to broaden the base of the Afghan Interim Government, rebel leaders continued persecuting supporters of the former King Zahir Shah who 'still commands the loyalty of a large proportion of the refugee population'. These supporters, members of the Afghan Mellat (a Pushtun nationalist party), and relief-agency employees, continue to be threatened, and a number of them have recently been killed. The HRW has collected evidence indicating that 'many of the killings are the work of the more radical of the Islamic resistance groups, including the Hezb e Islami led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the man who has received the bulk of the US and Saudi military assistance.

Member groups of the AIG, fighting for control over the refugee population in Pakistan where relief agencies wield considerable influence, have also instigated, and even directed, attacks on relief assistants working in co-ordination with the various Resistance factions. Two victims during the year were Mohammad Zakir, a field worker for the International Committee of the Red Cross and a member of Afghan Mellat, who was murdered on August 28 in Peshawar, and Abdul Farah Wudud, an employee of the UN World Food Programme

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH has just published its findings on the violation of human rights by the US and Pakistan-supported Afghan Resistance groups in Afghanistan. Aamer Ahmed Khan reviews the record



in Peshawar, who disappeared on September 3 after leaving his office to meet with a member of Hekmatyar's Hezb e Islami, the report records.

According to the report of the UN Special Rapporteur on Afghanistan, the US administration has failed to investigate the attacks on refugees by members of the Resistance, which 'increased notably after June'.

Despite the fact that Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hezb e Islami was involved in most cases of attacks on refugees and aid workers, the organisation continues to receive large amounts of aid. The US administration had stopped Pakistan's ISI from providing any American aid to Hekmatyar in November 1989, but since Saudi Arabia had imposed no such ban Hekmatyar's group remained unaffected. Of the US \$75m in aid given to the Resistance since the US ban on Hekmatyar, Saudi Arabia's share was US\$ 435 m, 'all of which had gone to Hekmatyar's faction'. If the US was sincere about stopping aid to Hekmatyar, it should have put pressure on Saudi Arabia as well. But according to the HRW report, 'there is no indication that such pressure has been exerted'.

In fact, the US administration does not even touch upon Hekmatyar's role in the Afghan war. In its public statements, it has disregarded evidence that the Hezb e Islami is using 'its favoured position to incite rival mujahideen groups and other

refugees'. After the summary execution of the Jamiat prisoners loyal to Ahmed Shah Massoud by Hezb e Islami, State Department spokesman Richard Boucher was asked if the Afghan guerrillas were required to respect human rights as a precondition for receiving US aid. 'I don't see how that comes into play here', he replied. Asked about continued fighting in August, Boucher stated that the US had 'discussed with the Resistance the importance of unity and continues to urge them to work toward common goals'. This indicates that the Bush administration's concern with unity among the resistance outweighs its concern over summary executions and other abuses by the resistance, 'even when the abusive organisations are backed by millions of dollars of US military aid'.

Pakistan's ISI is also a partner to such abuses since it started pressuring the Resistance commanders to shell Afghan cities. 'Far from pinpointing military targets, this shelling has been almost uniformly indiscriminate, in violation of the laws of war protecting civilians', says the report. Following the Soviet withdrawal, the ISI approached the Shooras of mujahideen commanders in Qandhar province and urged them to shell the city of Qandhar and its airport, promising weapons in return. The commanders were willing to shell the airport but not the city, unless civilians could be evacuated, which has not been possible.

The ISI then recruited other commanders who were willing to, and did, shell the city; they were formed into a second Shooras, ultimately bringing about the collapse of the first.

The Bush administration has failed to use its influence with Pakistan to prevent this kind of pressure on resistance commanders to undertake indiscriminate attacks on civilians, the report says.

The Resistance used US-supplied Egyptian SAKR-20 and SAKR-30 rockets in attacks on Kabul and Jalalabad in 1989 — rockets that are so inaccurate that casualties resulting from such attacks were mostly civilian. Defending rocket attacks on cities at a June 15 hearing before the House Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Howard Schaffer stated that the Afghan government had 'sage-managed activities for some American journalists', who had then reported growing anti-American sentiment among civilians in Kabul. State Department officials maintain that steps were taken by the Resistance to minimise civilian casualties. However, independent sources including the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) have confirmed that high numbers of civilian casualties continue.

When pressed by the HRW to respond to allegations that the US-supplied cluster munitions have been used in attacks on civilian areas of Kabul and other cities, the administration refused to comment. The use of such weapons has been reported by Western journalists based in Kabul as well as by the US Special Rapporteur for Afghanistan. But despite the seriousness of these reports, the US administration has not investigated the allegations against the Resistance nor stated publicly its opposition to the use of such weapons.

In his address to the Third Committee of the UN General Assembly on November 27, US Ambassador to the UN Thomas Pickering cited 'overwhelming evidence of continuing massive violations of human rights by the Kabul authorities, including political killings, disappearances, torture, summary executions, arbitrary arrests and imprisonment

under unacceptable conditions'. But according to the HRW, 'the statement appears to be based on conditions of a few years ago, and does not take into account changes in Afghan government practices which have been reported by such independent sources as Amnesty International and the US Special Rapporteur'.

Apart from the misrepresentation of truth, exaggerated accusations of this sort have also served to divert international attention from serious abuses that are actually occurring in Kabul. The HRW report mentions one incident where a political opponent of the Kabul regime was arrested and later disappeared. The security laws in Kabul, says the report, define 'crimes' in such broad terms that they can easily be used against political opponents.

Mohammad Mohsen Formoly, a member of the Afghan Academy of Science, was arrested for his political activities and later disappeared, but after investigations by the Special Rapporteur, Formoly was found to be in detention at the Shasharak interrogation centre.

The Special Rapporteur's report also describes the continuing serious mistreatment of prisoners under interrogation, and states that while prison conditions have improved for convicted prisoners, those under investigation are kept in conditions 'that fall far short of minimum standards'. Prisoners sentenced to terms of less than 10 years are denied the right of appeal. Afghan government sources have stated that some 2,600 political prisoners are currently in jail, among them members of resistance forces who have been tried as 'terrorists'.

The US administration's call for an end to these and all other continuing human rights violations by the Afghan government, including indiscriminate attacks on civilians, can only be taken seriously if the US itself adheres to the principle of fundamental rights. If the US continues to ignore the violations by the rebel groups funded and armed by the Kabul regime would naturally ring hollow. Since the US has consistently refused to link the question of arms supply to the issue of human rights, it cannot expect world opinion to turn against the Kabul regime alone on this issue. The initiative must come from the United States because it claims to be the champion of human rights all over the world.

Conditions ideal for Afghan refugees return: UN mission

By Sadiq Jafri

ISLAMABAD—A high-level mission of the United Nations on Tuesday evening issued the first green signal to the Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran to the effect that they could begin going back home, by describing the current conditions in Afghanistan as "ideal" for the repatriation and rehabilitation of the refugees.

The Inter-Agency Mission of the United Nations declared that the already-delayed repatriation of refugees could not be delayed further and all the parties concerned should join their efforts for voluntary and safe return of over five million refugees staying in Pakistan and Iran.

The announcement was made at a news conference here jointly addressed by Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, the United Nations Co-ordinator for Afghanistan, Mr. Thorvald Stoltenberg, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Mr. James C. Ingram, Executive Director of the World Food Programme, and Mr. Benon Sevan, Personal Representative of the Secretary General in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

At the news conference, which was abruptly called off without allowing most of the newsmen to take part, the four members of the Mission explained progress in their respective areas of activity. They were unanimous in saying that repatriation and rehabilitation of refugees had to be started without waiting for total peace in Afghanistan.

Under the Geneva Accord, the United Nations was supposed to work on the return of refugees from the next day of the total pullout of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, on Feb. 15, 1989. Without particularly mentioning the Accord and the delay in the repatriation work thereof, the members of the Mission said that the various organisations of the United Nations were facing shortage of funds for achieving the mammoth task of the return of refugees.

The news release distributed among journalists said it was the joint responsibility of the United Nations, the Government of Pakistan and above all, Afghan leaders to commit their efforts jointly to ensure that voluntary repatriation can start in 1990 and that most of the remaining refugees can return to their homes as soon as possible thereafter.

The Mission, during its stay in Pakistan and Afghanistan from March 25 to 27, called on President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Prime Minister Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto and Foreign Minister Hanif Qureshi. It also met with officials at a meeting chaired by the Adviser to the Prime Minister on Foreign Affairs and National Security, Mr. Iqbal Khan. The Mission called on President Najibullah and met with the

Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Abdul Wakil. The members of the mission also had a working session with concerned Cabinet ministers, chaired by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Mr. S.A. Keshatmand.

Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan said at the news conference that during his previous visits to the area he had witnessed real progress taken by various parties concerned. "But now politics seems to have perceived humanity." He said there were times when it seemed there was no light at the end of the tunnel for refugees. "We had to wait for long, until big changes took place."

The Prince said: "It is easier to open (refugee) camps than to close them." Previously there was a total stalemate, he said, adding that now the whole set-up seemed to be ideal. However, he said, over five million refugees cannot be sent back overnight.

Describing the current prevailing conditions in Afghanistan as "encouraging," he said there are certain areas in that country where "zones of peace and tranquillity" can be created where there is comparative calm. "We have established several UN offices in provinces like Kunar, Herat, Paktia and Mazar-i-Sharif. Fifty UN officials and 200 locals are working there. But we have to host more UN flags all over Afghanistan."

Most of the time of the news conference was wasted by foreign correspondents who wanted the news to dwell at length over certain issues. For example, a questioner wanted him to explain the dilapidated condition of the city of Kabul after the recent bombing during Tana'i revolt. Another correspondent asked him to allow NGOs to work inside Afghanistan on behalf of the UN, which he rejected outright. Yet another questioner said something in reply to which Mr. Benon Sevan had to spell out the scope and the role of UN.

Mr. Thorvald Stoltenberg, UN High Commissioner for Refugees, while speaking at the news conference, said during open and frank talks with Pakistani authorities, he had stressed the need to get started on the return of refugees, but only if it is voluntary. Prior to that, he stressed that like all other refugees of the world, they want to go back. My view was shared by Pakistani authorities."

Elaborating on the money problems, he said the UNHCR needed a total of \$ 750 million to return the refugees problem all over the world. But we have about \$ 500 million.

The shortage, he said, would influence the UNHCR's ability to provide help to Afghan refugees.

"But the present situation of refugees could not go on forever. The sooner we start repatriation the more effect it'll make on building of peace and also on funding," he remarked.

Mr. James C. Ingram,



Executive Director of the World Food Programme, which is responsible for mobilisation and delivery of food for Afghan refugees, said his organisation found it very difficult to know the exact number of the refugees. "Anyhow, somehow we have got to help them in 1990. But it cannot go on forever. It's already 11 years."

He said during his talks with Pakistani authorities, he had told the other side that the WFP needed more resources to feed the refugees and also help establish conditions inside Afghanistan to make it possible for them to return in peace and safety.

The news release issued by the Mission said: The Mission members stressed throughout their stay that their presence together at this time symbolised the determination of the Secretary General of the United Nations and his colleagues to contribute collectively towards peace and reconstruction in Afghanistan. Their discussions were based on the 1990 UN plans of action which elaborates on the coordinated efforts by the UN system to provide humanitarian and economic assistance to the Afghan people.

It further said that in this connection, they noted that parts of Afghanistan have been free from armed conflict for some time. The United Nations now occupies a position to focus its humanitarian assistance activities in "zones of tranquillity." The current prevailing conditions allow for an increased presence of UN officials and more systematic large-scale rehabilitation programmes. These programmes will be focussed particularly on the needs of displaced people who are unable to return home.

The political and democratic developments which have affected many parts of the world and accelerated so dramatically over the last six months will hopefully create a climate favourable to peace. The beginning of rehabilitation and reconstruction work in many parts of Afghanistan now offers new opportunities for at least some refugees to return voluntarily in security and dignity.

Refugee situations should not be allowed to stagnate. It is the joint responsibility of the United Nations, the Government of Pakistan.

While expressing appreciation for the support and assistance given to Afghan refugees by the host countries, the mission members pledged the full support of their organisations to the efforts of all parties involved in attempts to bring the conflict to an end and to promote voluntary repatriation of the refugees as well as the reconstruction of the country, the release concluded.

Afghan mujahideen hold elections in Kunar

PESHAWAR—For the first time the Mujahideen started holding election Thursday on March 1 for Kunar province, which fell to Mujahideen in October 1988, to form a 100-member Shura which will elect a Governor for the province, Afghan News Agency reported.

Twelve Mujahideen parties have announced their participation in election process. However, earlier, the Afghan Mujahideen interim government had rejected the election for Mula and asked for non-participation of their respective commanders and followers, Maulvi Abdul Qayyum, added.

The process of election will be completed in a ten-day period and an eight-member committee will observe the whole process.

Meanwhile, Maulvi Younus Khalis, chief of the Hezbi Islami (Khalis Group) and Interim Minister in AIG, in an interview with BBC has said that holding of these elections will further deteriorate the already tense situation in Afghanistan and those who were conducting elections would be responsible for its negative results. On the other side, Eng. Gulbadin Hekmatyar, head of Hezbi-Islami, a Chairman has strongly opposed the holding of elections in Kunar and termed it a right decision.

"Only through elections the current problems of Afghanistan can be solved", Hekmatyar said.

A team of journalists visited some of the polling stations in Assadabad and outside the capital. A total of 40 votes were polled till 1240 hours. However, a large number of voters were standing in a queue outside the polling station and were waiting for their turn. It is interesting to note that any person of the Kunar province could cast his vote from any polling station. However, the voter had to mention his place (balga) on the ballot paper before polling his vote.

There was no list of the voters at any polling station that was why it was difficult to ascertain the number of electorates. The age limit for the voters is 15 while the female were not allowed to exercise their right of franchise.

Chief Election Commissioner, Maulvi Ghulam Rabbani, Governor Kunar Qazi Ihsanullah and secretary Election Commission, briefed the journalists about the election procedure. They said that a total of 3 lakh ballot papers had been printed and the counting would start from Saturday (tomorrow) and it was expected that counting would be completed within one week, they said.

When asked as to what would be the function of the newly elected Shura, Qazi Ihsanullah said that it would help a lot in improving the law and order situation besides organising the relief on sound footings and execution of developmental works in the province. He said "We need a forum where we can solve our problems peacefully and through negotiations".

PT

then it would continue to function. However, if the members expressed dissatisfaction with their election, the new Shura would be held for the new Shura. — March 3, 1990

the newly elected Shura would be for a period of two years and after that, the members would be elected. Shura would critically analyse its performance and if the performance found satisfactory,

to another question, he said that hold elections without their support and co-operation. The first fire of the Afghan and spread to whole Afghanistan, he added.

for about 17 months (AIG) for will do something constructive in Kunar, and we will hold elections and the said that we wanted to show them that we could

He was very much critical of the Afghan interim government (AIG) and said that AIG was only limited to Islamabad and Peshawar and it (AIG) had no working relationship for service. We waited for them

Gory sights at Muj hospital

Twice mud-walled compounds face one another across the road to the border, much the same — except for their size — as the other fortress-like dwellings dotting the Kurram Valley. Squat guard towers at each corner overlook the highway and the surrounding fields.

Just north loom the west-ernmost peaks of the Orakzai agency. A half-hour's walk south rise the first rugged hills of Waziristan. Due west, the sun sinks into the dusty road, haze obscuring the mountains along the Afghan frontier.

The men who guard the gates and man the towers wear blue uniforms. They wear the color of granite and dry grass. Their faces are as wind-and weather-worn as the surrounding mountainsides. But this is no den of devils, no stronghold of some drug baron's private army. It's a hospital, and all you have to do to get past security is get hurt, or fall ill and ask for help.

Sometimes — often in the middle of the night — the emergency-room siren howls, alerting the staff to yet another visitor in economic. Until last year, the distant murmur and grumble of bombardments

to the west would herald an impending rush of torn bodies and desperate relatives, packed tortuously into overcrowded patient trucks.

Nowadays the doctors and nurses see fewer combat wounds. The injured usually come one by one, from the villages of local tribes or from nearby refugee camps. They come burned, cut and battered by almost every means besides combat. Children in particular seem to fall into sawdust, off roofs, and in from of speeding vehicles. But most — men, women and children — come in sick, not hurt. They suffer from scabies, impetigo, dysentery and more fearful plagues, all of which the Frontier shares with other dirty poverty-stricken places around the world.

This is a surgical, not a medical hospital. In layman's terms, the staff here specialize

in treating injuries rather than illnesses. So if a patient is a very sick, he or she is referred to hospitals better equipped to deal with disease.

The hospital was built four years ago by a private American organization. The founder's cause was the Afghan resistance. Specifically, they meant to give the mujahideen a way to fight back in what had become a war of attrition. Doctors and hospitals treating the people in the Afghan countryside were few, and those few were prime targets of Soviet troops and bombers. Because of the resulting lack of care, Afghans were dying of wounds which would hardly get one admitted to a hospital in the West.

So the hospital opened as part of a training centre for mujahideen doctors. In a six-month course, hand-picked young resistance fighters learned how to treat their wounded best. The hospital was a perfect laboratory for the medical-to-see. They learned physical examination, wound care and the like, supervised by skilled surgeons and other

medical workers, both fellow Afghans and volunteers from the west.

Almost from the start, however, the course began evolving away from a strict emphasis on "combat medicine," towards tending those ailments upon which even guerrilla medicals spend most of their time: tuberculosis, dysentery and the other infections spread by filth and perpetuated by ignorance.

The Soviets are gone; nowadays ignorance is the enemy. Many in the Frontier's large expatriate medical community say that from a health standpoint, it has been the real enemy all along. In political terms it is just one more vulnerability of an under-developed society.

Up and down the frontier — and on both sides of it — the story is the same. Pakistani, Afghan and western medical workers recount hair-raising examples of local wound-care techniques. One man, who had chopped open his leg with an axe while cutting wood, had the gash packed full of sawdust; the local staff he time he sought medical help. Another, a tribesman wounded in a blood-fed, arrived at the hospital with a several-days-old dead bird strapped over the wound as a poultice.

"I wouldn't have believed

it," said an American, "if I hadn't already read about it in Pennell's book." Theodore L. Pennell, an English missionary, ran a Christian mission hospital in Bannu for many years around the turn of the century. His experiences led him to write *Among the Wild Tribes of the North-West Frontier*, wherein he mentioned bird poultices in passing. Such stubborn habits are just another example of how resistant the Frontier and its people can be to change.

Dr Haider, an Afghan who directs the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan's medical efforts, suggested that the medical attention focused on Afghan refugees has raised their standard of health above that of rural Pakistanis in the NWFP.

"Years ago many Pakistanis in the health department here saw the refugees as a threat to the local population. They were afraid the Afghans would infect people here with diseases like tuberculosis." Now, he said, his Pakistani colleagues are quick to admit that the refugees generally are in far better health than the locals.

The aid community has never been blind to the importance of education. It is axiomatic that outsiders have to

teach people to take care of themselves, or the standard of medical care will simply fall back to where it was when the foreigners leave. The presence of "health visitors" and the like in the refugee camps has unquestionably contributed to the refugees' improved health. These "visitors" are generally refugees themselves, trained to hammer in basic points such as the importance of good sanitation, and of getting help as soon as one gets sick.

But the victories in this more subtle war are still hard-fought and limited. Anybody who has travelled with mujahideen in Afghanistan can attest that few seem to have grasped the basic link between filth and disease. "You will have noticed that they defecate right next to the rivers from which they drink," remarked Dr Haider.

"They always wait until they're really sick before they come in," remarked a frustrated Canadian nurse of her patients. "Especially the women." In the countryside *chadai* and *chadai* still hold sway. Some women won't let themselves be examined thoroughly for gynecological complaints, even by another woman, until they are desperately ill. . . .

John M Jennings

February 22-28, 1990
The Friday Times

No Muj in the valley

Long after the uprising in Occupied Kashmir flared up, rumours of Afghan involvement in the valley remain rumours. A TFT Exclusive from John M Jennings

PESHAWAR — While bullets flew, bombs blew and anti-Delhi shovels filled the air in Held Kashmir, the scent of intrigue lay heavy in the narrow alleyways of Peshawar.

Even before the leader of an Islamic Kashmiri resistance group, calling themselves Allah's Tigres, proclaimed his allegiance to Afghan guerrilla chief Gulbuddin Hekmatyar in an interview in the Indian press, rumours of Afghan involvement in Kashmir had begun drifting through refugee camps and colonies.

Weeks later the rumours remain just that. But they are firmly believed by many refugees and mujahideen. Those Pakistanis who had always questioned Ziaul Haq's motives for welcoming the refugees tend to agree.

As with all good conspiracy theories, it is quite plausible at first glance. Muslims yet unborn at Partition have been reliving the events of 1947 as though they were participants. Therefore the Pukhtoon *taskars* which once nearly won Kashmir for Pakistan are fresh in everyone's mind again.

Furthermore, at last two Western journalists last autumn sneaked across the Amu Darya with Afghan guerrillas proselytising in Soviet Tajikistan. So if Afghans were slipping across yet another frontier to egg on or even fight alongside the Kashmiri rebels, it would hardly be unprecedented.

One prominent Pakistani scholar remarked that "Zia was the biggest rascal we ever had. He let those people (the refugees) in and gave them weapons because he

wanted an armed force, loyal only to him, that would crush local politics in the NWFP. Now, with Zia gone, the Afghans are a handy armed force catering to the adventurist whims of the dictator's untamed backers within the political opposition."

An Afghan intellectual and journalist agreed in part, suggesting that Kashmir may have been part of Zia's plan for the Afghans all along.

Many Afghans here have met volunteers from both Azad and Held Kashmir fighting alongside mujahideen inside Afghanistan. And last week in these very pages Sardar Qayyum, Azad Jammu and Kashmir's President, suggested that these young volunteers might be returning to their homes in the Valley and carrying their weapons with them.

During fighting three weeks ago around Khost, a Pakistani volunteer, with links to conservative religious groups here, said he met a group of Kashmiris from both sides of the Line of Control among the forces of Maulvi Jalanduddin Haqqani. "I was thinking they were just mujahideen. I thought nothing of it at the time," he said, but added he had since come to suspect that Jalanduddin may indeed be helping the Kashmiri rebels.

Maulvi Jalanduddin, the most prominent guerrilla leader in the Khost area, reportedly receives a great deal of direct aid from wealthy supporters in the Arab world. He, in his turn has a reputation for generosity when approached for assistance by smaller, less well-off guerrilla bands. One Peshawar-based Afghan journalist in regular contact with Jalanduddin remarked that once convinced of a supplicant's sincerity, the Maulvi "doesn't ask a lot of questions."

But Jalanduddin's representatives in Peshawar say they know nothing about any assistance to the Kashmiri rebels. So does everyone else here most likely either to be involved, or to know of such shenanigans.

Li Gen (Retd) Fazle Haq, for years Ziaul Haq's right-hand man on the Frontier, characterised the Afghans' involvement as "out of the question. They (the Afghans) owe the government everything. They fear the government ... and they won't do anything the government doesn't want them to do."

Qazi Hussain Ahmad, the Amir of the Jama'at-i-Islami Pakistan, has been spending a lot of time in Muzaffarabad lately. Back home in Peshawar for a series of public meetings last week, he said such talk is "totally baseless. There is no need of Afghans slipping into Indian-held Kashmir. There is a favour among the Kashmiris themselves, and no shortage of manpower."

Qazi Hussain said that while there was a Jama'at-i-Islami organisation in Held Kashmir, "it has no organisational links with the Jama'at in Pakistan. We have ideological links but no organisational links."



Friday Times 2/15-21-

10-Year War Disfigures a Nation and Its People

■ Afghanistan:

Amputees flood daily into Kabul for help. Many must wait months for artificial limbs.

By MARK FINEMAN
Times Staff Writer

KABUL, Afghanistan—Roshan Gul and Anar Gul are not related by blood, only by tragedy.

They bear the same last name, and their villages were not so far apart in the days before both were bombed to rubble. Yet it took the same war that has been destroying their homeland to bring the two women together recently—at the Red Cross limb factory in Kabul, where they patiently waited for their new artificial legs.

The Guls are among the ranks of what experts say is Afghanistan's fastest-growing population—war-wounded amputees who are perhaps the starkest metaphor for a civil conflict that continues to disfigure an entire nation.

Every day, amputees fill the urban bazaars of Kabul, hobbling around bomb craters and rocket holes on the capital's ramshackle streets. At virtually every intersection in every city, they can be seen struggling through traffic and clinging to buses.

After more than a decade of bombing runs, rocket and missile barrages and massive mine-seeding programs, these legless men, women and children—whose total is estimated at 100,000—represent what experts believe to be the world's largest war amputee population. In fact, the number of amputees is so large that almost every shoe shop in Kabul has a section selling half-pairs only.

And the numbers may climb as Afghan refugees begin returning to their villages, which are still heavily mined.

"There is nowhere else in the world with a problem of these dimensions," said Claude Alain-Amiet, the Red Cross orthopedist who built the state-of-the-art Kabul limb factory from scratch two years ago.

Anar and Roshan Gul are typical of the amputees.

Anar, who still has the face of a child, was 13 when she tripped a hidden land mine three years ago. Her right leg was blown off at the knee. Her parents had sent her to explore their family grazing land—the once-idyllic shores of Kabul's Karga Lake after it was vacated by a military regiment.

Roshan, a 40-year-old whose face already is deeply lined, was home in her mud hut when her village, eight miles north of Kabul, was caught in an artillery barrage between government forces and the *mujahideen* rebels. A rocket

hit the hut, and the blizzard of shrapnel sheared off her right leg at the thigh. That was five years ago.

Finally, early last month, the two women found their separate ways to the Red Cross limb factory.

Amiet, the Swiss project director, already has worked with amputees for the Red Cross in Lebanon and Angola and contends that the fundamental problem in Afghanistan is underdevelopment, compounded by the sheer numbers.

Most of the amputees interviewed at the Red Cross center had lost their limbs at least two years earlier, an indication of the length of time it takes a wounded villager to reach the Kabul center.

Barbaric surgery practices, poor logistics and acute shortages of medicine have deepened the crisis, Amiet said. Now, he said, his factory is producing and fitting a record 105 custom-made artificial legs every month—and still there are 3,000 amputees on the waiting list, with each month of war adding scores more.

In Angola, he recalled, "the amputations were done better than here. When mine victims came in, the Cuban surgeons tried to save at least one of the legs. Here, they just cut them both. They just don't care. So we have about 8% double amputees here."


Lecturing Afghan war surgeons a year ago, a Red Cross surgeon, Dr. Kenneth Barent, spent nearly an hour detailing proper triage procedures that can prevent infections of war wounds, and he appealed to them to try save limbs rather than try to save time in the operating room.

Still, legless civilians and soldiers alike continue to come in. First, they are fitted for a pair of crutches and are given a number on the waiting list; several months later, they get an appointment to begin the long process of fitting and manufacturing new legs.

At first glance, the scene in the center's courtyard is depressing: Dozens of hobbling men, women and children; women like Anar and Roshan Gul sitting idly on the floor; old men stumbling as they try to walk again, and double amputees from isolated villages struggling with sophisticated wheelchairs.

But beneath the surface there is something different about these war-wounded—something that Red Cross workers say is as extraordinary as their huge numbers.

"There is one thing that sets these amputees apart," said one British physiotherapist at the center who has also worked with amputees in Cambodia and Lebanon. "With very few exceptions, they never seem to go through the stage of depression that most amputees experience. There's just a



Afghan amputees fitted with artificial limbs at Kabul Red Cross clinic.

whole different spirit in these people—stoic will to go on."

Indeed, in interviews with more than a dozen legless, it was clear that they have retained their dignity and hope.

Mohammed Younis, for example, refused to give up when he stepped on a mine in Kunduz province four years ago. His face lit up with a proud, toothless grin through a yellowing beard as he rolled up his tattered trousers to show off an artificial leg that he made himself out of scrap metal and discarded bicycle parts.

Younis, 68, is a bicycle repair man by trade, so, he explained, he fixed his leg the same way he would a crumpled bike.

Raz and Lal Mohammed, 13-year-old cousins, are even more extraordinary. Red Cross workers said. Both boys lost both their legs a year ago when they stepped simultaneously on two land mines while walking to their uncle's house.

The boys have been walking on their new Red Cross legs for several months now and have become role models for other amputees, helping every day to run physiotherapy classes at the limb factory.

When asked what they want to do when they grow up, both responded, "I want to be a doctor."

DIETER LUDWIG/For The Times

In the women's dormitory at the factory, where Roshan and Anar Gul fill their time sewing prayer scarfs and chatting about their families, the same spirit came through.

"I am a seamstress by profession," Roshan explained. "When my husband was alive, we had a fine field of crops. We had children. We had a life."

"Now, I've lost everything. No money, my husband is dead, my children are gone, my leg is cut, and I have forgotten everything because of this war," she said. "But what I have lost, I have lost. Only pray that God will keep others from losing their lives, and that is what I live for—for those prayers."

Anar, the 16-year-old, said she has the same prayer. But for her, the future appears to be more difficult. Perhaps it was her age; many Afghan girls are preparing for marriage at 16.

But when asked to tell her dreams for her life, a tear formed at the corner of Anar's right eye.

Looking down, she said quietly, "Every night when I am sleeping, I dream that I have my leg back."

LAT 4/2

Hikmatyar's support for Khalqis' coup blurs line separating Mujahideen from communists

By: Abdullah Mujahid

The failed coup of Gen. Tanai, which was supported by Hezb Islami (Hikmatyar), will have far-reaching effects on both the resistance and communist regime.

The coup was an attempt by the Khalq faction of PDPA to take power. General Shah Nawaz Tanai, the Kabul regime defence minister and the head of the Khalq faction of PDPA, has been trying since the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan to take power from Kabul strongman Dr. Najibullah, who is the head of Parcham faction. To do that, Tanai wanted to have the support of some Mujahideen groups.

Among the Mujahideen parties, Hezb Islami (Hikmatyar) showed keen interest in depositing Najib through a military coup. They adopted this tactic after the Mujahideen's failure to defeat the Kabul regime in conventional warfare at Jalalabad and on other fronts.

The coup began March 6 and was openly supported by Hezb. This support resulted in little if any practical benefit for muftineers. The life of up-rising was so short that no time was left for Hezb Mujahideen to support the muftineers even if they had been in a position to do so.

Hezb's support for the coup might even have weakened the position of rebellious soldiers. Since Hezb has a reputation for ruthlessness among the regime's supporters, their cooperation with Tanai might have made Khalqi soldiers hesitant to support the coup.

Just as the Hezb alliance with Tanai must have surprised members of the Khalq faction, it also surprised Mujahideen parties, ordinary Afghans and foreign observers.

Why were they surprised?

Hezb leadership have always displayed a revolutionary and uncompromising facade. These policies had gained the admiration of some young Afghans and some Islamic parties outside Afghanistan, from which Hezb benefited materially and politically.

Hezb left AIG over the issue of elections and announced that it will not support any unelected set-up! It also supported local elections in Kunar to prove its popularity among the people.

How is it that Hezb cannot get along with other Mujahideen parties, but can cooperate with a communist faction famous for its unbridled atrocities?

Hezb played a risky game by supporting the coup, because it was confident that it would succeed. A coup launched by the defence minister of a country, thought to have the support of most of the army, should have succeeded. Success would have paved the way

for power-sharing between the Khalq faction and Hezb Islami.

Had the coup been successful, other Mujahideen parties would have been caught by surprise and would have not been able to pose an immediate threat to the Khalq-Hezb Alliance.

Hezb also might have thought that a government formed through a successful coup would have been recognized by the outside world. Because of the involvement of a Mujahideen group, pro-Mujahideen countries would have recognized the new government, and because of presence of Khalq faction in it Soviet Union would have not opposed it.

The strong desire of supporters of the Mujahideen to see Afghan problems solved might have given Hezb the impression that they would support any move against Najib, and that other Mujahideen parties' reactions could be checked.

A successful coup would not have brought peace. Most of the Mujahideen would have found the alliance unacceptable and a dangerous threat to their survival and would have opposed it.

Here is information available about the way power would have been shared between Hezb and Khalq faction, but it is clear that Tanai and his politburo friends would have not been satisfied with less 50% of power.

In a press conference organized by Hezb in Logar, Tanai said he was still a member of Khalq and defence minister of the PDPA. Hezb spokesman who translated Tanai's press conference tried very hard to make the journalists understand that there was no alliance between Hezb and Tanai, but they had "strategic cooperation".

Hikmatyar does not call the cooperation with Tanai an alliance; he calls it Tanai's surrender to Hezb.

Now that the coup has failed, what will be its effect on developments in Afghanistan?

The coup widened the gap between Hezb and the other Mujahideen parties which cannot now be easily bridged. Although there were differences between Hezb and other Mujahideen parties in the past, neither side justified the rift on religious grounds. Unfortunately the Tanai coup changed the situation. Other Mujahideen parties have denounced Hezb's position on the basis of religion.

The coup will have a negative effect on Hezb Islami itself. Most of the ordinary members of Hezb, especially those on the battlefields, will find cooperation with Khalqis unacceptable. Hezb members will come under pressure from the rival groups among the

resistance. They will find it difficult to defend their party position.

Ordinary Afghans will not believe Hezb's slogans in favor of establishing pure Islamic government in Afghanistan, but will consider them a pretext for seizing power.

The rift between the Mujahideen parties in Peshawar will make Shia parties less willing to join the interim government. The Shia groups are trying to gain more ethnic and religious concessions from the Peshawar-based parties.

The coup was a blow to the popularity of Jihad, both at home and abroad. The strength of Jihad was its simple nature. It was understandable to Afghans and foreigners alike. The Muslim Mujahideen were trying to overthrow the Godless communists.

During the Soviet occupation Afghans and outsiders alike found the motives behind the fighting easily understandable, and supported the Jihad.

After the Soviet troop withdrawal the outsiders, mainly Westerners, found it less understandable that they should support the Mujahideen against communists in Kabul, since both sides had differences with the West on political, religious and economic issues. Support for the right of self-determination was not strong enough to attach the outsiders emotionally to the cause.

For ordinary Afghans the situation was clear. They knew the people on each side. The majority of Afghans continued to support the resistance against the communists, despite the shortcomings of the resistance. Hezb's involvement with one of the communist factions has blurred the line separating the two groups.

The coup will have a negative impact on the Afghan resistance's links with other Islamic movements. Hezb had gained a reputation of a revolutionary group, struggling for the supremacy of Islam, among the Islamic parties in Turkey, Gulf region, Pakistan and Malaysia. Hezb's action will make these groups suspicious about the whole resistance because most of them have little information about Afghanistan and do not differentiate between one group and the others.

The possibility of some small army units joining the Hezb-Tanai alliance still exists, but it may not take the form of large-scale desertions.

Even if some army units join them, the balance of power may not change very much, because an army unit cannot act effectively in combination with guerrilla fighters, especially when it is cut from supplies of ammunition and fuel and is deprived of its air cover.

The coup also created many problems for the communist regime in Kabul. It inflicted considerable mili-

tary and political damages to the Najib regime. The coup was a source of embarrassment for the Soviet leaders who claimed the PDPA was united and in control of the situation. The coup involved a considerable number of Politburo members of the PDPA.

Najib has tried to cover the involvement of the Khalq faction in the coup, and to project it as an act of some individuals within the party. Purges in the army and the party will weaken the regime's military performance, and consume a lot of time and energy.

It will be difficult for Najib to get rid of the problems permanently because the differences between the two factions are deep-rooted and have spread to lowest levels of the party.

The Khalqis' desire to take revenge will ensure that the struggle for power within the PDPA will continue unabated.

In short, the coup of March 6 would have been a positive thing for the Mujahideen if Hezb Islami had not supported it. It could have been exploited for the benefit of Jihad without taking political and ideological complexities for the resistance.

The Khalqi coup would have taken place anyway, but Hezb's desire to take power through a short-cut has created a new situation with unpredictable consequences.

AFGHANews April 1, 1990

Mujahideen allow private traders to bring goods from Afghanistan

The Mujahideen will allow private traders to bring goods from Afghanistan to Pakistan except alcohol and drugs.

The Mujahideen parties and tribal leaders in Pakistan have agreed that goods from Afghanistan can be transported through a secondary route by-passing Jalalabad.

A Mujahideen leader Younus Khalis has said that the Kabul regime requested the Mujahideen to open the Toorkham trade route but this was rejected because the Mujahideen do not deal with the communists.

Toorkham is a main trade route which connects Kabul with Peshawar. Despite fighting the road was open to trade until the fall of 1988. Since then, the Mujahideen have blocked the road.

The closure of Toorkham angered tribal leaders in Pakistan because their trade suffered. Russian and other foreign goods transported through the Soviet Union are brought to the tribal areas from Afghanistan. It is a profitable business because the goods entering the tribal area are not taxed.

PDPA Factions

The Peoples' Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) was formed in 1965 under the chairmanship of Noor Mohammad Taraki. The party wanted to bring to Afghanistan a Russian-style revolution.

After a while the party split into two factions bearing the same name, one headed by Taraki and other by Babrak Karmal.

The Taraki faction became known as Khalq because it published a paper by the name of Khalq (people) and Babrak's faction was called Parcham because the party published a paper called Parcham (flag).

The Khalq party remained united under the leadership of Taraki. Hafizullah Amin became the second man of the party.

The Parcham split once more. The new group was called Sejam-i-Milli (National Depression Party) which was headed by Mohammad Tahir Badakhshi. This splinter group claimed to fight for the right of non-Pashtoon nationalities.

Parcham split for the second time giving birth a new party, called Khalq-i-Kargar (worker masses) led by Ghulam Dastagir Panjshiri.

At one stage Khalq and Khalq-i-Kargar cooperated with each other, but retained their independent nature.

Sejam-i-Milli also split into two factions, the moderate section under Bahrudin Bais. The Tahir group cooperated with the communist regime in Kabul, but the Bais group opposed the Taraki regime and launch armed attacks against it. This group was responsible for killing the American Ambassador to Kabul, Mr. Dubs.

When Daud took power, the communists assumed important positions in

the government. When Daud decided to improve his relations with other neighboring countries tension between him and the communists mounted. The Soviet Union which patronized all communist factions except the Moists forced them to unite their ranks to be able to replace Daud and run the country.

On April 27, the 'united PDPA' took power in a bloody coup. Taraki became the president and Babrak vice president of the Peoples' Democratic Party of Afghanistan.

The honeymoon of the Khalq and Parcham did not last long. Babrak and Najib were sent abroad as ambassadors to Prague and Tehran respectively.

In the fall of 1979, Taraki was killed by Amin. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on December 27, 1979, ended Khalq's rule and brought Babrak and Najib back to power under the protection of the Red Army.

This event annoyed the Khalqis who were in the majority in the army. The Soviet army's presence prevented any open out-break of violence between the two factions but the Soviets failed to unite their ranks.

Parcham suffered another division when Babrak was replaced by Najib in 1986. Some people supported Babrak and others became loyal to Najib, the new chosen man of Moscow. Finally the Soviets admitting their failure to unite different communist factions, started to deal with each group separately.

After the announcement of the multi-party system, different communist factions became active. The present coup of Khalqis against Parchamis is the continuation of old hostilities which will not end with the crush of the coup. **AFGHANews 3/15**

Tanai says he is still a member of PDPA

The ex-defence minister of the Kabul regime and leader of failed coup told reporters on March 14 that his struggle to overthrow Najib will continue.

General Shah Nawaz Tanai met with 30 journalists in a Hezb Islami base camp in Logar province, about 70 kilometers from Kabul, for the first time since the failure of the coup.

He said that his coup against Najib failed because Soviet planes bombed Bagram air base, which was controlled by his supporters, and disrupted his communication link.

He claimed that his supporters are still fighting against Najib northeast and northwest of Kabul.

Tanai was dressed in a military uniform and was accompanied by Niaz Mohammad Mohmand, a member of ruling party politburo, and two generals.

All his guards were Mujahideen from Hezb Islami (Hikmatyar).

He claimed that he was still residing in Afghanistan, leading the war against Najib from a mobile high command, but the journalists doubted this explanation.

He told the reporters that he had come from an area close to Pul-i-Alam, the provincial capital of Logar, to meet them.

Journalists were told by Mujahideen from another group that Tanai's convoy had been seen moving toward Logar from the Pakistan border the previous day.

Tanai gave the impression of a professional soldier rather than a politician. He continuously consulted with Niaz Mohammad Mohmand when he was asked tough questions.

Tanai said that he was still a member of the PDPA and that he considered himself the legal defence minister of Afghanistan.

In response to a question as to whether he had denounced commu-

nism, he said that he was born a Muslim and Afghanistan was an Islamic country.

He added that the PDPA program should be changed so that it could play a positive role in the future life of Afghans.

He denied forming an alliance with Hezb, but said that the two sides have reached a tactical understanding to oppose Najib. He thanked Hikmatyar for his support to the coup against Najib, and asked other Mujahideen leaders to cooperate with anti-Najib forces. He said that despite past differences, he and the Mujahideen have a common goal to oust Najib.

General Tanai admitted his past mistakes, but said that he now has taken the people's side and that this action should compensate for his errors.

He asked his followers in the armed forces of the regime to cooperate with Hezb Mujahideen, so that the Kabul regime would be overthrown and an interim government could take its place, then hold free elections within six months.

He emphasized the need for forming a revolutionary council of Mujahideen and patriotic military officers after Najib is forced out.

Tanai said that his uprising against Najib was aimed at paving the way for National Reconciliation.

He criticized the Soviet role in Afghanistan because of Soviet support to Najib during the coup, and preventing Afghans from determining their future. Tanai claimed that most of the soldiers defending Khost and Jalalabad were his supporters, and that they will surrender to the Mujahideen when he tells them to.

He said that he was busy reorganizing his forces and establishing contacts with them so that the war against Najib could continue. He predicted Najib's fall in the near future.

← AFGHANews Vol 6, No 7, April 1, 1980 →

'Buzkashi analogy' misleading about Afghan sports, politics

Habibur Rahman

Buzkashi, often called "Afghan polo," has become a metaphor for Afghan politics in the minds of some Western analysts.

These analysts see *buzkashi* as a game without rules: every horseman in the game tries to snatch the headless calf and put it into a goal, while fighting one another, in order to win.

Barnett Rubin, an American scholar, used this analogy recently in a hearing in the House of Representatives of the US Congress.

This analogy is misleading. Those who use it think that *buzkashi* is not governed by rules and that no teamwork is involved.

Like any other game, *Buzkashi* is contested between two teams. It is a rough game which needs brave players

and spectators - but it has both tactics and strategy.

In each team, the fastest and the strongest horse, ridden by a capable horseman called *achapandaz*, places the calf in the goal with help from the rest of the team. The horsemen in each team block those of the opposite team's while clearing the way for their own leading rider.

The late Prof. Majrooh, an Afghan writer, was the first to describe Afghan politics, by analogy, as *buzkashi*. But Majrooh was not a rider himself. *Buzkashi* was not played in the part of Afghanistan where he was brought up. His impression of the game was that of a spectator who does not know the rules.

If one does not know the rules of any game, it is confusing. *Buzkashi*, a rough game, can be even more confusing to a Westerner.

Once a Western diplomat, who had

dealt with Afghan issues for several years, told an Afghan friend that Afghan politics are very sophisticated. He compared them to three-dimensional chess, a game not easy to grasp.

Afghan politics has its own rules which must be understood. Afghans are living in difficult times and in a very confusing environment. At home there are many political parties, reflecting the composition of the society. In exile - where most of the politics is being played - the situation is also complex. This situation, at home and abroad, has forced the Afghans to play their political game in a complicated

way. The foreign observers who watch the game from a distance, with a ready-made models in their mind, find Afghan politics confusing and sometimes frustrating. They often resort to over-simplification and unsuitable analogies.

Afghan experts are advised to learn the rules of *buzkashi*; it is played with teamwork, strategy and tactics. They should also study three-dimensional chess in order to understand the complexities of Afghan politics.

Afghans cannot simplify the rules of their political games in order to make them understandable to outsiders. A simplified model will provide no answers in such a complicated situation.

Behind Afghanistan Coup Plot

Unlikely bedfellows foiled in attempt on President Najib

BY ANTHONY ARNOLD
Special to The Chronicle

The world learned on March 5 of another coup attempt — at least the third in less than a year — against the Soviet-supported regime in Afghanistan. Although details remain murky, for the first time, the names of the main plotters are known, revealing a surprising alliance of ideological opposites.

This only-in-Afghanistan story began early last summer, when the resistance leader and Islamic zealot Gulbuddin Hekmatyar reportedly told his fellow leaders that he was in touch with the Communist "out" faction, the hard-line Marxist/Leninist Khalqis.

Khalqis' Role

The Khalqis, still part of the Kabul regime, are subordinate to the Parchami "in" faction, led by President Najibullah, both factions making up the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). Hekmatyar proposed to his colleagues that the resistance join forces with the Khalqis to overthrow Najibullah and his Parchamis.

The other leaders flatly rejected Hekmatyar's proposal. "If he wants Communist allies so badly," one responded acidly, "why not just work with Najibullah himself?"

On the face of it, Hekmatyar's proposal seemed like an uncharming miniature of the Hitler-Stalin pact of 50 years ago — and just as wildly improbable an Islamic fanatic teamed with the reddest of Communists! Yet after Afghanistan's present leading Khalqi, Defense Minister Shahnawaz Tanai, failed in his third abortive coup attempt in eight months, he admitted he had been operating in collusion with Hekmatyar.

Those who have followed Hekmatyar's career are not surprised. They note that his loudly proclaimed anti-Communism directly contradicts a violent record of deceit and betrayal that for at least the past 15 years has helped more often than hurt the Communists: failure to do his promised part in joint resistance military operations; armed obstruction of other resistance forces; and the ambush and slaughter last July of seven key commanders from a rival resistance group.

He is also suspected of complicity in the murders of several Western journalists and his anti-democratic public posturing seems almost deliberately designed to undercut U.S. public support for the resistance across the board.

Potential Sponsors

Yet Hekmatyar has survived, apparently by convincing all potential sponsors that he is privately loyal only to them — or at least that his actions will serve their

purposes. The roster of those whom he has beguiled at various times includes the Pakistanis, the Americans, the Saudis, the Iranians, and, most probably if murky, the Soviets.

In fact, experts say, his commitment to any of the above — and even perhaps to Islam itself — is purely surface, calculated only to serve his own ambitions. If he were to succeed, he would join this century's rich crop of national megalomaniacs, from Hitler and Stalin down to Pol Pot and Idi Amin.

General Tanai's first coup attempt, in July, coincided closely with Hekmatyar's contract on the seven commanders, and the two events are almost surely connected.

Had the coup succeeded, the killings would have left Hekmatyar in a much stronger position than his most dangerous rival, Ahmad Shah Massoud, whose lieutenants the slain commanders had been. But the Tanai coup failed, and Massoud managed to round up his men's assassins who, after a trial by an independent Islamic court, were hanged.

The most puzzling aspect of the coup plot was that Najibullah neither punished nor disgraced nor even demoted the main culprit, General Tanai; within two weeks Tanai was back in the public eye, blandly supporting the policies of the government he had tried to topple. And four months later he tried again, again failed, and again survived.

Only after the third attempt this month did he flee to Pakistan and acknowledge his connection with Hekmatyar.


Why did Najibullah spare him the first two times? Part of the answer is doubtless the insecurity of the Kabul regime. Despite an outward appearance of growing strength, Najibullah and the PDPA constitute only a tiny, unpopular minority of Afghans.

Khalqis' Strength

Take away the Khalqis, whose main strength lies in the army and uniformed police, and the regime can only be sure of its last bastion, the Parchami-dominated secret police KHAD.

But not even a desperate situation can justify letting a high-level coup plotter keep his position, free to strike again. Did the Soviets pressure Najibullah to take this route, threatening to withdraw their \$250 million monthly arms subsidy if he refused, and promising him protection from Tanai if he obeyed?

No one knows, but a case can be made that the KGB, believing it could control Tanai and at least influence Hekmatyar, saw in their unholy alliance the possibility of



Afghan Coup Leader Links Up With Rebel Group

Gen. Shahnawaz Tanai, the former Afghan Defense Minister who led an unsuccessful coup last week, talking to reporters yesterday at a guerrilla base in Logar Province, near Kabul. The general said that, despite past differences, he has joined with the hard-line guerrilla group led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar to overthrow the Government of President Najibullah. "The coup has not failed," he said. "It is continuing."

NYT 3/16 Associated Press

casting off a political embarrassment (Najib) and installing an outwardly non-Communist but anti-American regime that was still under some measure of Soviet control.

It was a poor option but perhaps the best available. Only when it finally failed would they have let Najibullah take his revenge on Tanai.

In any case, the Tanai/Hekmatyar concord could hardly have lasted; Hekmatyar's record of betrayal speaks for itself, and he has openly proclaimed his intention of becoming both secular and religious boss of Afghanistan.

There is no room in his political philosophy for partners or even important subordinates. Tanai's ambitions are probably as great. And even if one succeeded in vanquishing the other, the Afghan people would be little more willing to accept Islamic totalitarianism than the Leninist version. Though strongly religious, the Afghans are first and foremost individualists.

The coup failed, but the cost to the Najibullah regime may have been fatally high. The regime's ranking party and state organs are the 14-man Politburo and 20-man Supreme Defense Council, respectively.

Coup Plotters

The coup plotters included four who were members of both bodies, two who were members of one, and two Central Committee figures whose party membership goes back to the 1965 founding congress, well before that of Najib himself.

Three of Afghanistan's "colonel generals" — the highest military rank — were involved, along with dozens of lower ranking officers. Each of the most prominent leaders commanded a pyramid of followers who, in a society that has always valued heavily as personal loyalties, can no longer be considered dependable by the regime.

For war-weary Afghans, a new dimension of violence has now been added. If there is a silver lining, it lies in the utter disgrace of the resistance's least savory leader, Hekmatyar, and the open disintegration of the discredited Najibullah regime.

Anthony Arnold is an expert on Afghanistan. His articles and analysis on political events in the region have appeared in numerous publications.

San Francisco Chronicle 3/28

From the Editor:

The attempted coup, which for a change happened after the FORUM was in the mail, fostered all sorts of articles & much astonishment that Gulbuddin would associate with PDPA hard-liners. Articles in the FORUM noted those tendencies as far back as 1982. We don't believe in guilt by association (we associate with almost everybody); we believe Gulbuddin to be an opportunist par excellence who would no doubt associate with anyone if he thought he could get enough mileage out of it. Anyway, reach for your magnifiers; the print in this issue is small.

For the first time in several years, a FORUM Occasional Paper is ready in the year it is supposed to appear. #30, "Washington, Moscow & the Struggle for Kabul," by Stephen Galster will be sent to everyone who ordered papers with their 1990 subscriptions. If you didn't order a copy, but want one, send us \$5.

Thanks to our readers, we've not yet had to worry about having enough material for the upcoming issue & we continue to be grateful. We hope you will keep the information coming. The deadline for the next issue is June 15.

EVENTS


The Writers Union of Free Afghanistan & the Association of Professors of Universities of Afghanistan sponsored a seminar on "Social & Cultural Prospects for Afghanistan" at the Asian Studies Centre of Peshawar University on March 20-21. The seminar was held in tribute to the memory of Louis Dupree who died a year ago. Participants included Rolf Bindemann, Asger Christensen, Klaus Ferdinand, Azam Gul, Richard Tapper, Abdul Wakil, Azmat Khan, M.B. Naqvi, Rasul Amin, Willi Steul, S.A. Hussain, H.R. Hala, Ijaz Gilani, Mushahid Hussain, William Maley, Bo Utas, Paul Bucherer-Dietschi, Erika Knabe, Margaret Mills, Micheline Centlivres, F.A. Durrani, Rafiq Moghal, A.W. Najimi, S. Shpoon, Bernt Glatzer, M.H. Reza, Hanneke Kouwenberg, M. Hussain Momand, Nazif Shahrani, M. Anwas Khan, Martin Barber, Ashraf Ghani, Nasim Jawad & Nancy Tapper. (See p. 12)

RECENT PUBLICATIONS

"Afghanistan - War as a Factor of Entry into Politics" by Olivier Roy, "The Militia in Afghanistan" by Gilles Dorransoro & Chantal Lobato," & "On the Routes of 'Hijrat'" by Marek K. Sliwinski, in CENTRAL ASIAN SURVEY, Vol. 8, #4, 1989.

DEVELOPMENT POTENTIAL FOR AID PROJECTS TARGETING AFGHAN WOMEN by Kerry M. Connor for the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan, G.P.O. Box 689, Peshawar, Pakistan. 41 pp.

Cont. on p. 32



The Muslim

U.S. ADOPTING NEW AFGHAN STRATEGY.. (News item). 2/8/90

Soviet Advisers Appear to Play Major Role In Afghanistan

A year ago, on Feb. 15, 1989, the last units of Soviet troops crossed into Soviet Central Asia from Afghanistan, thereby completing their much publicized military withdrawal. The USSR's indirect support for the government of President Najibullah as supplier of weapons and other material in massive quantities is well known, but its direct role in the continuing struggle is disputed. Did the withdrawal mark the end of Soviet military involvement in the Afghan war?

Spokesmen for the USSR have strenuously denied that Soviet advisers remain in Afghanistan, yet there is much evidence to the contrary. Claims by Afghan resistance sources that large numbers of Soviet advisers remained in the country during last summer were largely discounted by Western media, because reports from such sources had proved to be exaggerated in the past. The figure of 12,000 claimed by a defecting minister in 1989 is surely too high, but close observers of Afghan affairs are convinced that at least two thousand advisers remain in key positions, including approximately 1,000 civilian advisers, mainly in the capital.

Even if the total is not certain, the continuing dependence of the government of the People's Democratic Party (PDPA) upon Soviet advisers in key areas is not in doubt. Soviet advisers are concentrated in the capital, where much of the army is based, and in the key ministries of defense and of the interior and also in WAD—the Afghan secret police, who were trained by the KGB. The logistics of planning in the Ministry of Defense are still apparently in the hands of a large group of Soviet advisers, most of them army officers with long service in Afghanistan.

Soviet advisers, civilian and military, still make many of the important decisions in Kabul and are virtually in charge of many departments, according to some senior Afghan civil servants. The dominance of these advisers in the ministries is fostered by the Kabul government's almost total dependence on Soviet loans and aid, as well as the drain of Afghan staff with experience in administration. Soviet military advisers are present also in the larger military bases and in the important northern city of Mazar-i-Sharif, the logistic center of operations for the northern half of Afghanistan.

The main Afghan air force bases at Kabul, Bagram (close to Kabul), and Shindand (south of Herat, along the Iranian border) are still under the close supervision of the Soviet air force officers and PDPA trustees, according to defecting Afghan pilots who were based there. Even within the small, well-financed air force, whose personnel had been thought to be ideologically trustworthy, there are signs of mistrust. At Bagram and Shindand, Afghan pilots are permitted to fly only with Soviet clearance, and the thirty Mig-27 fighter-bombers delivered in late 1988 were reportedly still being flown only by Soviet pilots.

More detailed accounts have been given in the past month by defecting Afghan officers who belong to the disaffected Khalq (Masses) faction of the PDPA, which is at odds with the Parcham (Banner)—the faction that dominates the Najibullah government. One such was Captain Abdul Malik Jamdar, a graduate of the Police Academy in Leningrad, who had been attached to a SCUD missile launch site where twenty Soviet military advisers were on regular duty. The advisers do not advertise their presence, always wear Afghan army uniforms, and travel in cars with Afghan number plates. Married men live alone. In Kabul, Soviet military and civilian

advisers are housed in apartment blocks in specified enclaves of the capital, no longer mainly at Mikrovon colony but at Dar ul Aman, Kargha, and above all at the large military base of Pulp-e-Charkhi.

Thirteen SCUD launcher systems have been transferred to the PDPA government by the USSR, eight of which are based in and around Kabul and five at Mazar-i-Sharif in northern Afghanistan. All of these have overall Soviet direction. SCUD B missiles are long-range (over 300 kilometers) and carry a warhead of 2,000 pounds. These weapons were first sent to Afghanistan only in October, 1988, just months before the completion of the troop withdrawal. They were obviously intended to bolster the morale and firepower of the PDPA government, and they have been used to great effect.

It is quite possible that the SCUD missiles have had more political impact than military, because they are notoriously inaccurate. At least 900 SCUD missiles were launched from February through October, 1989, according to US intelligence. Few if any direct hits appear to have been scored against guerrilla bases inside Afghanistan, but they have done some damage. Some twenty SCUDs reportedly hit Afghan refugee camps, villages, and a small town across the Pakistani border in the North West Frontier Province.

The continuing presence of Soviet advisers playing an important, possibly crucial role in bolstering the PDPA government in Afghanistan is obviously relevant to any superpower deal to suspend deliveries of arms in the near future to their respective proxies in the Afghan struggle. What effect the withdrawal of Soviet military and civilian advisers—together with suspension of weapons shipments by the USSR and the US—would have on the balance of forces in the fighting is difficult to say, but it is bound to be considerable.

What is certain is that a very large quantity of arms and ammunition has already been stockpiled for such an eventuality. There can also be no doubt that these stocks are far from equally divided. The PDPA government has arms dumps in the major military bases and at other strategic points inside Afghanistan. With a regular flow of military supplies arriving through the past year by land and air from the USSR, the government in Kabul looks well placed for the medium term, at least for a holding operation. However, it would become even more dependent than it is now on the loyalty of the armed forces.

There is a large component of PDPA members among officers, but the Afghan army is based on conscripts. Rivalries between the Khalq faction and Najibullah's Parcham grouping led to the arrest of 127 army and air force officers in late 1989, following another attempted coup against Najibullah. The Khalq faction remains dominant in the army, where strong Pushtun nationalist sympathies have made for resentment at overall Soviet control of operations. Many Afghan army officers reportedly keep up links with their local counterparts in the guerrilla resistance, the commanders of parties based in exile. Other forces at the Kabul government's disposal are the air force and Sarandoy (paramilitary police), plus the militias, which were formed more recently. Probably the firmest support for the regime comes from the WAD units made up of PDPA activists. Some of the well-armed and highly paid militia regiments raised have also proved successful, especially the so-called Jowzjani militias, which are recruited in northern Afghanistan and active in Qandahar province and, according to some reports, commanded by Uzbek and Tajik officers from the republics of Soviet Central Asia.

On the resistance side, the impact of a cut-off in arms is even more uncertain. Even if the two superpowers come to an agreement to phase out deliveries of weapons, it would need the close cooperation of the neighboring states in the region to be effective. (Afghanistan shares a border not only with the Soviet Union but also with Pakistan, Iran, and China.) Would the USSR and the US be in a position to block other foreign help and arms reaching the various parties of the guerrilla resistance? Both Pakistan and Iran, each of which

The military failures of the Afghan resistance this past year, as well as the inability of the party leaders to unite and mount a viable challenge to the Kabul government, have harmed the reputation of all the opposition leaders in exile, who appear to have lost credit over the past year with the guerrilla commanders and with the Afghan refugees and people as a whole. Gulbuddin's tactics, and in particular his decision in late 1989 to quit the alternative interim government set by the seven main Afghan parties, have been resented by many of his own commanders, some of whom have joined rival parties. Party loyalties, already fluid, may count for less in 1990, since the country's political outlook is far from clear. (Based on a *RL Report* by Anthony Hyman)

tempted to reach a deal over the heads of the Afghan opposition. After the war with Iraq ended, Iran has shown itself to be more willing to become an active player in the struggle on its eastern frontier.

Of the various Afghan resistance parties, independent reports strongly suggest that the radical or fundamentalist Hizb-i-Islami (Islamic Party) of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar is by far the best armed. This tightly organized party has continued to receive the lion's share of foreign military supplies, though its commanders were far from active in the fighting in 1989. Gulbuddin reportedly ordered them to hoard weapons and ammunition.

has approximately five million Afghan refugees on its soil, are pursuing independent policies towards Afghanistan. Pakistan has collaborated closely not only with the US but also with Saudi Arabia and China.

In the early 1980s, Saudi Arabia became a substantial donor of arms and money for the Afghan jihad, acting with Kuwait to block what it saw as the spread of communism. Since the beginning of the war, China has been a major supplier of infantry weapons to the Afghan parties that are based in Pakistan. Moreover, Iran has been vocal in alleging that the superpowers have interfered in Afghanistan and at-

Fundamentalist Mujahideen Chief Is a KGB and Iranian Collaborator, a U.S. Report Charges

American Aid Reportedly Went for Anti-U.S. Terrorism

By PETER SAMUEL
Special to the New York City Tribune

WASHINGTON, March 11 — The leader of the Afghan resistance group that has for years received the bulk of American aid has been charged in a congressional report with being a collaborator with the Soviet KGB and Iranian-backed terrorists.

The report says further that some of the aid may have been funneled to anti-U.S. terrorists in the Soviet Union and Pakistan. Roughly \$500 million has been sent every year for almost a decade to the seven mujahideen resistance organizations.

The report, prepared for the House Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare, severely criticizes the CIA and its Pakistani counterpart, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), for channeling the bulk of Western aid to the Hebi-Islami, a fundamentalist Muslim resistance group led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who it claims is either a KGB agent or a regular collaborator with the Soviet intelligence service and has close relations with Iranian and Palestinian terrorists.

The report, written by task force chief staff Vaughn S. Forrest and its director, the House Intelligence Committee, dated March 1, but so far has not been released to the press.

Since the report was prepared, hard-line Communist Defense Minister Maj. Gen. Sh. Nawaz Tanai, who attempted a coup against Afghan President Najibullah early last week, flew out of Kabul and joined the Hebi-Islami forces of Hekmatyar.

The paper says that Hekmatyar symbolizes the "Byzantine subterfuge" of the situation in Southwest Asia. It adds that the mujahideen leader has been personally involved with the highest officials of the Khomeini regime in Iran and that many of his men have taken time off to engage in anti-U.S. terrorism — apparently in part on CIA money.

In addition, Hekmatyar has directed more of his energy and resources to neutralizing and destroying fellow mujahideen resistance movements than to fighting the Soviet, the Afghan regime or the Soviets, the report charges.

Yet his organization has been the principal recipient of U.S. aid to Afghanistan, which has been flowing at the rate of approximately \$600 million a year for several years.

The task force report states: "Gulbuddin's personal involvement with the highest echelons of the Khomeini regime and the ensuing cooperation of Gulbuddin with the Iranian and international terrorism should have made him ineligible for any U.S. assistance, let alone the bulk of it. Yet the ISI and the CIA steadily increased, promoted and propped up their man."

The report traces in detail Hekmatyar's history as an associate of Communist officers and commanders of the Military Academy in Kabul in the late 1960s, and his expulsion for homosexual behavior.

A member of the Communist PDPA, Parcham, the report says, Hekmatyar was involved in conspiratorial plots, including penetration of fundamentalist groups like the Muslim Brotherhood and promotion of dissent and violence within them.

The task force says that Hekmatyar's Parcham group maintained an intimate relationship with the KGB, reportedly operating out of the Soviet Embassy.

In 1972, he was arrested for the assassination of a Moscow intelligence officer.

A pre-Communist Afghan intelligence colonel told the task force that Hekmatyar, working undercover for the Communist Parcham in the Muslim Brotherhood, killed for the Islamic

organization in order to ally its name. By 1974, Hekmatyar was also working for the Pakistani ISI under the orders of former Pakistani President Zia-ul-Haq, who provided Hekmatyar with training for the insurgency against President Mohammad Daoud.

In 1975-76, he was further trained by Pakistani intelligence, says the report. Officials described him as "a cunning, ruthless and power-hungry man who would do anything to remain at the top."

ISI "considered him [Hekmatyar] their own man, a totally controlled agent, [and] imposed him on the [Afghan] resistance groups."

He rose to the leadership of Hebi-Islami following a series of suspicious deaths of elders and veteran commanders of the Islamic resistance group. The task force report, Hekmatyar maintained close relations with the Afghan KHAD intelligence service and its Soviet advisers.

In 1979, he is credited by three independent sources, according to the report, with betraying planned Muslim attacks against the Communists in Kabul. Daoud Durrani, former Afghan ambassador to the United States, said Hekmatyar was an officer who later defected said the KGB intelligence organization planned assassination attempts against the late President Daoud. The KHAD man says he was ordered explicitly not to make any move against Hekmatyar.

Another mujahideen commander, Abdul Haq, is said to have observed, "Gulbuddin's problem is that he kills more mujahideen than Soviets."

The task force report provides a history of spoiling operations by Hebi-Islami.

It claims that Hebi-Islami forces have generally been able to move unopposed by Soviet and Afghan Communist forces and able to camp in close proximity to their outposts without being attacked.

Hebi-Islami attacks on other mujahideen forces have occurred for many years but reached a peak in early July 1989 when 36 of Jamiat-ul-Islami, a moderate Afghan nationalist group, senior commanders and officers were ambushed and slain. Some were tortured before being shot.

Jamiat-ul-Islami, one of the seven mujahideen groups, responded by capturing, trying and hanging several Hebi-Islami leaders.

The task force report implicates Hekmatyar's group in the February 1988 assassination in Peshawar, Pakistan, of a leading Afghan exile leader, Said Babudhin Majidi, director of the Afghan Information Center, the organization that provided the major documentation of the war. Majidi was a strong advocate of moderate Afghan nationalism.

The task force report says he was killed by gunfire by a joint Hebi-Islami-Soviet spy team, and that he was the first of a series of social intellectuals to die in such a fashion.

It also claims that "While enjoying massive CIA [financial] support, Gulbuddin developed close cooperation with Khomeini's Iran," and that "his forces played a central role in the creation of anti-U.S. international terrorism."

A pivotal role in Hekmatyar's relations with Iranian terrorism is attributed

to Abbas Zamani, also known as Abu-Sharif, who was Iranian ambassador to Pakistan from 1980. Zamani had been involved in Palestinian Fatah and Black September terrorism in the 1970s and supervised PLO support for the training of the Pasdaran wing of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard.

Zamani's forces played a major role in the upheavals leading to the fall of the shah in Tehran.

The task force report says that Zamani was recruited by the KGB and the ISI in the late 1960s and remained a KGB agent in Islamabad in the 1960s. There, his job as Iranian ambassador to Pakistan was to develop relations between Iranian and Afghan Islamic radicals. "He coordinated the transfer of funds, weapons and trainees between Iran and the mujahideen camps in Pakistan," according to the congressional report.

"In the early 1980s, as a direct result of Zamani's efforts, Gulbuddin reached special agreement with Ayatollah Khomeini to coordinate cooperation." Gulbuddin's followers in the refugee camps in Iran were organized into a new "Santi" group [Jundallah].

The source of the report says that the task force report says he was killed by gunfire by a joint Hebi-Islami-Soviet spy team, and that he was the first of a series of social intellectuals to die in such a fashion.

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A pivotal role in Hekmatyar's relations with Iranian terrorism is attributed

to hundreds of Afghan resistance fighters and their supporters. He has also been accused of leaking information of mujahideen intelligence that has led to devastating Soviet losses.

But David Isby, a Soviet and Afghan specialist at the BOM Corp., a national security consulting firm in McLean, Va., says the congressional report is not entirely accurate.

Isby argues that in Afghanistan "everyone deals with everyone else," and that ethnic differences are a constant source of enmity among the various groups.

But Isby also says that Hekmatyar is "a pretty bad character," who has "killed a lot of people."

Isby says that Hekmatyar is a "Pakistani creation" — a reference to the suggestion he was built up by the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), of Pakistan. Isby also says that Hekmatyar has been "horribly counterproductive to the resistance."

An adviser on Afghanistan to the U.S. Army, Stephen Blank, of the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, Pa., says that Hekmatyar is a man of "limited outlook" who was selected by the Pakistanis as "their man."

Isby says: "Our policy was to give aid to Pakistan, not to the Afghans. Our policy was to get the Soviets out. We never had any policy about who should get it. War College, Carlisle, Pa., says that Hekmatyar is a man of "limited outlook" who was selected by the Pakistanis as "their man."

offshoots, Hezbollah and the Islamic Jihad, the shadowy groups operating in Lebanon that have been implicated in hostage-taking and other actions against Americans there.

Hezbollah (Party of God) terrorists in turn have used travel documents of Afghan resistance groups to move into and use Pakistan as a transit point, apparently with the assistance of Hekmatyar's Hebi-Islami.

The report says some of this public knowledge was quoted in *Investigative* of June 1, 1987, as reporting that Hekmatyar and the Iranians were cooperating.

It also states: "Afghans became the vehicle for the establishment of new cells of Hebi-Islami and Islamic Jihad in the West, and especially in the U.S. and Canada. Afghan 'refugees' and 'emigres' have received in the U.S. organized and assumed command over new cells of Hebi-Islami under the guise of solidarity committees with the Jihad in Afghanistan." The report also encouraged this operation.

It says this U.S. operation using the cover of Afghan freedom fighters has been used to establish the Islamic Shari' Ayatollah Mahmud Nassiri, a close friend of Khomeini's son, Mustafa. Nassiri is said to have visited the U.S. several times a year, organizing and supervising Iranian cells.

The report calls the CIA "innocents in a war between the U.S. and the Soviet Union," and suggests that the United States has been the victim of disinformation by Soviet and Pakistani intelligence agents who had their separate reasons for working with Hekmatyar.

It says the CIA has lacked its own sources of information in Afghanistan: "There is little or no independent cross-checking of U.S. and Soviet information and reality of just who the United States is working with in this region are far apart. If we fail to recognize and adjust to the real situation, we will be forced to achieve their historic goals: the domination and control of South Asia and the subcontinent [India and Pakistan]."

New York City

Tribune 3/12

Some Observers Applaud a U.S. Report That Fingers Mujahideen Boss as a Spy

By PETER SAMUEL
Special to the New York City Tribune

WASHINGTON, March 14 — A congressional report sharply critical of the U.S. aid program to the Afghan resistance forces has brought praise from outsiders and a terse set of "no comment" responses from the administration and congressmen with oversight of the supposedly covert operation.

The report, prepared by the House Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare, maintains that the fundamentalist Islamic group, Hebi-Islami, which has received the largest portion of U.S. aid to the Afghan resistance, has a long history of collaboration with the Soviet and Iranian government and Middle East terrorists.

Rosanne Klass, director of the Afghan Information Center of Freedom House, a Washington, D.C., group, said the report "supports in great detail what many observers of the Afghan war have long known and suspected, but could not fully substantiate."

The report suggests that Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the major recipient of U.S. Afghan aid, has been a "false flag" resistance leader working with the Soviet KGB and communist Afghan intelligence.

It also says he has systematically murdered, sabotaged and betrayed genuine Afghan resistance groups over the years.

The report also documents Hekmatyar's links to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards and Hezbollah (Party of God), one of the chief groups said to be holding American hostages in Lebanon.

Klass says that journalists and others working in the region have consistently out of the region, Pakistan — have told her a great deal more than they have written about Hekmatyar's collaboration with anti-American elements.

They haven't published the accounts, she says, because of threats against their lives.

Klass says that a member of Professor Isby's staff, a mujahideen, a respected scholar and documenter of the Afghan situation, came after he defected threats from Hekmatyar.

"Everybody in Peshawar knew that Gulbuddin did it, and it was a clear indication his party was prepared to carry out its threats and that nobody would be immune," Klass said. "Since his murder, many others who have received similar threats have become even more cautious."

Free English of the Committee for a Free Afghanistan says that reports of Hekmatyar's commanders working closely with KHAD or WAD, the Kabul intelligence service, have continuously surfaced since the beginning of the conflict.

She says the recent open collaboration of Hekmatyar and his forces with the former Kabul defense minister Maj. Gen. Shah Nawaz Tanai, the key figure in a recent coup attempt in Kabul, "proves Gulbuddin's disloyalty to the cause of freedom in Afghanistan."

Jim Phillips, the Afghan specialist at the Brookings Institution, a conservative think tank in Washington, D.C., says that Hekmatyar is "a cross between Pol Pot and Abu Nidal."

He has also been accused of leaking information of mujahideen intelligence that has led to devastating Soviet losses.

But David Isby, a Soviet and Afghan specialist at the BOM Corp., a national security consulting firm in McLean, Va., says the congressional report is not entirely accurate.

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New York City

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constantly during his term at the Pentagon.

He explains, "To this day no one really knows what happens to the aid. There is no proper accounting for it. When I personally objected to the aid being directed so much to Gulbuddin I was told that was the only really charismatic leader of the resistance, the most efficient military commander and so forth."

The Department of State and the CIA just were along with what they were told by the Pakistanis. They were not really interested in Afghanistan itself, only in Pakistan," he added.

Pakistan's policy has been to keep many groups of U.S. aid, and divide it among the various groups, says Blank, Krakowski says, and to advance Afghan leaders that are likely to remain dependent on their support and therefore controlled.

Congressman Don Ritter, R-Texas, who heads up a congressional task force on Afghanistan, has joined the many groups of U.S. aid, and divide it among the various groups, says Blank, Krakowski says, and to advance Afghan leaders that are likely to remain dependent on their support and therefore controlled.

New York City

Tribune 3/15

The war is still on

A year after the Soviet pullout, Afghanistan remains a battlefield. American politologist Barnett R. Rubin and Soviet historian Nodari Simoniya disagree on who and what stands in the way of settlement

Thirteen thousand of Soviet youth died in Afghanistan in a war the Soviet government itself now proclaims to have been illegal and unethical. Yet though this war may be over for the Soviet public, it is not over for the people of Afghanistan.

It is natural for Soviet people to think first of the suffering of those close to them—but they will not be able to understand why the conflict continues unless they also understand the suffering of the people of Afghanistan.

For them the past ten years have been their Great Patriotic War. Statistical studies show that this nation of about 15 million people sacrificed over 1.25 million lives—perhaps a higher proportion than the Soviet people lost in the battle against Hitler. Most of the casualties were ordinary peasants—children, women, old men—killed by bombs and rockets from machines they have never seen before, but which they learned to call "jet" and "helicopter." Over a third of the population fled their destroyed villages to Pakistan or Iran, where they still live as refugees. Millions have been crowded into new slums of Kabul or wander from village to village. Of course the Islamic partisans—the mujahedin—have also killed people, but despite all the aid they received from abroad, they had nothing to match the power of the Red Army and the Soviet Air Force.

Today, thanks to the courage of the Afghan people, supported by international public opinion, the efforts of the United Nations, and the principled decision taken by a new Soviet leadership, Soviet troops have left Afghanistan. The Soviet government now calls for a political solution based on several points including: a moratorium on outside weapons supplies (known as "negative symmetry" between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.), a cease-fire, and dialogue between the Afghan government and the "opposition groups."

No doubt these terms seem reasonable to Soviet citizens, who may wonder why they have not been accepted. And it is not only "cold war oracles" in the Pentagon or "Islamic extremists" among the exiled resistance leaders or the Pakistani military who reject these terms. Many others cannot accept them either. Including moderate Afghans, Pakistanis, and Americans, such as myself, who believe that a political solution is the only humane alternative.

The reasons lie in blank spots in history which are still hidden from the Soviet people. Most important is the connection of the Kabul regime to what Soviet officials call "the decision to send Soviet troops to Afghanistan at the request of the Afghan government," and which most people—including most Afghans—call invasion. The special commission of the Congress of People's Deputies which reported on the illegal decision to send the Soviet troops still remained silent on what those troops did.

It may be true that the government of Taraki and then Amin had asked for Soviet help in fighting the revolt, which their brutal policies had spread across the country. For the arriving troops seized the Afghan government itself. It was Soviet troops who killed president Amin. Babrak Karmal gave his first speech to the Afghan nation on the frequency of Kabul radio from Dushanbe as Soviet troops occupied the radio station in Kabul. Babrak Karmal and his retinue, including Najibullah, were flown into Kabul and installed in power by the Soviet military.

Despite their denunciations of Amin's atrocities, the new leaders continued to consider all those who opposed the PDPA's monopoly of power as their enemies. They took full advantage of the power of the Soviet military to try to destroy all opposition. Hence for Afghans they became an occupation regime.

Najibullah, too, replaced Babrak Karmal as the result of a decision made in Moscow, not Kabul. Najibullah, however, has called for national reconciliation and offered to share power and even to accept the results of elections. Why not forget the past and take advantage of his offers to build a better future? The answer is that, as the American author William Faulkner wrote, "the past is not dead. It's not even past."

The first obstacle is that for many Afghans it is impossible to deal openly or share power with a leadership which at one time directly opposed Islam and was installed by a foreign power. The second is that Najibullah presided over the Afghan KGB, known as KHAD, for six years.

Here is another "blank spot." The Soviet press has publicized the atrocities committed by Amin, atrocities which, in their unsystematic and massive brutality, recalled the harshest rulers of Afghanistan's past. But the Soviet people have not read of the more systematic terror of Najibullah's KHAD, advised by the Soviet KGB, which used the tools of Stalin's great terror—secret denunciations, anonymous spies, "confessions" extracted by torture, secret trials for tens of thousands and public show trials for a few, unannounced executions and long prison terms.

A representative of Najibullah's own government I once met estimated that 15,000 people from Kabul, at least one person from every family, has passed through these prisons in the past decade. That is why Afghans will never trust Najibullah to lead them to national reconciliation.

Of course, part of the reason for proposing negative symmetry is that depriving

both the PDPA and the mujahedin parties of external military support would weaken old antagonisms and create a momentum toward peace. And end to external supplies of weapons is a necessary condition for a peaceful settlement, and I have strongly criticized my own government for not negotiating Soviet offers on this question more seriously.

Nonetheless, while some in Washington oppose negative symmetry because they still harbour cold war dreams, others have more legitimate qualms. First, the State Department claims that Soviet proposals always link an arms cutoff with a cease-fire in place. The U.S. cannot control the mujahedin. It and Pakistan could at most cease pushing them into ill-conceived offensives such as the attack on Jalalabad. Furthermore, a cease-fire in place is a form of security guarantee to Najibullah's regime against even its internal weakness. Such a guarantee contradicts the purpose of negative symmetry, which is to allow the genuine correlation of forces within Afghan society to emerge with as little interference as possible.

Finally, the current level of Soviet support for Najibullah and the secrecy surrounding this policy within the Soviet Union perpetuates distrust. According to American estimates, since the withdrawal of Soviet troops, the Soviet Union has been sending about 300,000,000 U.S. dollars per month of arms to the Kabul regime. These shipments include SCUD missiles, which are extremely inaccurate and carry warheads of 1,000 kg. The Soviet press has rightly criticized the firing of American-supplied anti-personnel rockets into Kabul by elements of the mujahedin. (I have also criticized this here.) But do the Soviet people know about the damage caused by SCUD missiles dropped into Afghan villages? They have killed dozens of people at a time, mostly civilians, and the Kabul regime has fired more of them in the past year than were fired in the entire war of the cities between Iran and Iraq.

One of the lessons the Soviet government claims to have learned in Afghanistan is that it is dangerous to make foreign policy without open discussion informed by accurate information. Yet according to statements made by Soviet deputies, they still do not have accurate information about the cost or consequences of supporting governments like Najibullah's. A first step toward building the trust needed for a political settlement is an open discussion of Afghanistan policy in the U.S.S.R.

Next, Soviet leaders should follow up on vague hints they have sometimes made by offering to withdraw the new sophisticated weapons such as SCUD missiles which they have introduced into Afghanistan in the past year as part of an agreement on negative symmetry and a political settlement. Such an offer would undercut those in Washington who claim that Soviet offers of negative symmetry are only designed to perpetuate a military balance in favour of the Kabul regime. It would greatly strengthen those Americans,

Pakistanis, and Afghans who are arguing for an end to all external arms supplies to Afghanistan.

The arms cutoff must be linked to the launching of a political process enabling the people of Afghanistan to rebuild their motherland. The U.S.'s insistence that the U.S.S.R. intervene in Kabul once again to remove Najibullah as a precondition for any negotiation was always unrealistic, and American negotiators have now relaxed this demand. Now they want only guarantees that he and his closest collaborators will leave power at some stage. The U.S. and Pakistan should similarly cease supporting extremist elements among the mujahedin. The American decision, long overdue, to deny further U.S.-financed weapons to the Islamic party of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar is a first step in this direction.

What the U.S.S.R. can do is to cease its demands that the PDPA or Najibullah play a particular role in the political transition. There are a variety of formulas proposed by the U.N. and others for a political process based on relatively neutral figures which would, at least in the first stage, include only relatively nonpartisan figures from Kabul. The U.S.S.R., unlike the U.S., has at least endorsed the efforts by the U.N. Secretary General to sponsor a political solution. The U.S., as I have argued here in Washington, should also cease to insist on the primacy of the particular leaders it has been supporting and encourage the U.N. to help the Afghans find their own authentic voice. Millions of Afghans are still suffering in unspeakable ways from the conflict between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., a conflict which neither of us has any interest in perpetuating for another instant.

Let's end the cold war in Afghanistan.

Barnett R. Rubin,

Ph.D., is an American political scientist specializing in South Asia. He has published articles and books on India, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan. He is a former professor of political science at Yale University and is now a fellow at the United States Institute of Peace.

While reading Barnett Rubin's contribution to New Times, I took notice of a serious difference in treating the problems in the material intended for the Soviet reader and in its articles published in American newspapers earlier.

One of the central questions raised by Barnett Rubin is why the war in Afghanistan continues. His answer is simple: the Afghans do not want to deal with, or share power with the regime installed by the Soviet military. For this very reason, Rubin asserts, the Soviet proposals for a peaceful settlement in Afghanistan are unacceptable even to moderate Afghans, Pakistanis and Americans.

I am not going to justify the Soviet Union's armed intervention in the domestic affairs of Afghanistan. (In the mid-1970s, I analyzed left-radical attempts to "outpace" the times in politics, and later on,

criticized Brezhnev's policy with regard to Afghanistan.) I believe that everyone will benefit from an open discussion of the present-day situation. To my mind, Barnett Rubin sincerely wants a political settlement of the problem, and sincerely explains the obstacles as he sees them. But I do not agree with some of his points. First of all, it is absolutely wrong to claim that the People's Democratic Party government was installed by the Soviet military. Barnett Rubin evidently knows that the PDPA came to power not as a result of a decision made in Moscow, that it has been part of Afghanistan's social and political life from the first days of its existence.

In his article, published in *The Christian Science Monitor* last August, Barnett Rubin noted that "the PDPA was only the most radical faction within a much broader, more moderate coalition in Afghanistan." This coalition included supporters of the royal and republican regimes as well. He also knows well that the struggle of various fundamentalist opposition groups against "modernism" began under Zahir Shah and continued under Daoud. A social structural crisis in Afghanistan was engendered not by Soviet intervention. On the contrary, it created the possibility for intervention in keeping with the "Brezhnev doctrine" more than one and a half year after the PDPA had come to power, though this by no means justifies such intervention.

As a matter of fact, Rubin himself admits this fact in his article published in the *Foreign Affairs* (issue 5 of last year). This explains why the withdrawal of Soviet troops did not end the bloodshed in Afghanistan. On the contrary, the armed confrontation has involved other parties and spheres. In this connection, Rubin's comparison of the Afghan war with the German People's War of the Soviet people is incorrect from the scientific and political point of view. Rubin's contention that the Afghans do not want to negotiate with the Kabul regime does not sound too convincing either. For one thing, it is a purely emotional approach, and not a serious policy. The regime of Najibullah is a real opponent for the opposition, and not a "colossus on clay legs." Rubin admits in the *Foreign Affairs* that the PDPA government has a greater degree of unity than the opposition, it keeps under its control major cities and most of the provincial centres, the territories of several provinces and almost all main roads. The government has free access to all the areas under the control of local self-defence forces.

During the past year the opposition has been unable to win any major battle. In these circumstances those who really want to find a peaceful political settlement cannot seriously expect a unilateral capitulation of the Kabul regime. The refusal to negotiate with PDPA representatives is tantamount to an expectation of such capitulation.

It is the Peshawar "irreconcilable" who do not want to hold negotiations with PDPA representatives. Can it be said that they express the sentiments of the Afghan people? "It is becoming clearer," Rubin writes in *The Christian Science Monitor*, "that despite the role which the Peshawar Seven played in the resistance, neither the mujahedin nor the Afghan people want them. Two phenomena since the Soviet withdrawal illustrate this: the mujahedin are reluctant to attack, and the regime's

troops are reluctant to defect. The mujahedin are reluctant to fight, because they do not want to risk their lives for leaders they consider unrepresentative and corrupt." Having no firm social backing, the Peshawar leaders abuse emotional methods and play the intransigence. The contradictions between what Barnett Rubin wrote in the past and writes now are evident. I interpret them in his favour. In the American press Rubin explains the Soviet position, and in *New Times*, he "deciphers" the U.S. point of view.

The Kabul regime is by no means in total isolation, as Rubin tries to prove. During the past year the idea of national reconciliation has been slowly penetrating into the minds of Afghans (and this is only natural after 11 years of a fierce war). Many field commanders have started a dialogue with Kabul, disregarding the fact that for many years Najibullah was head of the Afghan state security service (known as KHAD). Some of the well-known agreements with the central authorities, and some have come over to the government's side.

The meetings of Pashtun tribal leaders, held between November 1989 and February 1990, unequivocally approved the idea of national reconciliation. In spite of this Barnett Rubin ineptly advises the Soviet Union to withdraw "its demand that the PDPA or Najibullah play a particular role in the political transition." However, Moscow has never demanded a "particular" role for the PDPA or Najibullah.

In his article, Barnett Rubin gives much attention to moral and humanitarian aspects of the Afghan problem. It is good in principle. However, he considers these aspects in a biased manner, with the sole purpose of denouncing the Soviet Union. Moscow has admitted its moral and political guilt and put its mistake right, though with delay. And what about the United States, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia? Do they have nothing to correct and repent of? Did they not conceal quite definite selfish goals behind the propagandist slogans of backing the "freedom fighters"?

Rubin discusses this point, too. In his opinion, "the American policy worked out together with holdovers from the Zia regime in Pakistan and the government of Saudi Arabia was to establish an Afghan resistance 'interim government' in Pakistan and install it in Kabul through a military offensive" (*The Washington Post*). At the same time, he found space to write about Washington's decision to stop the funding of arm purchases by the Islamic Party of Heikmatyar and to describe it as "the first step" towards ending American support for the "irreconcilable." Rubin knows well, however, that it is not so, that military aid to the Peshawar opposition continues, and that Saudi Arabia has effectively replaced the United States in the supply of arms and money to Heikmatyar.

The Soviet Union has put forward a realistic concept of an Afghan settlement: the simultaneous ending of arm deliveries to the feuding parties, the cessation of hostilities, and the beginning of a peaceful political settlement, with the participation of all confronting and interested parties. Moscow believes that the United Nations could play a more active role in this process. President

Lingering War

The Black Market Is Only Thing Thriving In Today's Afghanistan

By DAVID ROGERS

Excerpts:

...After more than a decade of fighting, this isn't a struggle of clear ideologies or regional divisions. "The mujahedeen are our brothers," says Col. Hassan Hekat at a Kabul outpost. Vice President Abdul Hamid Mohiat tells of crossing enemy lines to go home to the Panjshir Valley in December 1988 for a family event. Once there, he talked and ate with the celebrated guerrilla leader Ahmad Shah Massoud. "I was born in the valley. That is my valley," says the vice president, who comes from the same Tajik ethnic group as Mr. Massoud. "We have family connections and relatives."

Like the city itself, the Kabul Hotel is beaten down but defiant. Band music from nonstop weddings blares in the lobby. Disaffected mujahedeen, housed by the government upstairs, watch Soviet television and the British "Miss Marple"—dubbed in a male Afghan voice. Manning the switchboard is a geology professor who moonlights to make ends meet. "How is the life?" he asks each morning in broken English.

The life is hard. Rationing and an improved distribution system have helped avoid last year's shortages, but prices are prohibitively high and corruption in the government remains an embarrassment to the regime. A week's wages at least are needed to buy a single live chicken. The poor line up at bakeries where subsidized flour costs the cost of bread. A clinic run by the private International Assistance Mission distributes its own mix of grains and fruit to counter malnutrition in children.

Najibullah has also publicly declared for a peaceful settlement and for convening Loya Jirga (a supreme council of tribal leaders) which could organize free elections with the aim of forming a new leadership. He has always stated that he will accept any outcome of such elections.

Today the sincerity of the Soviet peace-making efforts is not trusted only by those who, as American scholar Harrison put it, want to depole the Soviet Union's strength in Afghanistan as long and as much as possible. "Not even the most obtuse sceptics could now make much of a case that the Soviet goal is to keep a 'Communist regime' in power in Afghanistan," Rubin wrote last November. "Hence, Soviet offers to negotiate both military and political questions deserve a far more careful hearing than they have thus far been receiving in Washington." As I see it, any preconditions only impede progress.

Prof. Nodari Simoniya,
vice-director of the Institute
of World Economics and International
Relations, Soviet Academy of Sciences

Soldiers, taking a page from the Soviets before them, siphon off military fuel to earn cash in the black market. Government filling stations are abandoned, and the dusty smell of the city is heavy with gasoline, as old men carry their ration home from leaky trucks. Batteries are a major commodity, and only Kabul gets power on any given day. To compensate, all of President Najibullah's speeches are televised on two successive nights.

Lack of opportunity drives many men to re-enlist in the military. Government jobs are valued less for their meager salaries than for their subsidies. When bombs began to fall on government buildings in last month's coup attempt, few workers were hurt because so many skip out after noon to look for work elsewhere.

Children—and education—are the greatest casualties of the war. Classes are erratic because of the violence. Shopkeepers keep their families in for safety, and, among the poor, children are pressed into work even more than in the past. As scores of soldiers stand idly by, young boys in Kabul dig a ditch to help generate a torn cable.

"We have a whole generation that doesn't know what to do if peace came tomorrow," says Alfred W. Wines, a U.S. State Department United Nations refugee commission here.

What survives is the marketplace and a smuggling network that prospers as a last source of income in a desperate economy. Afghanistan's low inflation has led to a flood of goods, which are shipped legally to Kabul and then smuggled across the border to avoid the high tariffs erected by Pakistan, Iran and India.

In the city's bazaars, amid sheep heads, tea and oranges, men push wooden carts weighed down with towering boxes of television sets and appliances from the Far East. Indian tires, Soviet tractors and European autos parts move through mud-walled warehouses. China coats its business tools with colored brochures of machine tools made in Shanghai. The old, long-nosed Bedford trucks of the British empire are shipped in from Nottingham.

Last year, goods from the Soviet Union (from Dubai by air. Heavier items travel by train from Europe, Leningrad and the Black Sea or from Pacific ports across the trans-Siberian rail line. Trucks take over at the Afghanistan border, abuzz with Pushtun tribal streamers and patterned quilts to block the mountain cold. Runs, once measured in hours, can stretch into a week, but the rewards are great. The trip from the Soviet border to Kabul can earn for a driver a sum equal to twice a month's salary and subsidies for many government workers.

It is a network almost everyone uses. The U.N. relies on it to move relief assistance. Drug smugglers exploit it to convey contraband into the Soviet Union. Guerrilla factions have their own set of routes, the trade—and therefore in letting some traffic pass. And the Kabul government takes its cut in the form of customs and license fees.

The richness of the commerce is a reminder of how much the nation has come to depend on forces outside its borders. Afghani bank notes are minted in the Soviet Union. Kabul bus tickets come from Czechoslovakia. In Kabul, the industry has declined with the loss of raw materials. Unemployment is high. Abdul Azim exported cotton and sesame seeds and employed 150 people at a mill on the outskirts of the city. Today cotton production is estimated to be an eighth of what it once was, and the 36-year-old trader lives on commissions as an agent for Japan-based Bridgestone Tires, whose product he sells for re-export outside Afghanistan.

In less than two years, the value of the Afghan currency has fallen more than 60% against the dollar, leaving the nation so desperate for hard money that it may re-open its natural-gas pipeline to the Soviet Union.

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A SOVIET WEEKLY:
OF WORLD AFFAIRS

Latest war in Kabul has fizz

Coke "isn't it" any more in the poor and war-ravaged Afghanistan capital of Kabul, and nobody knows it better than Surrya Majid.

A round-faced woman who is vice-president of Afghanistan's Coca-Cola franchise, Ms Majid sat behind her desk in a mud-walled quarter of the city and recited a list of woes that would chill the heart of any corporate manager.

Moslem guerrillas armed by the United States have closed the road over which Ms Majid used to truck in bottles.

The Soviet-backed revolutionary government in Kabul, worried about feeding its soldiers and bureaucrats, has cut off her sugar supply.

Her husband, the former company president, is in the United States recovering from a stroke.

The factory engineers at Coca-Cola's headquarters in Atlanta, scared off by rocket attacks and skirmishes on Kabul's outskirts, won't come near the place.

And now, as if all that wasn't bad enough, Ms Majid has learned the worst - Pepsi is coming to town.

Afghanistan is about to have a Cola war to go along with all its other wars.

Boosted by two large loans from the Kabul government, Pepsi is scrambling to begin selling the taste of a new generation to Afghan revolutionaries and guerrillas within a few months.

Ms Majid, whose sales have fallen by half in the last two years

When the franchise holders of Coca-Cola thought that everything that could go wrong had gone wrong, Pepsi moved in on their territory. Steve Coll reports.

because of shortages and blockades, is confused.

"I don't want Coca-Cola to go down," she said passionately, noting that the Kabul government owns a 20 per cent stake in her franchise.

"I want Coca-Cola to go to the top... we are working for the Afghan people, not for ourselves."

"But why does the government give money to Pepsi? Why not give it to me? That is what I don't understand."

Like most things in Afghanistan, the answer has to do with blood feuds, tribal lineages and family ties.

Ms Majid's father-in-law was a big man during the reign of former King Zahir Shah, deposed in 1973, but now his family is in eclipse.

The family of the Pepsi franchisee is said to be on the rise. Apart from the hundreds of millions of dollars spent by the Central Intelligence Agency on guerrillas for anti-communist guerrillas, Afghanistan isn't exactly been a magnet for US investment of late.

Not only is the country desperately poor - government employees earn the equivalent of about US\$8 (about HK\$360) a month - but also some five million Afghans have fled to refugee camps in Pakistan and Iran, out-

side the usual marketing channels.

American policy during the last year has been to encourage the guerrillas, known as Mujahideen, to choke off big government-held cities like Kabul in the hope that hungry and frustrated urban dwellers will rise up against the Soviet-backed administration.

A Cola war in which Kabul residents are bombarded with Coke and Pepsi might tend to undercut that goal.

Afghanistan's Cola war will be fought along the usual fronts: marketing, advertising and distribution.

But there are aspects of the fight peculiar to a country embroiled in civil war.

For example, both franchises face the problem of production slowdowns due to guerrilla rocket attacks or eventually, perhaps, house-to-house street fighting. Coke has the disadvantage of being located next to the conspicuous Ministry of Defence building, a frequent target for guerrilla rockets and a site of bloody fighting in past coup attempts.

Pepsi, on the other hand, is far from where the rockets usually land but smack along the historic invasion route to Kabul from the east.

Coke and Pepsi are now the only two American companies officially doing business in Afghanistan.

Yet Kabul government officials don't seem worried about that redundancy.

"I believe we do need them both very much," said M Hakim, president of the Afghan Chambers of Commerce and Industry.

"I believe even if we have these two companies working properly, still the need will be there. The demand will be there."

Pepsi, at least, is bullish.

"If you look at the population size, which is what, 18 million, and at the low per-capita consumption rate, which runs about 10 (bottles per person per year), then you're looking at a very good potential," said a spokeswoman for the company's international division, overlooking the dramatic impact of the country's decade-long war on its population and the fact that it is one of the world's poorest countries.

Ms Majid, the Coke vice-president, is worried.

She's hoping to cut a deal soon to buy sugar from United Nations stocks, but her plan seems a little quixotic.

Nor can she get much help from Coke headquarters.

She said: "I tried two or three times to contact our head office, but I'm not getting any answer."

SCMP 2/10

FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS

Latest Afghan Feud—War of the Colas

KABUL, Afghanistan — In Afghanistan, where blood feuds and ancient tribal rivalries help to fuel an 11-year-old civil war, Coca-Cola and Pepsi are squaring off to do battle in their long-standing cola wars.

"I'm not happy. I have to tell you, I'm upset," Surrya Majid said repeatedly in a recent interview at the 20-year-old Coca-Cola factory in Kabul, which she and her husband Rahim run under a licensing agreement with the Atlanta, Ga.-based company.

Surrya was annoyed that the government had given approval to Abdul Qader Bakhtary, a Kabul raisin exporter, to operate a rival Pepsi franchise in Afghanistan, a country which does not have a growing market for soft drinks or much else these days. PepsiCo is headquartered in Purchase, N.Y. She spoke only a few days after the bidding plant was damaged in an all-night tank battle, the adjacent defense ministry during an abortive coup against President Najibullah's government March 6.

Surrya said she threw a shawl over her head and fled on foot from the factory as shrapnel shattered most of the windows and put a big dent in a mixing tank.

"It doesn't matter. I'll always be two steps ahead of Pepsi," said the 37-year-old mother of six, whose husband is receiving medical treatment in the United States.

Surrya, who said she was related to deposed Afghan King Zahir Shah, criticized Bakhtary's operation strongly.

"My money is family money. His money he borrowed from the government. I'm upset. But I think he's in trouble. He hasn't been able to open his factory until now," she said.

Mr. Bakhtary, 38-year-old president of the new PepsiCo franchise, was blithely confident about breaking Coca-Cola's stranglehold on Afghanistan's soft drink market.

The PepsiCo bottling plant will begin production in four months when the weather turns hot, two years after the government approved the project, he said.

"Coca-Cola has a problem with quality," Mr. Bakhtary said at the new brick PepsiCo plant in an industrial zone on the outskirts of Kabul. "That's why we're importing the concentrate direct from the U.S."

"Maybe she's afraid Pepsi will swamp the bazaars, but competition is good and will make Coca-Cola better," he said.

Mr. Bakhtary said he and his partner in the Qwo (pronounced "coup") Joint Stock Co. were investing \$3.4 million in the project. Most of it is financed by a loan from the state-owned Bank of Afghanistan.

"The government is supporting this project because it's been the only big project in the last three years," Mr. Bakhtary said.

"The government wants to show people a successful project and how they're supporting the private sector, so they've shown a lot of interest and given us a lot of support."

Sayed Amanuddin Amin, deputy prime minister, an avowed free

marketeer who supervises the trade, finance and commerce ministries, said the erstwhile Marxist government was trying to spur private enterprise with a package of incentives.

New private sector projects like Pepsi are allowed to import machinery duty-free and will be given a tax break of two to six years, Mr. Amin said.

The maximum duty on imported raw materials is 10% and businessmen can borrow up to 70% of their investment in new projects from state banks, he said.

The reforms, including allowing foreign firms to hold up to 100% equity in projects in Afghanistan, will be approved in May at a Loya Jirga, a traditional council of Afghan elders, he said.

Coca-Cola's sales peaked in 1986 at 1.5 million 24-bottle crates. But sales plunged to less than 100,000 crates in 1989 after the Soviet troop pullout, when sugar and many other commodities were in severe shortage, Surrya said. (Reuters)

POSSIBILITIES FOR PEACE STILL EXIST IN AFGHANISTAN

by Pierre Castel,
the pseudonym of
a European diplomat
who was involved
in events leading
up to the Geneva
Accords.

As we enter 1990, witnessing perhaps the most profound democratic changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in four decades, and very possibly the end of the cold war, in a distant corner of the globe, the cold war continues to be fought out with increasing intensity in Afghanistan. The casualties of this anachronistic and failed policy are not only the thousands of innocent Afghan lives, but also a broader sense of regional stability and a further improvement in East-West relations.

Since the final withdrawal of Soviet troops on February 15, 1989, Afghanistan has been locked in a bloody, stalemated civil war, fueled by arms and money from the United States, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, and by Soviet military supplies, designed to sustain the present Kabul government in place. Although the desire for a military victory seems to find its most ardent supporters in the United States and Pakistan, the majority of Afghans seek peace through a political settlement. It is for this reason that many commanders have refused to fight. Nevertheless, the sorry reality is that the wishes of the Afghan people do not count. Instead, civilians from Jalalabad to Khost to Kandahar to Kabul are subjected to indiscriminate rocket attacks, which have produced tremendous civilian losses and have gained absolutely nothing strategically. Moreover, in the months since February 1989, factional fighting among the resistance has increased, and opium production in resistance held areas is at an all time high.

The prevailing policy and approach by all sides to the Afghan conflict belongs to the dreaded days of cold war confrontation, and can produce no positive results. Instead, an alternative approach must be found by which to escape from the present cycle of mutual destruction. The most effective way to address the present

continued on next p.



MISSION: AFGHANISTAN

BY MARY WILLIAMS WALSH

This is the story of how a network contract reporter who knew his way around the rugged countryside in which a faraway war was being waged pursued an agenda of his own under the mantle of journalism. It is a story that may serve as a warning of what can happen at any news organization, particularly at a time when bottom-line pressures are forcing editors and producers to rely increasingly on personnel about whom they may know little and over whom they exercise little control. And it is a story that sheds light on the forces that left Americans with a poor understanding of the Soviet-Afghan war and this country's biggest covert action since CIA operations during the Vietnam war.

To be sure, there were brave and professional stringers and free-lancers who willingly endured countless difficulties in an effort to accurately report a war story complicated by murderous infighting among many guerrilla factions. A few found it hard to resist being caught up in this factionalism, however.

It was in 1987, seven years after the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, that CBS put Kurt Lohbeck on contract as a long-leash reporter and producer, its day-in-and-day-out eyes and ears on the war. Based in the Pakistani border city of Peshawar, he traveled into Afghanistan with the guerrillas, filmed their operations, and filed reports. On big stories, when CBS sent its staff correspondents to Peshawar — as when Mason came in for the Soviet withdrawal last February — Lohbeck helped to make arrangements for them.

"Kurt is, and was, the main Afghan source of material for CBS News over the years," says R.J. Halderman, a producer in the network's London bureau who has worked on Afghanistan reports with Lohbeck. "I can't think of many people we have a relationship with that's as strong as Kurt's."

But Lohbeck was a partisan of the mujahideen and of one guerrilla leader in particular, Abdul Haq, for whom he served in effect as a publicist. Moreover, other reporters claim that he sought by various means to shape their coverage of the war. U.S. and Afghan sources say furthermore that, while he was on contract for CBS, Lohbeck set up a press conference for the guerrillas and coached them on how to address skeptical Western reporters. There is even evidence to suggest that he tried to help put together at least one weapons deal for the mujahideen. Finally, Lohbeck's past — which CBS apparently made no attempt to check up on — hardly recommended him (see sidebar, page 30).

How did CBS come to rely on such a man? CBS News executives had not responded to repeated requests for information about Lohbeck and his coverage of the war in Afghanistan. They were only slightly more forthcoming in

the case of free-lance cameraman Mike Hoover, recently accused of staging footage used by CBS (see box, page 32).

Without knowing all the facts, one can at least enumerate some of the factors that may have contributed to the network's decision to rely on an outsider like Kurt Lohbeck.

First, there was the sheer physical difficulty of getting staff crews into Afghanistan and working inside. Cameramen packing big loads of conspicuous high-tech equipment had to make risky, illegal border crossings and then walk for weeks over high mountain passes, all the while braving helicopter attacks and such hardships as wretched food and hepatitis. If the cameramen found anything worth filming, they were unable to feed it home instantaneously; all film had to be carried out again, either on foot or on horseback. To add to the frustrations of the assignment, the mujahideen would sometimes mount their attacks at night without bothering to awaken the foreign journalists who had trudged for weeks to be on hand for the action. British video journalist Aernout van Lynden summed up the situation: "No news organization wants to send someone into a war zone for six weeks and not hear anything. That's Afghanistan."

Cost was another factor — and, by chance, the Afghan war was being waged at a time when all three networks were trying to cut costs. Keeping a staff reporter on the ground in the world's trouble spots can be horrifically expensive; it is estimated that it can cost upwards of \$200,000 a year for a network to do so.

All three networks, therefore, were prepared, wherever possible, to rely on free-lancers — and in Afghanistan, they did. The difficulty of getting staff into the country contributed to the decision of most of the U.S. media not to cover the war from inside Afghanistan but from places like Islamabad, New Delhi, Washington, and Geneva, supplementing such nominal coverage by purchasing front-line footage from free-lancers and stringers.

At the same time, in the early 1980s, CBS was also dealing with problems caused by the drop in ratings following Dan Rather's replacement of Walter Cronkite as the network's anchor. But, to its credit, CBS pressed ahead with its coverage of the Afghan war even as the network cut back on its news staff. A 1988 study by the Congressional Research Service showed that year after year CBS devoted more air time to the war than did the other networks. In 1986, for instance, a high-water year for coverage, CBS aired 55.2 minutes of Afghan news, while NBC aired 28.8 minutes and ABC only 19.7 minutes.

Rather's admirers say the difference reflects his special interest in Afghanistan, from which he made a dramatic report in April 1980, nearly four years before Kurt Lohbeck arrived on his first visit to the border city of Peshawar. These friends and supporters add that Rather believed the story was an important one — a huge nation invading an impoverished neighbor and toppling its government, then brutally imposing an alien and unpopular ideology on its people — and that it deserved far more media attention than most news organizations were giving it. Others, however, suggest another possibility — that, to counter criticism by conservative groups of the network's coverage of leftist insurgencies in Central America, Rather used the occasional Afghan story to demonstrate that he was not soft on the Soviets.

Whichever explanation proves to be the correct one — and they are not mutually exclusive — there can be no doubt about one thing: because of its special commitment to get a story in a land where it could not supervise a reporter, the network was left in a particularly vulnerable position.

Lohbeck's interest in Afghanistan dates back to 1983, when he formed a video-production company and made plans to film a documentary about Central America. Before setting off, however, he met a young woman, Anne Hurd, who was organizing a fund-raising event for the benefit of the mujahideen. Lohbeck took an interest in her, and in her cause. He made Hurd his production manager, boned up on Afghanistan, and, abandoning the Central America project, started raising funds to produce a film on the Afghan jihad, or holy war.

Mary Williams Walsh is Toronto bureau chief of the *Los Angeles Times*. From 1983 through 1989, she worked at *The Wall Street Journal*, as a general assignment staff writer, as the paper's bureau chief in Mexico City, as a correspondent in South America, and, finally, as the *Journal's* principal correspondent in south and south-east Asia, covering Pakistan and Afghanistan between 1987 and 1989. She entered Afghanistan both legally, with a visa, and with the mujahideen.

Hamed Naweed, an Afghan who taught art history in Kabul University before the war, remembers going to a Washington fund-raiser and listening to Lohbeck make his pitch. "He said he wanted to help Afghanistan through the media, because television is very powerful," Naweed recalls, adding that Lohbeck took up a collection and that most of the exiles present gave \$20 or \$30. "He said, 'You will see more and more pictures of Afghanistan on the screens.' And he kept his promise."

It was on the couple's first trip to Peshawar, in 1983, that Lohbeck and Hurd met Abdul Haq, the young and personable Afghan guerrilla who turned up on *The CBS Evening News* with his computer and maps in February 1989. Early in the war, Abdul Haq had made a name for himself as an urban guerrilla, credited with ambushing several Afghan communist party members and shooting down a large Soviet transport plane over the approaches to Kabul airport. But after the regime beefed up its troop presence in Kabul in the mid-1980s, says David Isby, the author of *War in a Distant Country*, a history of the Soviet-Afghan war, Abdul Haq found it harder to operate in the capital and decided to move to Peshawar and focus more on diplomatic and political work.

It was Abdul Haq—who spoke some English and was more tolerant of Western ways than many mujahideen—who helped arrange Lohbeck's maiden voyage into Afghanistan. On his return, Lohbeck gave Abdul Haq an opportunity to speak at great length in a film he made, *Beyond the Khyber Pass*, portions of which were used by CBS.

Most reporters who wanted to get inside Afghanistan were compelled to form relationships of this kind, in which each party helped the other in some way. But owing, in part, to such relationships, reporters tended to present their warrior-hosts in a heroic light and to gloss over some of the grim facts of this calamitous war—the murderous infighting among the many mujahideen factions, the Afghans' cultivation of opium poppies in some of the regions under their control, and the people's resentment of U.S., Iranian, Pakistani, and Saudi manipulation of their plight.

One mujahideen faction well known for cooperating with Western journalists was the National Islamic Front of Afghanistan, or NIFA, a group with which controversial cameraman Mike Hoover worked closely. The party's leadership tended to be so well-heeled, so sophisticated and worldly that reporters in Peshawar dubbed them "the Gucci guerrillas." Unlike the simple peasant fighters of the popular imagination, NIFA higher-ups knew plenty about the Western media and were well aware that a good many journalists yearned for the Afghan dateline but dreaded the violence and risks that getting it entailed. And NIFA leaders knew that still others were under tremendous deadline pressures and didn't have the time it took to walk deep into the country until they found what they wanted. Not that even a long trek was any guarantee of seeing action. As Chris Hooke, an Australian video journalist who lives in Peshawar and has covered the war at close range, observes, a lot of journalists "want to see tanks, shells, explosions, people dying," but "when you go into Afghanistan it's very hard to find combat."

NIFA and certain other guerrilla parties helped reporters get their coveted Afghan dateline by arranging for short, relatively painless trips over the border and back.

There was even once a heated debate among the various guerrilla factions over whether to deploy their foreign-supplied weapons deep inside Afghanistan—beyond the range of all but the most intrepid reporters—or near the border, within easy access of Western reporters, who could photograph the weapons, get their datelines, and, unwittingly, help the guerrillas wage their war in the media. David Isby calls the latter approach "the war of the periphery."

Most journalists came and went. Lohbeck stayed and, as his career as a combat cameraman flourished, so did Abdul Haq's fame as a spokesman for the mujahideen. Time and again the articulate Afghan turned up on the air, first in free-lanced reports which Lohbeck sold to the different net-

works, and later in contract work for CBS.

In December 1984, for instance, at a time when the government was beginning to weigh the question of how best to arm the guerrillas, Lohbeck featured Abdul Haq in a piece aired on ABC in which the Afghan complained that "during the five-year war with the Soviet Union in Afghanistan" the U.S. had done "nothing" for the mujahideen. In fact, U.S. appropriations to the guerrillas for 1984 alone are estimated at \$140 million.

In 1985, at the time of the Reagan-Gorbachev summit in Geneva, Abdul Haq again appeared on the air as a spokesman for the mujahideen, asserting on *The CBS Evening News* that the war was intensifying under the new Soviet leader. The same year, Abdul Haq turned up in Washington for a Conservative Political Action Conference banquet held to honor anticommunist insurgents in the third world, and was singled out for personal recognition by President Reagan while Lohbeck beamed in the audience. Lohbeck later wrote master of ceremonies Robert Dolan a thank-you note for having helped to obtain the presidential recognition for the guerrilla. "Following our private meetings at the White House," he wrote, "it gave Abdul and his people renewed encouragement."

Two years later, by which time Lohbeck was working under contract with CBS, Abdul Haq made another network appearance in a piece Lohbeck supplied—this one about how the mujahideen were financing their war effort by blasting for rubies, emeralds, and lapis lazuli with explosives scavenged from Russian bombs. In 1988, during key end-game negotiations in Geneva between Pakistan and the Kabul regime, Abdul Haq once again turned up on CBS, complaining that President Reagan was selling out the resistance. And two months later, when the Geneva accords were signed, setting a timetable for the Soviet Army's withdrawal, he made yet another appearance on *The CBS Evening News*, this time speaking dismissively of America's financial commitment, which by then totaled an estimated \$2.4 billion since the Soviet invasion.

By then, Abdul Haq had come to be known among senior U.S. diplomats in Pakistan as "Commander Hollywood," an allusion to his frequent appearances in the American media. Other coverage, besides Lohbeck's, singled him out: *The New York Times Magazine* profiled him favorably. *Newsweek* interviewed him at length. *The New York Times* called him the leader of "more than 5,000 American-armed guerrillas," and *The Wall Street Journal* called him "the resistance commander most likely to pull down the flag in Kabul." This reporter quoted him on more than one occasion after Lohbeck introduced us. Abdul Haq is likeable, articulate in English, and well-organized. More important, at least in the context of media attention, ever since his movements were restricted when his right foot was blown off by a land mine in 1987, he has been available in Peshawar to reporters who don't have time for lengthy treks overland. "There are two thousand commanders fighting in Afghanistan," observes Hamid Naweed. Of the commanders who spend time in Peshawar, he says, "these are the commanders the whole West knows, and [Westerners] think they have done everything. [But] the ones who will decide the future of Afghanistan are the tribal people. These guys are unknown to the West because . . . they don't have spokespeople who speak English. . . . You've never heard of them, but these are the Afghan nation."

Lohbeck's efforts to shape coverage of the war took another turn in 1988, following the defection of some Afghan air force pilots, who ended up in the hands of Abdul Haq's men in Peshawar. An American diplomat who insisted on anonymity recalls that Lohbeck told him he had met with the defectors and the guerrillas and had coached the pilots on what to say to the press, even staging a "dry-run" press conference in which he played the part of a skeptical Western reporter.

stalemate is to create the conditions which will allow the Afghans to determine their own future. Although this has been repeatedly acknowledged, it will never happen so long as foreign involvement in the conflict continues to advance notions of a military victory on the ground.

A political mechanism is urgently required which will establish a cease-fire and create a broadly based interim authority capable of staunching a process of internal fragmentation. However, movement on the internal political mechanism has been blocked by events both at the regional and international levels. Continued arms supplies and support by foreign powers for their specific proxies has been a crucial factor in maintaining the present impasse.

What is now required is international disengagement of all outside powers. Disengagement must be the first step and must be initiated by both the United States and the Soviet Union and supported by other regional powers in the form of negative symmetry (i.e., the cut-off of all arms supplies) followed by the withdrawal of sophisticated weapons. This process could be monitored by a restructured United Nations observer force.

This first step will have to be linked to a series of understandings between the Soviets and Americans regarding an acceptable and legitimate internal political process that would be coordinated and directed by Afghans. The two superpowers and the other neighbouring states will only be able to find common ground in their efforts to disengage by accepting, without preconditions, an internal process which will produce a legitimate Afghan government. Both sides must accept structures and means grounded in Afghan traditions if the result is to be legitimate and acceptable to the Afghan people. A *Loya Jirga*, modified to address the realities of today in Afghanistan, is the best hope. It is in such a situation that the former King, Zahir Shah, and other independent Afghans of stature and credibility, who have so far been excluded, can play an important and useful role in facilitating a legitimate process which can lead to peace and neutrality for Afghanistan.

The recent Malta Summit was a tentative, but nonetheless

This account was amplified by a member of Abdul Haq's guerrilla faction who was summoned to appear at the press conference. This was Mullah Malang, a well-known guerrilla fighter from Kandahar Province. Mullah Malang said that Lohbeck worked up a script for the whole thing. "There was one paragraph for me, something for me to say," Mullah Malang recalls. "He had written, 'You say to the press conference that the Russians have come back to Kandahar.' (But) this was something I knew couldn't be true. I said so then and I say so now."

Lohbeck says that he attended the press conference and filmed it, but that was all he did. "I am not a player," he said at another point. "I was a reporter."

There is evidence that Lohbeck also dabbled in attempts to supply guns to the guerrillas. Jonathan Jay Pollard, the former U.S. naval intelligence analyst now serving a life sentence for spying for Israel, stated through his lawyer in court pleadings that he and Lohbeck used to exchange classified documents "to further arms sales that they were attempting to arrange."

When asked about his relationship with Pollard, Lohbeck said that, although he had known Pollard socially and had gotten information from him, he had done so strictly in the spirit of journalistic inquiry. "I received things from Jon Pollard," he said. "My employers were aware of that. Subsequently the FBI was aware of that. The CIA was aware of that. I violated no laws, period." He went on to say that he had never met an arms dealer in his life.

But then there is Dominick Spadea, a New Jersey-based manufacturer of pistol-sized machine guns. Spadea says the two men met in late 1985 and early 1986 — shortly before Lohbeck signed on with CBS — to discuss an order for 10,000 of the guns. "The mujahideen needed a type of weapon that they could smuggle into the cities and attack the Russians with at the source," Spadea says. His machine gun would have been the perfect weapon, he adds, being small enough to be concealed in the billowing garb of the Afghan peasantry.

Spadea says that he made a couple of trips to Washington to talk over the deal with Lohbeck. In Washington, he says, Lohbeck told him that Abdul Haq would be the ideal recipient of the miniature machine guns because of his background in urban warfare. Lohbeck promised to make introductions and scheduled a date, Spadea says. After these initial talks, however, Lohbeck stopped returning his phone calls, Spadea says. The machine gun-pistol order evaporated, leaving the manufacturer baffled. The next thing he heard was that the mujahideen would soon be receiving a shipment of American-made Stinger missiles, the top-of-the-line, shoulder-launched anti-aircraft weapon.

Lohbeck confirms that he has spoken with Spadea, but, he says, it was only by telephone and only because Spadea called him up, unsolicited. Spadea's engagement calendar, however, indicates that the two met in person, and Spadea can accurately describe Lohbeck's physical appearance and he recalls at which Washington restaurants the two snacked and dined. In addition, Spadea's lawyer wrote Lohbeck a letter — later entered in evidence in an unrelated court proceeding — asking Lohbeck to execute a letter of intent with a delivery and payment schedule and to specify "the caliber desired."

While he was helping the cause of the mujahideen, Lohbeck was also keeping a watchful eye on other reporters' work. Lohbeck and Hurd rented a large house in Peshawar, and in it Hurd set up the field office of a Washington-based charity called the Mercy Fund. The group's direct-mail fund-raising appeals say it runs "M*A*S*H units" in Afghanistan's "front lines," and its financial statements show that the appeals bring in several million dollars each year. The statements also show that the charity's biggest budget item is not clinics, however, but "public information."

Lohbeck and Hurd rented out their extra rooms as a Mercy Fund hostel for journalists. The couple offered its paying guests the use of their telex, helped the newcomers — in-

cluding this writer, in 1987 — make contacts with the mujahideen, and briefed them on the war. Often, the couple urged the newcomers to interview Abdul Haq.

The U.S. government encouraged journalists to touch base with Lohbeck and Hurd, whose names were on a list of "selected contacts for covering Afghan affairs" handed out to reporters who stopped by the United States Information Service office in Peshawar. The handout listed the Mercy Fund — the only "hostel for journalists" listed; Lohbeck — the only network representative listed — appears under "C" for CBS.

Many of those who sought out Lohbeck or stayed in the hostel said they did so because he was the representative of a respected network. Some say they came to regret their association with a man who, while initially pleasant and helpful, was quick to turn against them if they failed to see and do things his way. A few examples must suffice.

British video journalist Peter Jovenal, one of the most respected and senior members of the Peshawar-based press corps, says that he once made a trip into Afghanistan with Lohbeck and that the two encountered some mujahideen with covertly supplied Stinger missiles. Jovenal says Lohbeck tried to talk him out of filming the weapons, but Jovenal filmed them anyway. Jovenal says that later, back in Pakistan, Lohbeck called him up and asked about his appointment schedule for the day — and, soon after, he noticed that he was being tailed by a jeepful of Pakistani military intelligence men. "The only people who knew what I had filmed were Lohbeck and the mujahideen in Afghanistan," he says.

Lohbeck denies Jovenal's allegation, adding that he had never been in touch with Pakistani military intelligence.

Two Americans say that Lohbeck tried in various ways to dissuade them from covering the activities of Ahmad Shah Massoud, a prominent and well-regarded commander from northern Afghanistan, whom, it would seem, Lohbeck regarded as Abdul Haq's archrival — at least for media attention. One of the two was Ottilie English, who in 1987 left her job at the American Security Council, a conservative Washington, D.C.-based advocacy group, to make a film about Afghanistan. English says that she moved into the Lohbeck-Hurd hostel and there set about making plans for two overland trips with the forces of Massoud. She says that, after Lohbeck heard of her plans, he tried to talk her out of them. She went ahead anyway with a first brief visit. When she returned, English says, Lohbeck brandished a piece of paper and claimed it was a cable from her former American Security Council boss, stating that she had been fired and was traveling with stolen camera equipment, none of which was true, English says that he refused to show her the cable, then denounced her around Peshawar.

She says that she went to a hotel to place an overseas call to her former boss, to ask whether he had sent out any communique about her — he said that he had not — and there, on a table by the hotel telex, she found a copy of a message from Lohbeck to Hurd's boss at the Mercy Fund headquarters in Washington, thanking him for the "invaluable . . . information on English." (She took, and has preserved, this odd document.)

English says she was stunned. Since she had never met Hurd's boss or even heard of him, she could not understand what he could possibly know about her or why he and a CBS newsmen should be swapping "information" about her. When asked about English's allegations, Lohbeck said that she had behaved immorally in Peshawar and that he wouldn't discuss English "for her sake." (I had a similar experience with Lohbeck in Peshawar. During an interview, he said, "There are stories that have been told to me by the mujahideen, which I have not repeated, that you spent several nights" in the house of a prominent Afghan.)

Sparkle Hayter, an American free-lancer who lived in the Lohbeck-Hurd hostel from August 1988 to March 1989, says that, like English, she made plans to travel inside Afghanistan with some of Massoud's people. Although she had made her plans in what she thought was the utmost secrecy, Lohbeck learned of them and, Hayter says, he sat her down and tried to talk her out of making the trip.

"Kurt sort of liked to control your thinking and your

Cont. from p. 26

less, positive step toward finding a solution. At the Summit, discussion focused on the need for a transitional period in which some genuine political process could be initiated. At the end of such a process only the leaders acceptable to the majority of Afghans would emerge.

A framework for dialogue between the United States and the Soviet Union is now in place to reach the necessary mutual understandings and to formulate the process of international disengagement — namely the meeting to take place between Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and Secretary of State Baker which will take place in Moscow in April. In the coming months discussions must proceed on the requisite mechanics for disengagement and on acceptable internal political structures.

One possible scenario would be for the Soviets and the Americans to countenance the convening of a forum or commission of independent Afghans possibly under the aegis of an international organization, such as the United Nations or Non Aligned Movement. This forum would call for both a cease-fire and for a modified Loya Jirga which would include representatives of all segments of the Afghan population, including the PDPA. Concurrently, an understanding would also be reached that after such a process, certain political leaders would abstain from seeking any future office in Afghanistan. As these understandings are reached, disengagement would take concrete form through a mutual arms cutoff.

International disengagement is a necessity for a legitimate process of self-determination to advance. More than a year and a half ago, Diego Cordovez, the former UN negotiator and present Foreign Minister of Ecuador, advanced such a formulation as a basis for peace in Afghanistan. Cordovez has again emphasized recently the need for the superpowers to reach understandings between themselves on disengagement from the conflict, and thereby give the Afghans a chance to determine their own future.

In some international forums, a variety of vague ideas have been suggested recently on how to structure certain aspects of a Afghan resistance delegation which would be

access to certain people," Hayter says. "I think he's had a significant impact on the way this war has been reported." The problem with that, she says, is: "The war according to Kurt just wasn't the war."

Last February, as the last Soviet Army convoys wound northward up the Salang Highway and out of Afghanistan, scores of foreign newsmen waited in Peshawar for word that the mujahideen were marching on Kabul at last. An excited Kurt Lohbeck told acquaintances that it was only a matter of days, a bit of wishful thinking expressed by members of the U.S. diplomatic corps in Pakistan and reflected in many press accounts.

He seemed to have it all sewed up: renters in the Mercy Fund hotel say they saw a telex arrive from Don DeCesare, CBS's vice-president for news coverage, asking Lohbeck to confirm whether the network did or did not have an "exclusive video arrangement with Abdul Haq." Lohbeck had apparently convinced the news executives that he, and he alone, could get front-row seats for what promised to be one of the biggest shows ever — the final push on Kabul.

The network sent out a crew. After the men filmed the computer war-room sequence with Abdul Haq, Lohbeck arranged a trip to the Kabul front.

The journey was a disaster. The snow was unusually deep in the mountains. The camera crew drew mortar fire as it slogged across valleys and frozen wastes within view of Afghan army posts. The men had loaded their equipment onto a horse, but the animal somehow got separated from the crew, and the camera was lost. By the time the men arrived at Abdul Haq's base camp outside Kabul, they had nothing to film with — but there was nothing to film anyway. Abdul Haq was still in Peshawar, and Kabul wasn't about to fall to the mujahideen.

Nevertheless, guided by Lohbeck, CBS aired an optimistic report, blaming the guerrillas' setback on the snow. There was no mention of factional rivalry within the resistance, no inkling that there was a heated dispute over whether to attack the city at all, not a clue that the mujahideen might not be as united as their foreign supporters might have wished them to be. Nor was there a single word on Abdul Haq's true field strength, which, for reasons too tedious to explain on the air, was far below what would be required to march on Kabul.

"The mujahideen have used the winter to dig in around the capital," correspondent Anthony Mason said. "The mountain trails are finally beginning to clear." It's only a matter of time now, said one guerrilla commander. "When the snow melts, so will the regime."

The snows have melted and returned again, but the regime hangs on, perversely, stronger than ever. The U.S. waits for Afghanistan's cities to fall. To many Americans who followed this prolonged and spottily covered war story, the collapse of the mujahideens' jihad into internecine strife — complete with drug-running and run-outs of rivals — has come as a sudden, baffling development. It is no such thing. The complicated truth of Afghanistan was always there for those who would but look.

Bitter truths are always unwelcome — and especially so in stories about our side in a "good war." But telling such truths has traditionally been the reporter's mission. In the case of Afghanistan, at least one key reporter assigned himself a different mission — as a partisan in a holy war. ♦

CBS JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1990

Afghan reformers face fight

KABUL: Farid Ahmad Mazdak rubs his hand over his youthful, unshaven face and grins.

"The resistance is there. Our society is traditional, so we have to be careful," he said, referring not to the Mujahideen resistance fighting his Soviet-backed government here, but to his own party colleagues.

At 32, Mr Mazdak, with only a high school education, has been catapulted by President Najibullah into the vanguard of a fight to change the image of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), which is spurned by the Mujahideen as a "Soviet puppet communist regime".

Mr Mazdak, in an open-necked blue shirt and security corduroy jacket, is a formidable political weapon. After four years at the head of the Democratic Youth Organisation of Afghanistan (DYOA), the nursery for PDPA cadres, he is now the youngest member of the Politburo and a secretary of the party's Central Committee.

Last week he added yet another hat, that of acting president of the National Front, an umbrella organization grouping a few small left-wing parties with the PDPA that Mr Najibullah wants to turn into a centrist peace front to contest general elections if and when peace comes to Afghanistan.

The young Mr Mazdak sings a persuasive song.

He calls himself a "human being", not a communist, and talks of the "old party" as having made a host of "mistakes", including imitating the socialist policies of other countries.

The PDPA has been blamed not only for allowing the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan but also for thousands of murders in the name of the revolution.

The new party, Mr Mazdak says, will concentrate on attracting foreign investment while recognising the importance of the Afghan peasant and of the different nationalities that have made Afghanistan one of the most complex political entities in the world.

He refers unabashedly to the complete lack of economic progress in the 12 years "the old party" was in power and the necessity for restarting American irrigation projects, stalled since former king Zahir Shah was deposed in 1973.

He enthuses about the changes underway in Eastern Europe, before tackling more cautiously the sticky question of how he and the reformists can push through the changes that Mr Najibullah, 43, hopes will turn the PDPA into a strong centrist party with a populist platform of peace.

"The resistance is there," he says, referring to his own appointments and to the changes the president is trying to push through.


"We have elements who try to follow the past system, who say we should use force."

In the past, Mr Najibullah has jailed those opposing his plans to try for a political rather than a military solution in Afghanistan.

Mr Mazdak says his group will not need to use force, and fellow central committee member Najmuddin Kawyani puts the reformists in a "decisive majority".

Mr Kawyani adds that the conservatives do not represent a danger to the unity of the party, which in the past has been plagued by factionalism.

- AFP



seeking to keep the cold war alive. It is time to bring the cold war to an end in Afghanistan.

March 22-28, 1990

The Friday Times

ASCHAD...

Cont. from p. 27

able to participate in a two sided negotiation. However these have failed to gain support because they were fundamentally incompatible with the realities in Afghanistan namely, that there are many more than two sides, and that it is impossible for foreigners to force the Afghan political mosaic into a simple two sided equation.

The Cordover approach still offers the only useful blueprint for addressing the essential issues surrounding the present conflict in Afghanistan. Let us hope that future meetings between Baker and Shevardnadze will utilize this blueprint to bring to an end 12 years of bloody warfare. Too many Afghan lives have been lost by those

The neglect of Pushto

John M Jennings

For outsiders like myself, language has always been part of the Frontier's mystique. Not only westerners but other peoples nearby, such as Punjabis and Tajiks, have described Pushto as fierce, harsh and difficult — much as they have tended to describe its speakers.

Among Pukhtoons themselves (or Pushtuns, or Pathans, according to your dialect and preference) an altogether different mystique prevails. Pushto is a language of poetry: its most important written expression is verse. The archetypal Pukhtoon hero has always been the warrior-poet, as personified by Khushhal Khan Khattak in the late 17th century.

At any rate, their language has been foremost among the traits which have set Pukhtoons apart from their neighbours.

Today the birth rate among native Pushto speakers is soaring. Turkic and Persian-speaking northern Afghans, who would never have learned Pushto in the old days, have picked it up in Pakistan's refugee camps. Moreover, more westerners than ever before are coming into daily contact with the language. Even though most make do with interpreters, two beginners' Pushto courses — one at Peshawar University and a small private programme in the aid community here — exist to serve the scholarly handful who want to speak it themselves.

So why are Pukhtoon intellectuals so worried about the state of their mother tongue? Hardly a week goes by without a poet or author denouncing another threat to Pushto. (At the moment Pushto films are at the top of the intelligentsia's cultural hit list. But this seems at most a symptom of the underlying problem).

I went to see Sultan Saber, Editor of *Heywad* (Nation), a pioneer Pushto newspaper based here. Saber saheb has written a thick book on the history of Pushto and countless shorter works on its grammar and other aspects.

The Pukhtoons' unique tribal system has outlasted, in the past decade alone, both the Red Army's onslaught and Gen Zia's less overt efforts to undermine it. Pukhtoon culture survives, if not unchanged, still largely intact. "Why," I asked, "should anyone worry about the language, given such cultural resilience?"

Sultan saheb began tracing the history of the Pukhtoons and their language down the ages. I am in no position to question his view that the current tribal structure is 4,000 years old and that the Pukhtoons are related to the ancient Hittites of Asia Minor. But others, more learned than I, say such claims amount to little more than speculation. Sir Olaf Caroe, for one, felt Pushto could be traced reliably back to the Sakas, nomadic Iranian invaders of the first century BC, and less certainly to Achaemenian Persia (which fell to Alexander in 331 BC).

Nevertheless, few doubt Saber's view that Pushto and Persian are brother and sister. At this point, one of Saber's assistant editors — an articulate young Afghan named Ismatullah — interrupted tactfully to address my original question, and to explain how

Persian's spread has helped cast Pushto into limbo.

"You are familiar with Logar — you said you have been there?" I had, and I nodded. "Well, they (Logaris) are almost all Pukhtoon," he went on. "But most of them, especially in the towns, speak Persian now, from birth." Tribal identity among Pukhtoons, he explained, isn't necessarily determined by language. For socio-economic reasons Pukhtoons have sometimes given up their language — though they have never readily forgotten what it means to be Pukhtoon.

Ismatullah gave other examples in Afghanistan. "There are Pukhtoons around Herat who speak only Persian. Do you know the Safis in Baghlan?" I had never been to Baghlan so I asked whether they were related to the well-known Safis of Kunar. "The very same," said Ismatullah. "And in Baghlan they hardly speak Pushto."

Pushto, unlike Persian, has never been what might be called an imperialistic language — a tongue in favour of which whole peoples forget their birth language. Nor has it become a lingua franca like Urdu. Even though, as individual adventurers, Pukhtoon Shahs and Sultans have ruled in Iran and Delhi, even though Pukhtoon soldiers of fortune have roamed all Asia, even though today Pukhtoons dominate Pakistan's transport sector.

The problem, said Hamid Elmi, BBC radio's Peshawar representative, is that Pukhtoons 'like learning other people's languages. In Pakistan they want to speak Urdu. In Afghanistan they want to speak Persian. They all want to speak English'. Hamid added that he sometimes has trouble persuading people to be interviewed in Pushto on the BBC's Pushto service

broadcasts, even when it is their native language.

Pukhtoons collectively remain attached to their ancestral homelands, even if many individuals have gone off over the years to become Lodi Sultans or oilfield workers in the Gulf. Hamid feels this, along with their tendency to learn other languages and take their own for granted, has resulted in Pushto being stifled somewhat by the cultural dynamism of Persia and India, on either side.

A Pushto revival would be easier to speak if more Pukhtoons knew how to read and write. Those who can and do read are usually more conscious of their language than those who can't. But until a couple of years ago, school children in the NWFP were taught their basic subjects entirely in Urdu (or English, depending on the school). Now classes are held in Pushto, but only through to the fifth year of primary school.

The Pukhtoon intelligentsia may therefore start to see matters improve, and a few classes of kids with a good reading and writing knowledge of the Frontier's 'national language' may be more susceptible to the works of Khushhal Khan and Rehman Baba.

But the key to such a revival will have to be popular will. It can't be stage-managed by a few literary types who know what's best for everybody else's cultural well-being. And given the decline of the oral tradition — kids, even Pukhtoon kids, don't spend much time learning poetry by heart these days — the desire may simply be lacking.

But there is no proof of this yet. There probably won't be until the schools, at least, stop stacking the deck against Pushto by not teaching it in after fifth class. Why not a few experimental high school programmes

where Pushto remains the language of instruction, with Urdu as a mandatory second language? God help us — we might produce a generation of literate bilinguals on the frontier.

March 15-21, 1990



They are taught in Pushto only at the primary level and their 'natural' affinity for foreign languages may take them further away from their mother tongue

The Friday Times

ORGANIZATIONS

JOB POSSIBILITIES FOR AFGHAN PROFESSIONALS IN AFGHANISTAN OR PAKISTAN

Afghans with professional and technical skills are now being recruited to apply their talents towards reconstruction efforts planned for Afghanistan.

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) is an international organization of 35 member States which assists refugees and migrants of all types for humanitarian purposes. In the area of assistance to Afghans, IOM (formerly ICM) is most well-known for its Afghan Medical Program, through which war-wounded Afghan refugees are brought to the United States and Europe to receive medical treatment otherwise not available in Pakistan. Under this program, over 850 Afghan patients have been treated in 16 different countries over the past four years.

In an effort to support projects related to reconstruction in Afghanistan, IOM began a program of "Return of Talent" for Afghanistan in 1989. The main goal of the program is to provide an opportunity to interested Afghan professionals to relocate to the region and contribute their skills, knowledge and experience to projects designed to rebuild the country. The program is based on the premise that Afghan experts can provide greater long-term technical and cultural know-how than their non-Afghan colleagues. For Afghanistan itself, the program assists in replenishing some of the valuable human resources which were lost due to the war, and which hopefully add to development efforts in the major areas of agriculture, education, health, engineering and public administration.

HOW THE RETURN OF TALENT PROGRAM WORKS

Interested Afghan professionals should contact the IOM-Washington office to receive an application package. The application should be filled out and sent back to IOM-Washington, where it will be compiled and sent to the IOM office in Peshawar. IOM-Peshawar is currently receiving open job descriptions from organizations and agencies working on the reconstruction process in Afghanistan. IOM will then act as the intermediary to match Afghan professionals in the U.S. with employing organizations in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Should an applicant successfully receive an offer of employment, he or she may qualify for financial assistance from IOM to assist in their return home. This assistance is primarily intended to ease some of the burden involved in relocating from the U.S. to the region. Assistance can include fully-paid, one-way plane tickets for the professional and his/her dependents, as well as some limited funding to help with immediate financial needs encountered in the move.

If you have any questions or would like more information on the Return of Talent Program for Afghanistan, please write or call IOM at:

International Organization for Migration
1750 K Street NW, #1110
Washington, DC 20006

Tel.: (202) 862-1826

amnesty international

AFGHANISTAN

ARREST AND IMPRISONMENT OF MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL UNITY PARTY

In June 1989 arrests were carried out by the WAD, the security police, of the founding members of the newly formed National Unity Party, an association of university lecturers, scientists and army officers which has stated its aims as being the establishment of democracy and respect for human rights in Afghanistan through peaceful means. The party's supporters have said it has sought to create an atmosphere for the peaceful transfer of power to a government elected by the people of Afghanistan, and to be committed to a campaign for civil liberties and equality between men and women.

Among the detainees are Professor Mohammad Mohsen Formaly, member of the Academy of Science, Kabul University, sentenced to six years' imprisonment; Colonel (Dargval) Dr Abdul Jalil, lecturer at the University of War, 70 years old, sentenced to two years' imprisonment; Colonel (Dargval) Mohammad Hakim, lecturer at the Institute of Social Sciences; and Abdul Garib Khairkhah, lecturer at the School of Ideological Studies. Amnesty International does not have the names of all the detainees. Some army officers on active service were also among the reported members of the National Unity Party detained.

From an article in the
Washington Post by
Sadrulddin Aga Khan
on 4/17:

Although peace has not followed the Soviet withdrawal, Western interest in Afghanistan's problems seems to have somewhat lapsed. This is no doubt connected to the frustrated hope that the refugees would soon be returning in massive numbers. But the fact that they have not done so is not an argument against providing funds for the reconstruction of their country. The U.N.'s activities are closely linked to the future return of the uprooted and their reabsorption into Afghan society.

But it must be recognized that the repatriation of what amounts to 40 percent of the world's refugee population will not take place unless the refugees themselves perceive that there is something worth going back to. Most are women and children. . . .

Many commentators have outlined dreadful prospects for the future of Afghanistan, using such words as "Lebanization," "Vietnamization" or "Mongolization." It is an undoubted fact that if outside powers involved themselves more in Afghanistan's economic future and less in its politics, the prospects of both would be far brighter.

The Afghans are a fiercely independent people, and political interference in their country is passionately resented. When they request nonlethal help in their moment of need, however, the world should heed their appeal. In recent months the U.N. has witnessed a growing willingness from all quarters to allow U.N. provisions destined for civilians on the other side of military lines to pass through safely.

It is this emerging consensus that we must build on as a basis of unity. Only through the kind of assistance that the U.N. is providing (on purely humanitarian and nonpolitical considerations) is there a chance of Afghanistan's turning out in the way we all wish: independent, nonaligned, nonfundamentalist, largely self-supporting and—above all—peaceful and stable.

According to the law on political parties, any association with 500 or more members with peaceful aims and which accepts the government's official policy of national reconciliation can apply to be registered a political party. In accordance with this law, the National Unity Party reportedly undertook to compile a list of members to enclose with their application for registration. Before the list could be completed, security personnel known as agents of WAD (formerly KHAD) raided the houses of the founding members of the National Unity Party in June 1989 and arrested dozens of them. The detainees included the prisoners mentioned above. Some of the prisoners are believed to have already been tried by a special revolutionary court, probably in August 1989; their reported sentences are cited above. Amnesty International does not have other details of the trials. The procedures of the special revolutionary courts, however, fall far short of internationally established standards for a fair trial. The prisoners do not have access to a lawyer of their choice and have no right to a judicial review by a higher tribunal. . . .

JANUARY 1990

AI INDEX: ASA 11/04/90

The zip code given in the last FORUM for the HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFGHANISTAN COMMITTEE calendar was incorrect. The calendar is available from HRAC, % Farkhunda Fakri, 2055 W. Lunt Ave., Chicago, IL 60645, for \$2.50 each. The calendar is for the Afghan year 1369 (began 3/21/90) so it's not too late to order one.

In Afghanistan, canine warriors fight for honor

By Marc Kaufman
Inquirer Staff Writer

KABUL, Afghanistan — The hulking, snarling dog named Palawan had his fangs deep into the neck of equally ferocious Jang, and would not let go.

Steam rose as the big silver dog's warm blood hit the cold air, and Jang seemed to go limp. His dry, choked, near-death growl hung in the air.

But the wounded dog made one mighty effort — turning and jumping with the other dog still deep into his neck — and the fangs were loosened.

Jang was free, and hundreds of men watching and wagering roared their approval.

Snarling, the two wild-eyed animals went at it again.

They fought on a muddy, open field on the outskirts of the Afghan capital. A cold mist had moved in, blocking the view of the snow-covered mountains all around.

It was a recent Friday morning, the Muslim sabbath, but the 500 Afghan men gathered here — businessmen, and soldiers and officers — were not in the mood for prayer.

In the winter, Friday mornings in Kabul mean only one thing to many men here: dog fights.

Afghans are a tough and warlike people, well-known for their eagerness to fight, or watch a fight, and the weekly dog fights are evidence.

On a clear, chilly day — which keeps the dogs fresh — as many as 1,000 men will come to watch the dogs battle, and will bring 200 to 300 dogs with them. The fighting goes on all morning, with thousands of dollars bet.

It is brutal, but it is not, the dog owners insist, for nothing: There is a great deal of valor and pride to be won and lost on the fighting fields of Kabul.

"Our goal is always to have a noble, an honorable, fight," said Ahmed Gdani, a tall, fierce-eyed shopkeeper from Kandahar.

"Dogs should never die by fighting — they should always be pulled apart so they can recover and fight again. This is good fighting to see."

Ears are torn, muzzles shredded and necks opened in snarling, uncontrolled battle until one dog is declared — with the consent of its owner — to be defeated.

Many of the dogs are fine-looking animals — a big, thick-furred local breed that looks like a mix between a Saint Bernard and a German shepherd, with a little bit of wolf thrown in. The Afghans call them Koochi dogs, because they were initially bred by the Koochi nomads of Afghanistan as sheep dogs.

Many are so big and powerful — some well over 100 pounds — that two men and two leashes are needed to keep a dog under control.

These dogs are naturally tough, but not vicious. Hundreds of Kabul families also keep them as pets, and privately condemn the dog fighting as "nothing a good Muslim would do."

Nobody seems to know when the Kabul dog fights began, but all agree it was long ago. The brutal war that has engulfed Afghanistan for the last 11 years, the men say, has neither stopped nor much changed the fights.

"In Kabul, most of the people cannot read, and movies are very few these days," explained a government worker named Ismatullah Haq. "People have little excitement, and they look forward to the dog fights for that."

However brutal the fights might be, the process of matching the contestants has that typically Afghan combination of formality, subtlety and politeness that surprises so many first-time visitors to the country.

The dog owners sit with their animals — often covered in garlands and with harnesses of rich, red Turkomen designs — and both man and beast try to look as calm and uninterested as possible. Some youngsters, and then older dog trainers, are sent from each party to size up the competition.

Tentative contacts are made and possible bets discussed. Then one owner will make his move: Slowly, casually, he will walk with his dog to the center of the large — perhaps 50-yard-wide — circle.

If another owner wants his dog to fight, he will walk his dog forward,

too. Negotiations continue — with the excited dogs barking and straining at their leashes — and bets are made.

Then the dogs are unleashed. They immediately pounce at each other in a snarling rage. In a blur of action fur, blood and saliva fly into the air.

Some dogs are trained to go for the jugular, others to attack the legs and upend the opponent.

The spectators draw closer, but are scolded, pushed and then sometimes whipped back by fight organizers. If the excited Afghans, their heads covered in large turbans and with blankets slung over their shoulders, get too close, the dogs may turn on them.

When one dog appears beaten the fight ends. But it is no easy matter to pull apart powerful animals when they are intent on killing each other. It sometimes takes three or four men to separate the dogs. The men grab whatever they can — tail, torso or leg — to end the fight. The wounds of both victor and vanquished are cleaned and treated with antiseptic as soon as the fight ends.

The fight between Palawan (Warrior) and Jang (Battle) was fierce and long — lasting more than 15 minutes. By the end both were panting, badly bloodied, and in pain.

It was near the bloody finish when a sudden reminder streaked by of the other Afghan war taking place. Shooting up from behind a nearby mountain, two government rockets took off — trailed by long tongues of orange flame.

The two rockets passed into the clouds on their way out to the *mujaheddin*-controlled countryside, followed several seconds later by the crashing sound of their passing.

It was as if a peal of thunder had broken just down the block — one so close it shook the ground — but neither the dogs nor their owners nor the spectators seemed to notice.


They were much too involved in the timeless war before them.

— The Philadelphia Inquirer —



Palawan (meaning Warrior), with his collar decorated before battle, is handled by his master.

Feb. 25, 1990



Friday morning on the outskirts of Kabul, in a muddy field, the Koochi dogs fight for sport.

DINING OUT

PAMIR MORRISTOWN

★★

Food: Afghan
Ambiance: Casbah
Service: Somewhat rushed
Wine List: No liquor license
Price Value: Very good

It's refreshing to find a restaurant that knows exactly what it is, and Pamir is just such a place. Its snappy outdoor awning boldly announces PAMIR—CUISINE OF AFGHANISTAN, and the restaurant's large front windows carry the theme further, with displays of copper samovars and Afghan artifacts. Step inside and you'll find a handsome Afghan rug spread on the floor and a refrigerated display case stocked with some of the world's more exotic desserts. You sense immediately that your visit to this restaurant will be unusual, and it is.

That's because Afghan food is a curious mixture of tastes and textures. The country's location—landlocked on the major trading routes between Russia, the Middle East, and India—is reflected in its food, an earthy, sometimes spicy, yet noble blend of all three traditions. Lamb and eggplant are staples of the Afghan kitchen, and these are often spiced with yogurt, onion, garlic (lots of it), and cinnamon. Of special interest is the rice. Pamir serves the nutty Basmati variety, described as "white spice rice," which is grown in the foothills of the Himalayas, and which, with its toothy texture, is the perfect foil for the saucers served here.

The dining room itself has a dark, exotic quality because the chandeliers cast light glow on the greenish-blue walls and red carpet. On our first visit a tall, elegant waiter with eyes like Omar Sharif emerged from the shadows. An Afghan native, he wore a gold-spangled vest and flashed a warm smile. He asked if we were familiar with the menu, and our negative reply gave him the opportunity to describe each item and its sauce in great detail. His tendency to address only the men at the table, however, was disconcerting, but may have been a cultural peculiarity rather than a lapse in common courtesy. He also rushed us along, plunking down one course as he removed the dishes from the earlier one, so that we polished off a multicourse dinner in less than an hour.

While the menu looks quite diverse at first glance, choices are often variations of the same thing. The same can be said about saucers, especially the ubiquitous tomato/meat sauce and the pureed spinach sauce, which appear and reappear. The quality of the ingredients, however, is uniformly excellent, even though portion sizes tend to be small.

The best appetizer I tried was *auskak*, a fragile, ravioli-type dumpling filled with scallops and topped with yogurt and meat sauce. Of the two fried turnover appetizers listed, the better one is stuffed with potato and meat. Called *hulanee kachaloo*, it is served with yogurt and is nicely flavored and not greasy, while the spicy Afghan sauce flavored with vinegar and coriander gave a nice accent to *samosa goushi*, the pillow-shaped fried pastries stuffed with beef, chick-peas, and spices.

A full-bodied soup called *aukh* was laced with diced vegetables and ground beef; I would have enjoyed it more if it had been served piping hot instead of tepid, although, according to the restaurant, it is deliberately served warm. But you can dip the crusty flat bread in it and have quite a meal. In addition, a fresh-tasting salad is included in the dinner price, but it is served in a small bowl and the garlicky yogurt dressing is not mixed through.

Several different kababs are offered, including lamb, chicken, and ground beef. In

each, the featured meat is marinated, threaded on a skewer, and broiled. The kabob is served with rice or vegetables. My favorite was the tender and flavorful chicken kabob, but all were first-rate.

Two of the more interesting lamb entrées are *norange palaw* and *sabhi-chalaw*. The first is a striking dish in which a mountain of white rice is laced with mushy pistachios and almonds, flavored with rosewater, and sprinkled with a confetti of orange peel. Buried under the rice mountain, one finds chunks of lamb. While there wasn't much meat in this dish, each piece was tender and tasty. *Sabhi-chalaw* was a stew-like creation, with pieces of lamb served in a spinach/onion sauce, all of which was ladled over Basmati rice.

For dessert there's *firni*, a milky, custard-like pudding, which was too heavily flavored with rosewater for my taste; and *baghlawa*, a walnut-based pastry with flaky crust that is very similar to Greek baklava, except that it is made with lemon and orange syrup instead of honey and is not quite so sweet. The jumbo fried pastry called elephant ears is another option.

—L.B.

85 Washington Street (Route 24), Morristown (201-605-1095). Lunch: Tuesday through Friday, 11:30 AM to 2:30 PM. Dinner: Sunday through Thursday, 4:30 to 10 PM; Friday and Saturday, 4:30 to 11 PM. MasterCard, Visa. Wheelchair access easy. Dinner for two without wine averages \$35.

New Jersey Monthly / March 1990

Kabul Restaurant
5401 State St. MADISON, WISC.
256-6322
Open 11 a.m.-10:30 p.m. Mon.-Sat.,
11 a.m.-10 p.m. Sun. Dinner from
4:30. Nearest parking in Lake Street
Ramp. Wheelchair accessible.
Smoking and nonsmoking sections.
VISA, MasterCard.

Occasionally, in a restaurant kitchen, a little magic occurs. Culinary alchemy is practiced, and perfectly ordinary ingredients are combined and worked with such skill and understanding that something truly special is created.

Ghafoor Zafari has a knack for making kitchen magic happen whenever he touches Afghanisthan cuisine. He has done so at Panjshir, on Odessa Road, and now he has brought his Southwest Asian magic to State Street, where—with his brother Saboor and head chef Nuri Elgutas—he has opened the Kabul Restaurant. Judging by the crowds in the restaurant's first week, the Kabul is an instant hit. If you haven't tried it yet, I urge you to do so without further delay.

I generally do not try a new restaurant in its first month or two—often a period of trial and error—but I couldn't resist stopping in for lunch at Kabul during its inaugural week. I ate lightly—Mashawa soup, house salad, Afghan bread (\$8.75) and a bottle of Garten Brau bock beer.

The Mashawa soup was delightful—chickpeas, split peas, rice and meats

(ground beef and chicken?) in a moderately spicy and highly seasoned broth. The house salad—crisp greens with a slightly sweet cucumber-curry dressing—offered a nice contrast. And the flat Afghan bread is in itself reason enough to come to the Kabul. (The bread is now available in some Madison-area grocery stores.)

A companion and I returned for dinner several days later. Companion ordered the very pleasing evening special, Lamb Tajine (\$8.95)—chunks of cilantro, oregano and other spices, and served with sliced potatoes, green peppers and carrots.

I tried the mahi (\$7.75), which is described as "fresh fillet of catfish baked with seasoning and served with a spiced tomato-based sauce with mushrooms." This mahi is not to be confused with mahi-mahi, which is the dolphin fish caught in Hawaiian waters. And the dolphin fish used to make mahi-mahi, in turn, is not to be confused with the friendly dolphin of "Flipper" fame, which is not a fish but a marine mammal. But I digress.

I love catfish, but had never before thought to order it in an Afghan restaurant. And now I will most certainly order it again and again—for it is one of those magic dishes. The fillets were tender, swimming in a rich curry seasoned with tumeric, cilantro, coriander and other spices, and served with sliced potatoes. Kabul's mahi easily takes a spot on my list of all-time favorite dishes.

We finished the evening with Arabic coffee and a dish of fresh strawberries, raspberries and kiwi, all nestled into a large dollop of whipped cream. It was the perfect ending to a perfect meal. ■

ISTHMUS • APRIL 13, 1990

AS THE FASTEST PIZZAMAKER ALIVE, WAHEED ASIM HAS A WINNING SECRET: HE KNEADS THE DOUGH



Waheed Asim wanted what every young immigrant wants: a slice of the good life. Asim's American dream wasn't just pie in the sky either. Thanks to the Horatio Alger virtues of pluck, hard work and dedication—combined with the superheroan eye-hand coordination of a Michael Jordan—Asim, 19, is rolling in dough. For three years he has been America's champion pizzamaker.

Asim's rise to pizza superstardom began modestly enough in the parking lot of a Domino's Pizza in Alexandria, Va. "He was 14. He just kept hanging around. He didn't speak a word of English," says Frank Meeks, the franchisee and Asim's biggest fan. "He was willing to work hard, so we hired him." For Asim, an Afghan who had been in the U.S. for just one week, it was instant culture shock. "I had

never seen a pizza," he says. "I didn't even know what a pizza was. I started out as a garbage man, in charge of the trash."

In six months Waheed worked his way out of garbage and into pizzamaking. The money he made—\$3.45 an hour plus bonuses—meant survival for his family, who had left everything when they fled Afghanistan in 1983. His father had died, and his mother got Waheed, his brother and sister out of the country on the pretext that she had to go to India for surgery. "We had houses in Afghanistan," he says, "but we left them so they would think we were coming back."

The family was still struggling when Asim entered the Pizza Olympics in Ann Arbor, Mich., in 1986. Just like any Olympian hopeful, he had carefully honed his skills. "For a year and a half I worked real

hard," he says. "I picked up techniques—how to use the little seconds that we waste. After work I'd do a little jogging and come back and start practicing. But 75 percent of my practice is at work. I do about 260 pizzas an hour." Asim's dedication paid off. He came in second that year and won \$7,500. The next year he won first place and \$8,500. Asim retained his title again in 1988 and last year won again, making 16 pizzas in 3 minutes, 41 seconds.

Waheed used his prize money to make a down payment on a town house in Alexandria or his family. His lightning speed has propelled him into a managerial training program, and he also travels the country demonstrating his skills and preaching the virtues of pizza. "I love pizza," he says. "I eat pizza, if not three times a day, at least twice." ■

RECENT PUBLICATIONS

ROADS AND RIVALS: The Political Uses of Access in the Borderlands of Asia by Mahnaz Ispahani, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1990. 256 pp., maps, illus. \$29.95.

Ispahani explores the crucial but unacknowledged role that land routes have played in the strategic, political, and economic evolution of the borderlands of Central, South, and West Asia, an increasingly developed frontier where Pakistani, Iranian, Afghan, American, and Soviet interests compete.

The **AFGHAN MEDIA RESOURCE CENTER**, U.P.O. Box 909, Peshawar, has published a report of its activities for the past few years. The 24-page illustrated report is available from the Center at the above address. Haji Sayed Daud directs the Center.

MAPS OF MUGHAL INDIA. Drawn by Jean-Baptiste-Joseph Gentil, Agent for the French Gov't to the Court of Shuja-udaula at Faizabad, in 1770, by Susan Gole, Kegan Paul Int'l, (Routledge, 29 West 35th St., New York, NY 10001-2291), April 1990. 60 pp., illus. throughout. \$85.

STATE, REVOLUTION, & SUPERPOWERS IN AFGHANISTAN by Hafizullah Emadi, Praeger Publishers (order from Greenwood Press, 88 Post Road West, Box 5007, Westport, CT 06881), 1990. 176 pp. ISBN 0-275-93460-8. \$39.95.

This volume studies the process of nation-state building, its role in modernization and developments in Afghanistan following World War II to the period of Soviet occupation of the country in December 1979, and the struggle of various social strata for social transformation in the country. Emadi explores the policies of the United States and Soviet Union and their economic assistance in Afghanistan's modernization projects following World War II. Each superpower tried to wind Afghanistan to its side by supporting a particular social strata within the state apparatus.

CONTENTS: Foreword; Introduction; State and Society; Politics of Change and Development; State and the Superpowers; Politics of the Resistance; Problems and Outlook; Appendix; Selected Bibliography; Index.

HAFIZULLAH EMADI is the author of several articles and papers. He received his Ph.D from the University of Hawaii.

"Afghanistan in 1989" by Theodore Eliot, Jr., in **ASIAN SURVEY**, Vol. XXX, #2, February 1990.

"Afghanistan - War as a Factor of Entry into Politics" by Olivier Roy, "On the Routes of 'Hijrat'" by Marek Sliwinski, & "The Militia in Afghanistan" by Gilles Dorronsoro & Chantal Lobato, all appeared in **CENTRAL ASIAN SURVEY**, Vol. 8, #4, 1989.

THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF EARLY INNER ASIA, edited by Denis Sinor, Cambridge University Press, 40 West 20th Street, New York, NY 10011, 1990. 504 pp. \$79.50.

Originally announced as Volume I of *The Cambridge History of Central Asia*, this book will now be published as a one volume history. (Volumes 2 and 3, previously announced, will not now be published.)

This book introduces the geographical setting of Inner Asia and follows its history from the paleolithic era to the rise of the Mongol empire in the thirteenth century. From earliest times Inner Asia has linked and separated the great sedentary civilizations of Europe and Asia. In the premodern period it was definable more as a cultural than a geographical entity, its frontiers shifting according to the changing balances of power.

Written by distinguished international scholars who have pioneered the exploration of Inner Asia's poorly documented past, this book chronologically traces the varying historical achievements of the disparate population groups in the region. These include the Scythians and Sarmatians, the Hsiung-nu, the Huns and Avars, the people of the Russian steppes, the Turk empire, the Uighurs and the Tibetan empire. It is the editor's hope that this book will bring Inner Asia more closely into the fabric of world history.

Contributors: Denis Sinor, Robert N. Taaffe, A.P. Okladnikov, A.I. Melyukova, Ying-Shih Yu, A.K. Narain, Samuel Szádeczky-Kardoss, Peter B. Golden, Colin Mackerras, Helmut Hoffman, Herbert Franke.

FAMOUS AFGHANS OR THE ROLE OF AFGHANS IN THE HISTORY & CIVILIZATION OF INDIA by Ghulam Ghaus Khaibari, Ministry of Information & Culture, ROA. 304 pp. In Pushto. The book describes in 8 chapters "the golden eras of Afghan rulers, scholars, poets, in India during the 11th century A.D. & afterwards." **KT 1/22**

"A Vegetal Dye Weaving Project for Afghan Turkomans" by Chris Walter in **ORIENTAL RUG REVIEW**, Vol. 10, #2, Dec/Jan 1990.

"Pitfalls in Policy on the Path to Kabul" by Richard Mackenzie in **INSIGHT**, April 9, 1990.

A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION OF CONTEMPORARY AFGHAN COUNCILS prepared for ACBAR by Lynn Carter & Kerry Connor, April 1989, Peshawar. 52 pp.

A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE ACHAEMENID EMPIRE by M.A. Dandamaev, trans. into English by W.J. Vogelsang, Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1989. 373 pp + illus., maps. \$90. ISBN 90 04 09172 6

BOOK REVIEWS

THE SOVIET WITHDRAWAL FROM AFGHANISTAN, Amin Saikal & William Maley, eds., Cambridge/New York/Melbourne, Cambridge University Press, 1989. 177 pp., notes, index. Contributors: Amin Saikal, William Maley, Louis Dupree, T.H. Rigby, Geoffrey Jukes, Robert F. Miller, Leslie Holmes, Richard A. Falk, J.L. Richardson.

This is a collection of papers presented at a scholarly symposium held by the Political Science Department of the Australian National University in August 1988. Except for the Americans Louis Dupree and Richard Falk, the participants were all associated with Australian universities.

The symposium was held only a few months after the Geneva accords were signed and the announced withdrawal of uniformed Soviet ground forces began, when euphoria was at its height and long before the settlement's dismaying consequences had become too obvious to be dismissed. Apparently none of the authors had hands-on involvement in any aspect of significant military or political policy on the post-1978 Afghanistan crisis or (except for Dr. Dupree) extensive post-invasion field experience, any of which might have inspired more skepticism. In any case, they all accept as their point of departure what then constituted wisdom - e.g., that the UN-brokered settlement was a successful solution, that the Soviet Union was withdrawing totally and giving up its effort to control Afghanistan, that Kabul's communist regime would speedily collapse, that a triumphant resistance would form a new government, that the refugees would rush homeward, etc. Unfortunately, the reality of events has long since demolished such illusions and vitiated conclusions based on them.

In addition, although the editors point out that the authors "were in no way obligated to adopt a particular methodological approach, or to conform to a particular line of argument," all come from the academic world and their papers take an essentially academic approach based largely on published sources.

A scholarly perspective is often a virtue, particularly when time and distance make it possible to sort out the facts. But it is not adequate - at least not yet - in the case of Afghanistan, where the realities are extremely confused and more messy, Machiavellian and complicated than most; where much of the truth is still hidden, disguised or falsified; and where the situation is, to put it mildly, still in flux. (As one well-known foreign affairs writer remarked, "Afghanistan is so complicated that by comparison, the whole Central American mess is a piece of cake.") Moreover, since much of the general writing and reporting on Afghanistan is (and always has been) remarkably uninformed, superficial, and inaccurate, analysis based on published sources is unavoidably handicapped by the flaws of those sources. Nevertheless, the book is not without interest.

Those familiar with the work of the American participants will find their contributions characteristic. The late Louis Dupree's paper epitomizes his lifelong anthropological approach to Afghan issues. Richard Falk labors as usual to establish moral and political equivalency between the Soviet Union in Afghanistan since 1979 and the United States almost anywhere and always.

One might anticipate that the Australian scholars would provide some fresh, Pacific-oriented perspectives, but their work turns out to rely in large part on the same sources used by European and American scholars. There is, however, information of significant interest in the papers by T.H. Rigby, Geoffrey Jukes and Leslie Holmes, who deal with the effect of Afghanistan on, respectively, Soviet domestic politics, the Soviet armed forces and Sino-Soviet relations. All three draw on primary Soviet sources. These papers (and, to a lesser degree, the others) include additional data on events between 1979 and 1988.

The book can be of interest to knowledgeable readers who can spot errors and dig out the useful bits. Its very flaws make it useful to anyone who wants to know what went wrong after Geneva, since it provides a compendium of most of the misinformed and unrealistic assumptions connected with the settlement which helped pave the way for subsequent disasters and widespread disillusion. So, even though events have invalidated many of its authors' premises and conclusions, this can be a worthwhile - though not an essential - addition to the specialist's bookshelf.

Rosanne Klass
New York, New York

THE HAZĀRAS, Hassan Poladi, Stockton CA, Mughal Publishing Co., 1989. Pp. xvi + 431, index. (Distributed through Avenue Books, 840 W. Benjamin Holt Drive, Stockton, CA 95207) \$19.95.

The Hazaras are a minority people in Afghanistan whose customs and historical experience have been treated lightly in most studies of Afghanistan. Their own memory of their past has scarcely been recorded, and much of what is recorded comes from outsiders. Moreover, most works on the Hazaras have received relatively little attention, especially in comparison with their historic rivals, the Pashtuns. Hassan Poladi has produced the first monograph on the Hazaras aiming to be comprehensive. Drawing from a diversity of sources in several languages, Poladi has collected what is known about the history and culture of these people and adds some new material from his own experience of growing up a Hazara. This book thus represents a certain viewpoint - an attempt by a single Hazara to record the customs, beliefs and historical experience of his people.

The book is dedicated to "the souls of hundreds of thousands of Hazara men, women, and children who lost their lives during the 1891-1893 war," and, indeed, the focus of the book seems to be the hardships of the Hazaras under Afghan rule and in particular the extreme circumstances of the Abdur Rahman period when the Hazaras were compelled to accept Kabul rule. A separate chapter is devoted to the Hazarajat war, separated from the other chapters on Hazara history, presumably to emphasize the events of that period. Also, a full chapter is given to the enslavement of the Hazaras. In the final two chapters, "Economy" and "The Hazaras as a Minority," Poladi presents extensive evidence of discrimination against his people in the modern period, attributing it as much to their religious sect (most Hazaras are Shi'ite) as to their race and the competition for resources.

Poladi was not a polished scholar and the book has certain weaknesses. He has assembled and attempted to use virtually everything he could find on his subject; hence, the inclusion of some unnecessary material. The comments of poorly informed travelers are treated with the same respect as the measured reports of thorough scholars. Nevertheless, after extensive summaries of such diverse works he usually comes to defensible conclusions of his own, and, despite his evident apologetic purpose, he presents a reasonable and plausible image of the Hazara experience. Indeed, weaknesses aside, this book is a rich mine of information on the Hazaras, for Poladi's inclusion of everything that is known about them makes it an incomparable source on the subject.

The book is a kind of final utterance of Hassan Poladi, "a project of the heart," as someone close to him put it, for he passed away in the same year his book was published. I was unable to learn much about him. He set up a trust to manage his book and his family has been unreachable. He was himself born in Pakistan of Hazara refugees from Afghanistan. His name suggests that he was a member

of the Polada tribe, whose ancestral territories are in Uruzgan. But he appears to have been strongly assimilated to the Hazara culture of Quetta, where he was raised; at least he supplied less information on the kinship terminology of Uruzgan, presumably his family's ancestral homeland, than on that of several other parts of the Hazarajat (on which published sources provided adequate information). Poladi received a Bachelor of Science degree with honors from the University of Sind and a Master's degree from the University of the Philippines. Later he received a second Master's degree from Cornell University, where (as he told me in a phone conversation last year) he did most of the research for this book. He became a naturalized American citizen and according to the dust jacket (which he of course designed himself) worked in Stockton as a "freelance writer"; his banker told me that he also sold insurance.

It has become common in recent years for Third World peoples to write histories and cultural studies from their own point of view. These works have supplied perspectives that have been veiled from the awareness of most scholars, who have been largely dependent on the well-intentioned, but nevertheless somewhat biased, research reports of Euro-Americans. In this work we find the viewpoint of a people who have been suppressed within a Third World nation; it is a viewpoint that (according to Poladi) is poorly understood by the dominant peoples within Afghanistan, to say nothing of outsiders. Hassan Poladi's attempt at a comprehensive examination of the Hazaras should stimulate new discussions about their origins and history and provoke a fresh interest in their experience as a minority people.

Indeed, it may be hoped that works such as these will receive the attention of other Afghans, particularly those who will emerge from the current war to positions of responsibility. Soon the energy for war will be spent and the various Afghanistan peoples will have the opportunity (or so we hope) to build a new nation. The Hazaras as a minority who have suffered under previous regimes will be among those elements seeking a more secure status. Now appears to be the time for the new leaders of the country to consider precisely how the new society shall institutionalize equal access to opportunity and influence for all the peoples of the country. Careful reflection on this extensive catalogue of the Hazaras' sufferings might help avoid the injustices of the past.

Robert L. Canfield
Washington University in St. Louis

From an article on Joey Adams by his wife Cindy in the March 18 issue of OUR TOWN describing a cultural exchange tour in Afghanistan:

In 1961 Joey, who was at the point President of AGVA, American Guild of Variety Artists, was sent by President Kennedy to head our first Cultural Exchange unit to Southeast Asia. While Russia was shipping its ballerinas and trained bears abroad, our country was sending J.A.

For 4 1/2 months the troupe worked places like Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam and points East. In Kabul, Afghanistan, Joey & Co. did their thing on a field, to 10,000 Afghans sitting cross-legged on the ground. It was their Jeshyn Fair, held annually in Sept. Joey did jokes in phonetic Farsi, the Afghan language. They loved Joey. As I remember saying: "They should only love you so much in America."

The audience laughed and screamed. What they didn't do was applaud. Afghans don't know from our quaint Western Custom. The ambassador-in-greasepaint from New York asked help from the country's sovereign, His Majesty King Zahir. After each joke the king clapped his hands high over his head. His countrymen followed suit. And, like I say, Joey was an instant big hit. Too bad the king wasn't. As you may have heard, the monarchy in Afghanistan has gone the way of Jane Pauley.

Monday, April 2: Dr. M. Jamil Hanifi will speak on "The Myth of the Pushtun State, Rule and Dominance in Afghanistan." Dr. Hanifi received his Ph.D. in anthropology in 1969, and taught at California State University (1968-69) and Northern Illinois University (1969-82). As an independent scholar, his current research deals with problems of ethnicity, state-tribe and center-periphery relations in Afghanistan. Using historical, ethnological, and first-hand ethnographic data, this talk will dispute the assumption (currently held in all genres of literature dealing with Afghanistan) that Pushtuns had been politically dominant and had created a so-called "tribal state" in Afghanistan.

From the Univ. of Michigan's Center for Near Eastern & North African Studies NEWSLETTER, March-April, 1990.

THE KABUL TIMES

Normalcy prevails throughout the country

In the name of Allah, the Merciful, the Beneficent,

Dear countrymen, servicemen of the country's armed forces!

Following my speeches yesterday and today at 9:30 a.m., I would like to address you once again now, at 1:30 p.m. today, March 7, 1980.

Painful and catastrophic events took place in the past 24 hours due to the traitorous attempt by Shahinawaz - Gulbuddin, mercenaries and agents of Pakistani intelligence services, exposing evermore their and their cliques' black and anti-Afghan face.

Shahinawaz and a handful of traitors, ambitious to capture state power, resorted with cruelty and far from every human, Islamic and moral standards, to arms and bombs the crowded points

of Kabul city and state establishments as a result of which a number of countrymen were martyred and wounded.

Hereby, I express my condolences and those of the leadership of the state of the Republic of Afghanistan to the families of the martyrs and the wounded and assure them that the perpetrators of these barbaric crimes should be punished soon.

Dear compatriots! The recent events, with all their bitterness, made the last devilish masks to fall down from the dirty and inhuman faces of Gulbuddin-Shahinawaz and their treacherous collaborators.

These extremist, selfish, adventurist war-mongering and treacherous elements, covertly and overtly using various

means and methods, plotted against the peace and security of the people of Afghanistan and caused numerous murders and destructions in the country.

On behalf of all the patriotic and peace-loving people of Afghanistan, I express gratitude to all soldiers, non-commissioned officers, officers and generals of the armed forces of RA for discharging resolutely and bravely their duties in defending the peace and security of the people of Afghanistan.

Dear countrymen, servicemen of the heroic armed forces!

On behalf of the Supreme Council for the Defence of Homeland, I assure you that the situation is normal all over the country. The units and detachments of the country's armed forces are ready with vigilance and combat preparedness to rebuff and crush every intrigue and plot of the foreign enemies of Afghanistan and their local mercenaries.

In some of the units, young and competent commanders have taken the initiative, disarming and arresting the elements attached to Gulbuddin and Shahinawaz band.

The only event reported in the last two hours is the exchange of sporadic fire in a part of Bagram airport. Warm and patriotic messages have been received by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces from all garrisons, units and detachments of the armed forces of RA and all parts of the country, assuring their full control over the situation and combat readiness for defending the interests of homeland, people and reconciliation against the intrigues of the coup plotters of Gulbuddin-Shahinawaz band.

The last resistance small nucleus of the accomplices of the treacherous band of Shahinawaz-Gulbuddin in the headquarters of the Defence Ministry of RA has been crushed and Darulaman palace has been cleared off this traitorous clique. Also, the persons and units, deceived and drawn by this or that means, to the abortive coup attempt of Shahinawaz-Gulbuddin, have been establishing contacts with the Defence Ministry and Supreme Command of the armed forces and introducing themselves to the units and detachments of the armed forces after the anti-Afghan and inhuman essence of the traitorous groups was exposed and after hearing the announcements of the Supreme Command of the armed forces of RA on guaranteeing the safety of those who come under the command of the Supreme command of the armed forces.

Now, when situation is speedily returning to normal, I would like to express deep gratitude for the devotion, loyalty and bravery of all the personnel of the armed forces of the Republic of Afghanistan, and for the vigilance and cooperation of the noble, pious and patriotic people of Afghanistan in suppressing and neutralizing the bloody and ferocious plot of the enemies of the country and their local accomplices. In the course of their praiseworthy history, the people of Afghanistan could bravely defend, with the help of God the Almighty, their political independence, territorial integrity, national sovereignty, dignity, honour and high interests of the homeland. Inshallah, they would defend them in future too.

Victory comes from Allah.

MARCH 8, 1980

Politburo

Condemning this treason of the coup plotters as contradicting all the organizational and moral objective and the peaceable aspirations of the PDPA, the politburo decided that Shahinawaz Tanai, Niaz Mohammad Momand, Sayed Mohammad Gulabzoi, Mir Saheb Karwal, and Col. Gen. Nazar Mohammad should be expelled from the membership of the Politburo of the PDPA and be dismissed from other party posts, and the traitors like Saleh Mohammad Zeraf, and Gulam Dastagir Panjsheri be expelled from the PDPA CC as per the party Rules. 3/10

ministers



Col. Gen. Mohammad Aslam Watanjar, Minister of Defence of the Republic of Afghanistan.



Raz Mohammad Pakter, Minister of Interior.

Assadullah Sarwari extradition demanded

Announcement of the high headquarters of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces of the RA:

The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces of the country informs the compatriots that Assadullah Sarwari without informing the concerned authorities of the RA, left his post as the ambassador of the RA in Aden and went to India.

Based on the authentic information, he established contacts with the intelligence services of Pakistan through Pacha Gul Wafadar and Gulbuddin. There are undeniable documents with the Supreme Command of the armed forces of the RA which proves the collaboration of Assadullah Sarwari with the abortive coup d'etat of the traitors, organized

by the intelligence services of Pakistan. Assadullah Sarwari's hands are stained with the blood of hundreds of innocent compatriots.

Assadullah Sarwari is considered the main perpetrator of the abortive coup d'etat, therefore, the government of the RA would demand his extradition from the country where he is residing.

Similarly, the Supreme Command of the armed forces of the RA calls on the compatriots that they should not desist from any efforts in apprehending Assadullah Sarwari, this traitor to the nation, either punish him or hand him over to the Afghan state authorities. This patriotic action would be materially and morally appreciated.

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces of the RA.

Shahnawaz expelled from PDPA CC

The announcement of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, PDPA:

Shahnawaz by organising a coup d'état with the collaboration of Gulbuddin and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan not only committed a national treason, but a treason against the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, as well.

He, utilising his party position, had been resorting to anti-party provocations, creation of discord among the party leadership and the ranks inside the party and organising unrest among them for quite some time. This way, he tried under different pretexts to prevent the implementation of the policy of the PDPA, namely, the national reconciliation policy in the country.

Shahnawaz continued his anti-party and anti-national actions to the extent of committing treason against the nation, and in collaboration with the criminal Gulbuddin and through him with the cooperation of the Inter-Services Intelligence of Pakistan hatched schemes against the Republic of Afghanistan.

Recently, that on the one hand the armed opposition have faced military defeats and Gulbuddin's plot in the month of Qaus was foiled. Shahnawaz and his traitorous accomplices tried in this delicate situation in the history of the country to create unrest inside the ranks of the PDPA and the armed forces of the country, on the other.

Shahnawaz and his traitorous accomplices for implementation of their plot have yielded to the criminal Gulbuddin and the (ISI) of Pakistan, and this way, they not only did not take into view the national interests, but completely trampled underfoot all the party norms to the extent of treason to the party.

As Shahnawaz before escaping from his hide-out, threw away his party membership card; a honourable document which links each member with the party, that is, in the service of the people and in defence of the national interests of the people of Afghanistan; which was today found in his office in the Darulaman Palace.

Similarly, he had thrown away his military uniform and belt which is regarded one's dignity before the militarymen especially the Afghans.

Therefore, all the members and supporters of the PDPA are informed that hereafter Shahnawaz does not belong to the PDPA which is the defender of people's interests and executor of the National reconciliation policy in the country.

The Secretariat of the Central Committee of the PDPA is fully confident that members of the PDPA preserve their dignity and honours by maintaining their unity, and awareness and would not allow the traitors and plotters and their foreign perpetrators to play with the high national interests of our country.

The Secretariat of the PDPA CC. MARCH 8, 1990



Sad view of the apartments demolished in the abortive coup

President approves CM'S legislative amnesty decree

KABUL, MAR. 11. (BIA)

President Najibullah has approved the legislative amnesty decree of the Council of Ministers applicable to those who opt for national reconciliation.

The presidential approval reads as follows:

In accordance with article 108 of the constitution, I approve the legislative decree No. 38 dated 10, 12, 1989 of the Council of Ministers enforced in eight articles offering amnesty to those who join the policy of national reconciliation..

The Council of Ministers is bound to submit the decree to the National Assembly for final ratification. The President

approval and the decree of the Council of Ministers have to be sent to the Justice Ministry to be published in the official gazette.

Najibullah, President of the Republic of Afghanistan

Under article 104 of the constitution, the Council of Ministers has passed the following legislative decree:

Article one:
This decree is meant for full realization of the programme of national reconciliation, consolidation of the national unity, ensuring peaceful life for the citizens and their active contribution in the socio-economic and political life, taking in

view the objective realities, the accepted traditions and customs of the people, the UN Charter, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights concerning those who accept the policy of national reconciliation.

Article two:
The following categories of individuals are not persecuted for the crimes they have committed:

- 1- Those who voluntarily give up their anti-state activities and join the State organs along with their arms;
- 2- Those in league with the anti-state organizations and engaged in anti-state activities contrary to the laws of the State of the Republic of Afghanistan, provided they renounce their anti-state group and individual activities and join the

Cont. on next page

President orders on creation of special court for plotters

KABUL, MAR. 10. (BIA) The Presidential Office reported that Najibullah, President of the Republic of Afghanistan, has approved through his decree of March 8, 1990, the creation of a special court and a special attorney office to investigate

into the big national treason of the plotters, who on Tuesday, March 6, committed, under the leadership of Shahnawaz, unforgivable crimes against the independence, national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country and the achievements of the national

reconciliation policy and thus inflicted huge material and human losses to the state and people of Afghanistan.

As per the provisions of the decree, the special attorney office and court have been set up under Article 3 of the law on the State of Emergency with the task to investigate, at the soonest possible time, the crimes committed by the culprits and adopt decisions, taking in view the Article 111 of

the Constitution in conformity with the provisions of the enforced laws in the country and taking into account the state of emergency, the war situation and the coup and conspiratory character of their deeds.

It has been enshrined in the President's decree that high Islamic and Afghan principles, high interests of the people of Afghanistan, preservation of the independence, national sovereignty and

territorial integrity of the country and the principles of the national reconciliation policy should constitute the basis for the approaches and activities of the special Attorney Office and Special Court.

state organs.

Article three:

1- The punishment of those covered by the second article are also waived.

2- The consequences of resignation, quitting the duty or service enshrined in other legislations are not applicable on those covered by the second article; they have the right to re-occupy their posts, after referring to the state organs. If they are soldiers or non-commissioned officers, their punishment is pardoned and readmitted to their former service and their previous term of service will be counted in case they return.

Article four:

1- If that category of individuals mentioned in the second article have misused, damaged or illegally grasped public properties, they are bound only for compensation of the same.

2- The extent of compensation is determined by the relevant organs and ordered by an authorized court.

3- If the personal property of the armed forces servicemen fail to compensate the loss, 20 per cent of their salary will be remitted to this effect. If they are in receipt of salary, the provision of clause 4 of this decree is applicable on them.

4- If the property of those individuals cannot compensate for the damage, it will be handled in accordance with other relevant laws.

Article five:

1- After joining the state, if the individuals hand over arms, ammunition, explosives and other combat equipments they can be substituted for the ones they have formerly destroyed, misused or illegally grasped.

2- If the total cost of the goods of the above category of surrenderers does not match the ones he had misused, destroyed or grasped, he is bound to pay the remaining sum.

3- If the arms, ammunition, explosives and other combat equipments are one's personal property, it is handled as per the decree of the Presidium of the Revolutionary Council dated HS 15, 9, 66 on the purchase of arms and ammunition of the detachments, individuals, and groups who quit combat activities.

Article Six:

The individuals covered by the second article of this decree can avail of it only once.

Article seven: --

This decree does not impede the claim for individual rights and cannot interrupt the rights of other individuals.

President decrees new promotions

As per a decree of President Najibullah, Maj. General Ghulam Mustafa s/o Abdul Aziz, hero of the Republic of Afghanistan has been awarded the title of the hero of the Republic of Afghanistan for the second time and the medal of Golden Star and the rank of Lt. General in appreciation of his services in crushing the abortive coup attempt of Shahinwaz-Gulbuddin.

As per the decree of President Najibullah, the following dignitaries have been awarded the Order of the April Revolution in appreciation of their activities in repelling the abortive coup attempt of Shahinwaz-Gulbuddin.

Raz Mohammad Pak-teen Minister of Interior.

Lt. General Abdul Haq Ulomi, Secretary of the Supreme Council for Defence of Homeland, Lt. General Abdul Baqi, head of the presidential department for defence and national security, Lt. General Rahmatullah Raoufi s/o Abdul Raouf, Lt. General Sayed Masom s/o Sayed Ghulam Nahi.

As per the decree of President Najibullah following officers have been promoted to Lt. General for their active part in crushing the abortive coup attempt of Shahinwaz-Gulbuddin.

Maj. General Abdul Rashid Doostum s/o Rahim Booy hero of the Republic of Afghanistan, Maj. General Abdul Moqim Paikar s/o Abdul Qasim, Maj. General Al-

em s/o Ghulam Rahman, Maj. General Assadullah s/o Malik Khan, Maj. General Mohammad Eisa s/o Abdul Wakil, Maj. General Abdul Razeq s/o Abdul Wahab, Maj. General Abdul Satar s/o Mohammad Yusuf, Maj. General Ali Mohammad Aqdash s/o Abdul Qodus, Maj. General Attiqullah Amar Khail s/o Mir Adzai, Maj. General Marjan s/o Sultan Jan, Maj. General Omid Mohammad s/o Wali Mohammad, Maj. General Haas s/o Mohammad Ali, Maj. General Joma Gul, Maj. General Gulbazar s/o Faten Mohammad, Maj. General Abdul Ghafar Hamidi s/o Abdul Wahid Maj. General Tareq s/o Mohammad Ali and Maj. General Sayed Jan s/o Mohammad Sharif.

MARCH 14, 1996

idual rights and cannot interrupt the rights of other individuals.

Article eight:

1- This decree runs into force after being approved and published in the official gazette.

2- The entry into force of this decree invalidates the following decrees:

A- Decree No. 420 of the Revolutionary Council Presidium dated HS 28, 3, 1360 published in the official gazette of

HS 31, 4, 1360.

B- The President's decree No. 156 dated HS 16, 2, 1367 published in the official gazette issue 688 dated HS 31, 3, 1367.

C- Other decrees contrary to this decree.

3/11

Women are equally rightful...

Text of President's message on Women's Day:

Mothers, Sisters of my homeland!

First of all, allow me to congratulate all the mothers and Afghan women and the All-Afghanistan Women's Council on the 82nd anniversary of the world's women's day, with the hope of welfare and prosperity for them. This year the international women's day whose main content is peace and prosperity for all the world's women, is being celebrated under the conditions that the mothers and women's tranquillity and well-being has totally been disrupted and damaged by a handful of traitors to the nation and anti-national reconciliation as a result of whose anti-human and anti-Afghan

actions a number of the dears and relatives of the Afghan women have been killed and injured.

I express my deepest coincidence to all those Afghan women who have lost their relatives as a result of anti-national and anti-national reconciliation actions of the traitors and wish patience from God Almighty for them.

Noble mothers and women of the country: Honouring the international women's day undoubtedly manifests the world's women's movements towards independence, welfare, and equality of rights.

The solidarity of the Afghan women for ensuring of their rights and privileges under the present delicate and destiny-making situation of our country in reality is the continuation of perseverance of Afghan women

men such as Zarghunahs; Malalaiha, Rabiha. Makhlifa, and tens of other Afghan women whose honours and epics last for ever and recorded by history of the Afghan nation.

The state of the Republic of Afghanistan considers women as equally rightful member of the Afghan society. The state would not desert from any efforts for ensuring appropriate grounds so the women of the country are provided with sound education, health facilities and an increasingly better position in the society.

The Republic of Afghanistan believes that only peaceful conditions and tranquillity can provide the grounds for the performance of suitable and effective activities for the people including the women of the society. Endeavouring for insurance of nation-wide

peace is one of the most significant and vital tasks lying before all the people of the country including the women of the country under the current critical and delicate conditions.

The state of the RA is convinced that the solution of the present difficult issues is possible only through dialogue and negotiations which is the demand of the time. Inexhaustible efforts for the cessation of the imposed war, more pains of which unfortunately, is being shouldered by the women has an unbreakable link with the routine activities of the All-Afghanistan Women's Council.

The All-Afghanistan Women's Council as a credible prestigious social organisation should reflect the hatred and indignation of our people towards the war, to the

world social circles and attract the attention of the world's women bodies towards the cessation of the war and termination of foreign interference especially the armed opposition forces and their international supporters in the affairs of Afghanistan which cause merciless murder of our people.

The All-Afghanistan Women's Council with the utilisation of its possibilities should provide the grounds for understanding and talks at different levels and ever further play its role in ensuring peace and prosperity of the people. The Council should sincerely endeavour for providing a better living and working opportunity for the Afghan women.

With the hope of nationwide peace and prosperity and welfare for the women and mothers of the country.

3/10

Brief review of economic situation

In the post-revolutionary years, 1368 (the current Afghan year) can be described entirely an exceptional year. The plan targets and duties, such as the state budget have been implemented in the last nine months of the current year under particular political-military and economic conditions different from the past years. For a difficult political-military situation enveloped in the country as a result of the Soviet troops withdrawal, considerable escalation of war by the extremist opposition forces against the people of Afghanistan with wide dimensions of interference and aggression from abroad, economic sabotage, cutting-off of highways, blockade of cities, rocket attacks and acts of terrorism and the direct wide-scale and repeated assaults on Jalalabad, Kandahar and Kabul. Notwithstanding all these hardships, the heroic armed forces and the peace-loving people of Afghanistan, accepting the national reconciliation policy, not only withstood with a revolutionary attitude against the barbaric deeds and attacks of the aggressors but also dealt devastating retaliatory blows on them, opening a new chapter in the contemporary history of the country.

The protraction of the imposed war has caused huge material, moral and human losses and created great hurdles. Under such conditions that the last years' hardships had left unpleasant heritage from the view point of the sharing of the primary goods and high prices and under tense world economic and currency situation which has affected to a certain extent the economic situation and the life of our people, the government of the Republic of Afghanistan and the organs of the state administration have designed and are implementing the socio-economic development plan and the state budget. Basically, drafting of a really reasonable and practical plan, from the socio-economic point of view, and its implementation has been a difficult work in the present situation.

For every day new needs are emerging, new spheres of work are created and distinguished and the importance of some other spheres are reduced. The government is not only facing the internal

factors of shortcoming and requirements which take shape spontaneously or as a result of the need of accomplishments and certain measures, but the external factors, two, which directly or indirectly impede the economic growth of the country, leaves negative implications on the situation. In this regard, the organized military aggression from the territory of Pakistan, the economic, trade and transit sanctions and sabotage by that country are seriously a matter of anxiety. Also, not only the unilateral ban of every undertaken assistance and credit by some western countries and organizations attached to them, but also the creation of impediments by the United States of America against the humanitarian assistance of the organizations attached to the United Nations to the Republic of Afghanistan, as a form of the continuation and escalation of pressure, are described as a hostile inhu-

man act. Of course we express gratitude for the assistance so far rendered or about to be rendered through the UN channels to the Republic of Afghanistan.

It should be stated that despite this situation, certain relative successes have been scored in the realization of the socio-economic development plan and state budget, which is indicative of keeping of the relative record of production level in some economic and production spheres and the maintenance of relative growth in some plan targets.

During the nine months of the current year to better provide the needs of the people to fuel and other prime commodities, the transportation and distribution of the goods have been brought to a definite order. And with receiving new motor, forwarding and tanker vehicles and adopting extra measures for elevating the level of use of the economic and technical quotients of the

available vehicles, reduction in the transportation capacities and possibilities has been prevented to some extent.

During the present period, the government has supplied 100.5 thousand tonnes flour and wheat, 13.2 thousand tonnes ghee, 17.7 thousand tonnes of sugar, 1.2 thousand tonnes meat, 30.1 thousand tonnes bread, 10 million gae, 90.9 thousand tonnes coal and 286.9 thousand tonnes petroleum products to the people and institutions.

As per a Presidential decree and resolution of the Council of Ministers, state constant material stocks of the organs of the armed forces, including foodstuffs, fuel and other technical materials, have been created aimed at rendering timely assistance to the people and combating the unprecedented events.

Over one billion Afghanis have been allocated, through project amendments and utilization of reserved development sum, to finance 256 new

projects which were approved during the year. Also Af. 300 million have been spent for the construction of security outposts, blindages and headquarters. Furthermore, Af. 1.1 billion have been preferably allocated during the first half of the year to a number of projects requiring greater sums.

To help the victims and injured of the extremist socialist attacks, as many as 11 first aid centers have been set up in different parts of Kabul city and considerable sums, assisted to the families affected by these attacks. This is in addition to equipping and making ready the emergency works of the hospitals.

The results of the realization of the plan during the last nine months of 1368 in diverse economic and social sectors show that the value of the factory products of the state, mixed, cooperative and private sectors exceeds Af. 12.17 billion.

The nine-month plan targets of bread and bakery products have be-

en overfulfilled by 28 percent, of linter cotton by 18 percent, vegetable oil by 19.2 percent, soap by 54.1 percent and other foodstuffs by 46.2 percent. The plan of natural gas production has been overfulfilled by 2.5 percent compared to the plan target.

Out of the ministries and departments which have had implemented their plan, five ministries and departments have been overfulfilled their plan.

During the last nine months of the current year some, 68 new project in the private sector with a final capital of Af. 1.8 billion have been approved, which will provide job opportunity for 2364 persons.

The production plan of foodstuffs and other industries in the private sector shows an increase of 2.4 and 44.4 percent respectively over the plan.

To augment agricultural products, 78.7 thousand tonnes of fertilizers, 5125 tonnes of cotton seeds, 4.2 tonnes of sugar beet seed, 8,000 tonnes of improved wheat seeds and agricultural drugs valued at Af. 81.2 million have been distributed to peasants, cattle breeders and cooperatives. This shows an increase of 28 percent in the distribution of cotton seed. However, the results of

ALL DAMAGES INFLICTED BY PLOTTERS ARE TO BE MADE UP IN A MONTH CABINET TAKES CONTINGENCY DECISIONS

The Council of Ministers of the RA, severely condemns the treacherous anti-national abortive coup of March 6, 1990, by Shahmawez-Gulbuddin which was organised from outside in collaboration with Gulbuddin and a handful of other conspirators and call it as an anti-homeland and an action against the people of Afghanistan.

The Council of Ministers points out that with a precise and appropriate organisation the armed forces of the RA under the leadership of honourable Najibullah, President of the Republic of Afghanistan and the Supreme Commander of the armed forces of the RA, and timely action of the armed forces of the Kabul Garrison and with prompt cooperation of the Kabul citizens the abortive attempt was crushed and neutralised.

It is worth noting that as a result of this action which entirely was targeted at national and state institutions in the Kabul city, its huge human, ma-

terial, and financial losses were inflicted to the state and private enterprises and to the noble Kabul citizens.

In accordance with the decision of the Supreme Council for the Defence of Homeland, the High Economic Commission chaired by Sultan Ali Keashmand, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers has been established. In its first session convened on March 7, 1990 a commission to assess the preliminary magnitude of the losses incurred and has assigned two separate commissions under the chairmanship of two deputy prime ministers for precise assessment and verification of real losses in the areas affected.

The results of the work of the commissions and collection of preliminary data indicated that as a consequence of the traitorous coup attempt 197 of Kabul residents have been injured and hospitalised. Of this, 25 have died in the hospitals. Seventy others were martyred and have

been recovered from the debris of the areas bombed by the criminal traitors. The total number of the martyred reaches to 95 persons in the recent incident.

Out of the total number of the injured, 125 persons have been dismissed after receiving necessary treatments from the hospitals. Similarly, necessary medical help have been given to a number of Kabul residents who have temporarily lost their mental and physical balance.

A number of ancient and historical buildings and establishments such as the Darulaman Palace, Tepas-Tajbeg Palace, the Arg of Presidential Office, the Congregational mosque of Puli Khoshni and tens of other state structures are extensively damaged. In addition, economic damages so far specified in the sphere of private properties are 230 shops, four Sarais, nine restaurants, fifty private homes, 232 other residential quarters have completely been demolished.

Moreover, hundreds of other residential quarters and establishments have partially been damaged, tens of thousands of glasses of the state and private institutions have been smashed.

Though the economic losses have been squarely been extensive and reaches to hundreds of millions of Afghanis, but, fortunately, the human losses are quite low in proportion to the envisaged plan of the traitors: thanks to the timely action and steadfastness of the residents, the security organs, the members of the party primary organisations of the PDPA, social organisations who during the bombardments of the traitors showed necessary vigilance and adopted pre-emptive measures.

MARCH 13, 1990

CHRONOLOGY

2/15 - AFGHANews -The Hindukush News Agency (HINA) began operations inside Afghanistan last month. It is operated by Jamiat Islami.

- Abdul Qayyum, head of Sazman Azadi-bakh Mardom Afghanistan, a faction of Shola-i-Javid (a Maoist party active in the 60s & 70s) was killed by unknown assailants in Peshawar on 1/27. SAMA opposed Soviet activity in Afghanistan.

3/3 - PT - Pakistan Foreign Sec'y Tanvir Ahmad Khan told a Tass correspondent that Pakistan & the USSR can continue cooperating in the spirit of the Geneva Agreements in order to find ways for a political settlement in Afghanistan.

"We believe that ideas, coming from different sides, will finally allow them to elaborate a settlement plan acceptable to all."

- The mujahideen are holding an election in Kunar to form a 100-member shura which will select a governor in Kunar (see p 14).

3/4 - PT - The UN, citing food shortages in Afghanistan, appealed for more humanitarian assistance. The UN had planned \$650m in aid for Afghanistan but some promised donations have not been received, according to Sadruddin Aga Khan.

3/6 - PT - At the end of a Pakistani parliamentary delegation's visit to Moscow, Pakistan & the USSR issued a joint communique expressing concern over the continuation of bloodshed in Afghanistan & emphasizing that the problem should be solved through peaceful means & the promotion of an intra-Afghan dialogue.

- In Peshawar, 30 members of the United Milli Jabba issued a statement rejecting both the AIG & the Kabul Gov't, saying that neither had any relation to the Afghan nation. The group called for Zahir Shah to be made head of an interim gov't.

3/7 - LAT - ROA Defense Minister Shah-nawaz Tanai attempted a coup yesterday (see pp. 8-11, 36-38).

3/7 - PT - Gulbuddin Hekmatyar said his party fully supported the military action against the Najib gov't:



"We support actions, not persons."

3/7 - PT - Over 2,000 Afghan children were sent to the USSR for schooling last year. Over 50,000 have been sent since the Soviet invasion and, according to Dr. Moh'd Qasim Jamdar, a former Kabul Polytechnic Director, only 1 in 5 has been allowed to come home. The children go to Soviet boarding schools for 6 months. Many remain to go to military schools or stay with Soviet families & take part in Young Pioneer activities.

3/8 - LAT - Shahnawaz Tanai flew to Pakistan yesterday with his family & 11 others. Pakistan said Tanai only dropped off his family & conferred with some mujahideen leaders before recrossing the border. Najibullah, in a televised speech, said that many people had been killed & wounded in the fighting (see p 36). A 24-hour curfew is in effect in Kabul.

- NYT - Najibullah said Tanai had flown to Pakistan "carrying a lot of US dollars with him" & asked his forces to capture Tanai "dead or alive."

3/9 - NYT - Najib purges mutineers:

The Kabul radio said Mr. Najibullah replaced General Tanai as Defense Minister on Tuesday and dismissed him today from the Supreme Defense Council.


Four other council members were also replaced because of "national dishonesty," said the radio, monitored in Islamabad. They were identified as Naz Mohammad Momand and Mir Sahib Karwal, both Politburo members; Gen. Nazar Mohammad, an al-

ternate member of the Politburo and a former Defense Minister, and Gen. Sayed Aga Aka, who fled to Pakistan on Wednesday.



According to the radio, Mr. Najibullah declared that mutinous troops had been purged from the armed forces. A diplomat based in Kabul quoted the President as saying at a news conference: "The microbes, the radicals among us, have been cleansed. We don't have any more factions. We are more united than ever."



Najibullah disposes of...



...his rival Tanai



(The Economist 3/10)

3/10 - KT - Sayed Moh'd Gulabzoi, Saleh Moh'd Zeraf & Dastagir Panjsheri were also expelled.

cultivation and purchase of cotton seeds in the current year is perceived by consternation.

In the three quarters of the current year, eleven agricultural cooperatives with an aggregate membership of 836 peasants, a capital of 678,000 Afis covering a total of 22 thousand hectares of land were newly established and another seven inactive cooperatives were reactivated. This way, the overall number of active cooperatives shot up to 663, showing an increase of 22 cooperatives than the previous year. Sufficient and permanent water flow has been ensured for an area of 600 thousand hectares of land and its plan has been fulfilled.

The plan in force for preparing new lands for cultivation has been fulfilled and in order to procure potable water, eleven deepwells have been dug in Kabul and other provinces which show a 100 percent fulfillment of the nine months plan and 40 percent growth as compared to the same period last year.

It should be stressed that for better assurance of the requirements of the different spheres of the national economy of the country from the view point of materials needed, the state, has undertaken strict measures towards expansion of transportation and provision of more facilities to this effect. During this period, a total of 500 trucks and 696 tankers for the transport of fuel have been newly acquired thanks to the grant-aid of the Soviet Union.

In addition, for meeting the petroleum products requirements of the armed forces special trucks and tankers have been procured in the past nine months under the envisaged plan, around 4.4 million tons

of goods have been transported by the state and private sector.

With the implementation of 64 percent of the plan and an increase of 24 percent as compared to the nine months of the previous year, 9.2 thousand tons of commodities with a turnover of 10.6 ton/KM in the sphere of air transport have been fulfilled. The income from the telephone, telegraph, postage and telecommunication services amounting to 692.2 million Afghanshahi, 21.9 percent increase as per the set plan and a growth of 3.2 percent as compared to the same period of last year. During the past nine months, three new telephone exchanges, units have been installed in Kabul city.

The circulation of local wholesale, retail trade of the state mixed and cooperative sectors exceeds 32.8 milliard Afis. From the export of carpets, rugs and furs including Karakul, dried fruits, medicinal herbs which form the main export item, 147.7 dollars have been earned during the past nine months. Export of some items such as furs, medicinal herbs overfulfills the set plan.

In the spheres of education, the higher and vocational education, public health, information and culture, some specific accomplishments have been noticed. Over 70 small and medium cultural, economic state projects have been either totally or partially completed and commissioned.

It should be noted that considerable shortages and flaws in the spheres of production and social services exist. In recent years, considerable reduction has occurred in the production and distribution of power energy in Kabul city and cannot meet the power requirements of the citizens.

Due to the fall of water level and shortage of petroleum products recently, load shedding is being resorted to, causing problems for the working citizens. Despite this, the patriotic efforts of workers, engineers, and the security personnel guarding the power lines are worth appreciation.

The shortage of electric power and fuel, unavailability of sufficient amount of raw materials, existence of technical problems, compulsory over-production of some materials like cement, fertilisers and coal, transportation problems in the production and extraction sites have been created due to the irresponsible and improper organisation on part of some state officials which has affected the process of implementation of plan index. For instance, of 52 production plan indices, 39 indices were fulfilled with percentages less than the plan targets.

Deficiency has also been noticed in the spheres of chemical industries, light industries, pharmaceuticals, paper processing industry and carpentry of the private sector, and currently 12 industrial and constructional institutions of this sector are inactive due to various factors.

The distribution outlets of chemical fertilisers due to improper transportation of sufficient quantities of urea and shortage of phosphate fertilisers have not functioned well, leading to decrease in the production of main agricultural products especially that of cotton.

In the sphere of transportation, in-efficient use of the transport capacities of the private sector can be singled out among other shortcomings. The overall quantity of goods transported by this sector during the past nine months is 415.2

thousand tonnes or 70.2 percent of the anticipated plan. As whole, the transportation plan due to the peculiar situation on the highway emanating from plunderers, and burning of vehicles and trucks carrying essential goods for the people by the armed extremist groups and due to unnecessary stoppage of the vehicles, inefficient utilisation of technical possibilities, shortage of spares, and financial problems of the state transport enterprises have been fulfilled unsatisfactorily.

As a principle, an illustrated presentation of the positive and negative aspects of the work and successes are not sufficient and attributing the shortcomings to the objective basis emanating from the war is incorrect. One should search for reasons of the shortcomings and try to find the means for their removal.

For this reason, based on the proposals of the permanent commissions of the Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers headed by the deputy prime ministers, the Ministry of Planning has prepared a list of measures in forty articles aimed at improvement and acceleration of the main economic and social programmes in the country which was endorsed in today's session of the Council of Ministers. Such an important duty was assigned to the Council of Ministers by esteemed Najibullah President of the Republic of Afghanistan.

In this list, a series of specific measures have been envisaged which demand revision of the legislative documents pertaining to economic issues, search for finding new income source for the state, creation of new facilities for the traders and national entrepreneurs and mobilization of new

private foreign investments.

Likewise, ways and means for acceleration of constructional works, rehabilitation and expansion of the construction activities of different productive, economic and social services projects in the state, mixed, cooperative and private sections with joint state investments based on mutual interests of other countries, especially that of the Soviet Union on bilateral and thoroughly assessed and anticipated in the list of measures, in addition to most important steps in the spheres of social and cultural services have also been predicted in the new measures. It is planned that the set plans should be implemented by the end of the year 1368 and the first half of the year 1369 H.S.

The anticipated measures covering important socio-economic spheres, till its complete realisation will be thoroughly assessed and the duties and assignments of every section will be specified by the periodical sessions of the Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers. Along with implementation of the list of measures, strict security measures have been adopted for smooth functioning of projects, productive institutions, cultural and social services institutions.

We hope that the aforementioned measures would be other bold steps in the resolute defence of the homeland, independence and territorial integrity of the country and full realisation of the national reconciliation policy in different spheres of economy, production, and culture and would lead to decrease of miseries and improvement of work and living conditions for the noble people of Afghanistan.

JANUARY 28, 1990

stockpiles

KABUL, MAR. 13 (BIA)

The commission for arranging and coordinating State's constant material stockpiles convened a working session Monday morning, presided over by Chairman of the Council of Ministers' Executive Committee, Sultan Ali Keshmand.

The session studied the state of constant stockpiles of the prime commodities such as wheat, sugar, edible oil, tea, rice, grains and other goods needed by the public as well

as construction material and fuel.

Based on the reports of the ministries of armed forces, Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Light Industries and Foodstuffs, the Union of Peasants' Cooperatives and other relevant organs, the above-quoted institutions have had certain accomplishments towards creating constant stocks in the capital and provinces have met this goal as planned.

Moreover, it was de-

Presided over by Sultan Ali Keshmand, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers, and attended by deputy prime ministers, cabinet members and some departmental heads, the periodic plenary meeting of the Council of Ministers was held on Tuesday at the CM headquarters in which Sultan Ali Keshmand delivered a comprehensive speech. Text of the speech is presented:

ided that the amount of the goods taken out during the coup attempt for supplying the armed forces has to be re-stockpiled in a circular way upto the required norms.

MARCH 13, 1990



S. A. Keshmand

3/10 - Hong Kong Standard - Afghanistan accused Pakistan of playing a major role in the thwarted coup attempt. Pakistan called the allegations absurd.

3/11 - LA Daily News - The civilian death toll in the coup attempt rose to 95. No figures have been given on military casualties. (See 3/12)

3/12 - NYT - Robert Pear, reporting from Washington, cited Bush Administration officials as saying that the latest coup attempt showed that Najibullah was weak & vulnerable & was facing substantial opposition from within the party & the Afghan armed forces. A spokesman said that the US welcomed the coup but were dismayed over the Tanai-Hekmatyar alliance. He said, however, that the US figured Moscow would be nervous about that alliance, too.

- SCMP - Burhanuddin Rabbani visited Herat last week "to chalk out strategy with his commanders for stepping up mujahideen activity in the area." Rabbani entered Herat from Iran & met with Ismail Khan, whose forces reclaimed positions around Herat city after gov't militiamen abandoned them after the coup attempt. (See 4/6,7)

- PT - In the coup attempt, 10 planes were destroyed as well as 4 bazaars, 9 restaurants, 230 shops, 18 buildings & 282 apartments. Reportedly, over 2,000 people were jailed after the coup.
- New York City Tribune - A Congressional report (issued 3/1) charged that Gulbuddin has ties with the KGB & Iran (see p. 21).

3/14 - PT - There has been fierce fighting around Khost. It began before the coup attempt, let up during it, & has begun again. Some thought the Khost garrison would support Tanai since he hails from the area & many of the troops there are Khalqis. [Tanai reportedly said the troops there didn't join him because he didn't tell them to.]
- UN Press Release DH/599 - UN Sec'y Gen'1 de Cuellar advised the UN Security Council that he intended to redeploy a limited number of military officers as military advisers to his Personal Representative in Afghanistan & Pakistan. The present arrangement for "the temporary deployment in Afghanistan & Paki-

stan of military officers from existing UN operations to assist in the mission of good offices" ends 3/15. De Cuellar's "consultations with the signatories of the Geneva Accords had indicated that another extension for a further period of 2 months would not meet with the necessary consensus." At present, there are 35-40 UNGOMAP observers. A limited number will be redeployed as military advisers - 5 in Islamabad & 5 in Kabul, thus reducing "the form of UNGOMAP."



Mujahideen Weekly 3/8

3/15 - LAT -

The Soviet Union offered Afghanistan military support during a coup attempt in Kabul last week, but the Communist government turned down the aid, President Najibullah said. He also said that two days before the failed takeover, he suspected that the defense

minister, Shahnawaz Tanai, was plotting a coup and offered him the presidency. "It is yours if you think you can rule," Najibullah said. Tanai fled to Pakistan after the coup failed but is now believed to be back in Afghanistan. The Soviet news agency Tass said 200 civilians died in the coup attempt.

3/16 - Newsday - In a press conference in Logar yesterday, Tanai said he was still loyal to the Khalq faction but that this loyalty did not contradict his tactical alliance with Gulbuddin. Gulbuddin said that Tanai had agreed to step aside in case of victory & allow elections that could establish an Islamic gov't. (See p. 18)


"We will inflict new blows on Najib. In the near future, he will not be there," Tanai said in his first interview since the coup attempt. "For the national interests of Afghanistan, we have cooperated with Mr. Hekmatyar to remove the Najibullah regime." Tanai also asserted that by mutinying he had atoned for a dozen years of leading the war against the Islamic mujahideen.

"We accept that we have made mistakes," he said. "Our coming here and helping the mujahideen prove we have sided at last with the nation and, in fact, makes up for our mistakes."

3/19 - LAT - Former ROA air force chief Abdul Qadir Aka, Brig. Gen. Ghulam Hazarat & Niaz Moh'd Mohmand were with Tanai in Logar.

3/19 - Newsday - Najibullah told the PDPA CC that it should surrender its monopoly on power & hold a special session to write the change in the constitution. The CC also debated changing the PDPA's name.

3/21 - SCMP - Western diplomats said that the US expects a "radical change" in Soviet policy towards Afghanistan & is prepared to respond by modifying its own policy. The failed coup has presented a "window of opportunity" for all the forces involved.



3/22 - PT - An Afghan Jihad Exhibition was opened at the Capital Hotel in Islamabad. The show included crafts, captured weapons, maps, photos & paintings.

3/23 - HK Standard - The USSR might be willing to let Najibullah step down at the conclusion of a dialogue between the warring Afghan factions. Pakistan supports the idea that some of the refugees should return to "peace zones" in Afghanistan. (See p. 14)

3/24 - BIA - Working hours for ROA gov't offices during Ramadan will be from 8 a.m. to 1:30 p.m.

- Moh'd Shafai Rahguzar, journalist, writer & translator, died yesterday at age 68.

3/25 - BIA - The ROA will sell 20,000 tons of fertilizer to North Korea.
- Repair work on the Blue Mosque at Mazar-i-Sharif began this week. (See 4/3)

3/26 - WSJ - Najibullah said he was committed to reducing PDPA dominance of the gov't, but that the change must be preceded by progress toward a peace settlement.

Mr. Najibullah said the defense ministry was the last area where he was prepared to dismantle the party apparatus.

He rejected again any demand that he step down as a precondition for negotiations, but said the Kabul government would consider a more neutral site outside the capital for talks.

"A number of circles in the United States are trying to give one more chance to the Afghan opposition to prove their competency on the battlefield," the president said. "Such a decision, such a chance is actually another chance of killing more Afghan people."

Mr. Najibullah acknowledged that the prolonged war is widening the gap between rich and poor. Only last week, the government was forced to give significant increases in stipends to its workers to offset the fall in the Afghan currency. The regime has abandoned any effort to hold to the so-called official exchange rate, and there are complaints of corruption in the government and undue influence by money brokers whose speculation can affect the currency.

3/27 - SCMP - Ex-King Zahir Shah will be invited to Kabul shortly to attend the founding congress of the "Peace Front."

Mr. Farid Ahmad Muzdak, a member of the 15-man PDPA politburo, told foreign reporters that the deposed monarch would be asked to attend the congress along with Afghan political, social and religious leaders including others living in exile.

The Peace Front is the latest attempt by the Soviet-backed Government of the President, Mr. Najibullah, to seek a negotiated end to Afghanistan's 11-year-old civil war.

"The Peace Front will be the basis for a future coalition government," Mr. Muzdak said, emphasizing that the new grouping would not simply be the PDPA masquerading under another name.

He said it would include nine political parties and five social organizations, although he conceded it would have a credibility problem.

"The front will have a long way to go to draw people's trust," he said.

The Peace Front replaces the National Front the PDPA set up three years ago, but which most Afghans saw as merely a tool of the ruling party.

- NYT - The UN Food & Agricultural Organization noted serious food shortages in parts of Afghanistan.

3/28 - SCMP - Sadruddin Aga Khan said the UN wants "zones of tranquility" set up in Afghanistan so that the refugees can start going home. (see p. 14).

- BIA - Mullah Nasim Akhondzada, a drug lord, was assassinated in Helmand. Akhondzada was a rival of Gulbuddin & reportedly was killed by a cousin of a Gulbuddin commander for \$4m.

- Damage from the recent coup attempt was estimated at Afs. 1.6b.

- Najibullah visited Herat.

3/29 - BIA - The Peace Front of Afghanistan met to discuss its draft platform (see 3/27).

- Talks between the Peshawar groups & the Iranian 9-Alliance ended "without any result."

- Col. Gulaqa was promoted to the rank of major gen'l in recognition of his "meritorious services in foiling the Gulbuddin-Shahnawaz coup."

3/30 - BIA - The appointment of Rabbani to replace Gulbuddin as Foreign Minister of the AIG by Mujadiddi reportedly came as a surprise to Rabbani who "refrained from accepting the post."

4/1 - BIA - A 14-article decree concerns the restoration of property.

"The movable & immovable properties of private people & private enterprises confiscated by the RA on various causes such as land, cash, foreign currency, shares, factories, sarais, shops, trading companies & commercial stores in the past are to be given back to their owners, their legal representatives, custodians, heirs or guardians...."

"The immovable properties, with the exception of residential houses & apartments which their giving back will be regulated separately, will be returned ...on the presentation of their legal documents registered with the concerned governmental bodies, by the authorized court."

- Moh'd Azam Zaryab was elected chairman of the Writer's Association.

- AFGHANews - After Tanai's coup, Najibullah sent ex-King Zahir Shah a letter asking for his help in bring peace to Afghanistan. The ex-King rejected the offer; however, a Kabul regime spokesman said that now that the hard-liners were out of the party, the ex-King might find it easier to play a role.

- The Frontier Post reported that Gulbuddin met with Pakistan's Awami Nat'l Party leader Khan Abdul Wali Khan (who has been close to Kabul & Moscow & critical of the mujahideen, especially Gulbuddin).

4/2 - BIA - To "meet urgent demands" the ROA distributed Afs. 5m to some cultural & social organizations including the Afghan Film Dept., the Central Theater, the Writer's, Artists & Journalists Unions & the DYAO.

4/3 - BIA - The Iranian Embassy in Kabul gave a chevrolet to the Afghan Red Crescent Society.

- The Council of Ministers instructed the "concerned bodies" to take immediate action to repair the shrine of Hazrat Ali in Mazar-i-Sharif & ordered that a special maintenance office be opened in the building.

- Da Afghanistan Bank will increase its mortgaging capital from Afs. 40m to Afs. 750m.

4/4 - The ROA & the USSR signed a protocol concerning gratis aid for rubles 596,000 worth of wood to be used in the northern coal enterprise.

4/5 - BIA - Mir Moh'd Sidiq Farhang, scholar & historian, died abroad yesterday of heart failure. He was 75.

- New Ministers: Moh'd Aslam Watanjar, Defense; Ghulam Farouq Yaqubi, State Security; Raz M. Pakteen, Interior. Moh'd Asef Delawar was named armed forces chief of staff, Moh'd Rafi was made Vice President of the ROA. (See p. 36)

- PT - Over 90 Pakistani nationals are imprisoned in different jails in Afghanistan. At least 101 Afghans are in Peshawar's central jail.

- Tribal elders are demanding that the mujahideen reopen the Torkham-Jalalabad road. It has been closed since November 1988. It is the main trading route & the tribesmen are losing money. (See p. 17).

4/6 - BIA - "Four opposition groups...announced today their joining to the policy of nat'l reconciliation ... During the joining ceremony... a smaller terrorist group which had ambushed around the area of the ceremony, fired, killing several of our countrymen & wounding some of the officials, 2 of them seriously." (See 4/7)



4/7 - BIA - World Health Day was marked in Kabul with the slogan "Our planet, our health, our strivings in the field."
 - Najibullah visited Fazl Haq Khaleqyar, governor of the Northern Zone, & 4 others who were hospitalized as a result of injuries received in the Herat ambush.
 Gen. Jalal Razmenda, Dep. Min. of State Security, who was killed in the ambush, was buried today.
 - LA Signal - Jamiat said the Herat surrender (see 4/6) was a trap planned 5 months ago to trick ROA gov't forces
 - NYT -

Witnesses said at least 10 people died at the scene, some of them children. They said more than 50 people were wounded in the battle, which was fought with pistols, assault guns and machine guns fired by two Government tanks.

The first shots were fired as Governor Kalil Yar embraced one of the guerrilla commanders. When a handful of gunmen standing behind the commander shot the Governor, the whole area erupted in crossfire.

Foreigners who attended the ceremony appeared to have escaped injury, although they were only a few yards from the battle. An Afghan television cameraman was wounded in the head.

The Government-run Kabul radio blamed a "small terrorist group" for the shooting. It acknowledged that several top officials had been wounded but provided no other details.

The ceremony had been intended as a formal demonstration of President Najibullah's policy of national reconciliation, under which his Soviet-backed Government has persuaded many rebels to lay down their arms. Foreign journalists and diplomats were flown 400 miles across the country from Kabul to watch the ceremony.

- PT - Shevardnadze & Baker agreed that elections might be the best way to settle the Afghan situation.


- BIA - A 100-bed hospital will be built in Mazar-i-Sharif. The Afs, 100m project will be financed by Senator Moh'd Rasoul Barat, "a national entrepreneur of the country."

4/8 - BIA - Najibullah called the 4/6 Herat incident a "Painful event...The enemies of peace & calm...could not tolerate joining of such a big group to the nat'l reconciliation policy in Herat, so they cowardly resorted to anti-Islamic & anti-Afghan traditions' plot."


4/9 - BIA - "A group of British archaeologists, accompanied by a Pak-backed armed gang of extremists, contrary to all

internationally accepted norms & principles, has recently illegally entered in Acheen, Nazian Districts & Durbaba Grand District of Nangarhar Province from Pakistani territory & has commenced archaeological excavations in the said places." Reportedly they unearthed some relics & have taken them back to Pakistan

4/9 - PT - Two groups of Kabul troops clashed in Herat. 300 Khalqis were arrested in Kandahar for supporting Gen. Tanai. Parchamis have been appointed to all civil & military jobs in Kandahar & non-arrested Khalqis were sent to "far-flung" places.



The shooting in Pashtoon Jargon came at a reconciliation session.



Mutahideen Weekly 3/8

4/10 - BIA - Hamidullah Gran, 1st Sec'y of the Afghanistan Peasants Organization (APO), told a reporter that "the experiences of the past 11 years showed that no single force can ensure peace in the country." The APO is involved in drafting the program of the Peace Front, a commission consisting of representatives from all the socio-political organizations of the country.

- The economic development plan for 1990 calls for Afs. 16.1b, of which Afs. 9.5b will come from internal sources & Afs. 6.6b from foreign sources. The USSR, in the current year, will provide \$103.7m in project assistance & \$120m worth of consumer goods in gratis aid.

- Benazir Bhutto met yesterday with the defense committee of her cabinet & the "Afghan cell." A spokesman said that Pakistan was preparing its role in a possible election in Afghanistan under either the UN or the OIC. He said the election was an internal Afghan matter & that Pakistan was only supposed to play a helping role. Regarding UN efforts for refugee repatriation, he said no date had been set for the start. He said the election could be held before the refugees returned & that they could vote in their camps. The same article stated that an agreement had been reached between the refugees in Iran & Pakistan about representation in a future government.

4/11 - PT - The USSR favors a status quo in Afghanistan during the transitional period. "No state structures should be changed & both governmental & mujahideen troops should remain in the territories under their control." Representatives of the Kabul gov't & the opposition should jointly engage in an effort to prepare elections under UN control which would become a natural culmination of the Afghan settlement."

- BIA - Reportedly 4 Arabs are excavating historical relics in Nangarhar (see 4/9) and taking them away.

4/17 - BIA - Last year over \$37m worth of carpets were exported from Afghanistan. Carpets are produced in 10 provinces.

4/20 - NYT - Soviet negotiators seeking the release of their war prisoners met with Gulbuddin's representatives in Islamabad. The Soviets hope to set up a system for regular meetings with the guerrilla groups. The Soviets have over 300 soldiers listed as missing but believe that only 80 - 100 are still alive.

As a gesture of good will before the visit of the Soviet negotiators, Mr. Hekmatyar supplied Moscow with the names of three missing men whose whereabouts had not been known until now, and invited their families to send them parcels and letters.

4/21 - NYT - Three Afghans, men in their early 20s who said they had no relatives in the US, escaped from an immigration jail in Queens. They were in the midst of political-asylum hearings. They are still at large.

Crisis in Kabul

A day in the life of the coup in Kabul

The unsuccessful coup in Kabul and other important provincial Afghan cities has brought to centre stage the factions and frictions within the PDPA regime. Deep discontent at President Najib's rule must be the answer to how, in the context of a strong state apparatus, two battalions of the PDPA army could move under instructions from the Defence Minister, Shahinawaz Tanai, without the knowledge of the Deputy Defence Minister, Nabil Azmi.

Nabil Azmi, along with three colleagues from the Shooraa Aali Difa-i-Watan (Supreme National Defence Council) - Chief of Army Staff, General Asif Dilawar; the Khad chief, General Farooq Yaqoobi and Area Commander Sharqi (Eastern Command), General Afzal Ludzin - moved to counter the coup and ensure the safety of the Uyg (presidential palace) three hours after the first shell struck it.

In the unprecedented panic which ensued, the whole state apparatus was paralysed by indecision. Only the Uyg staff, by now familiar with such situations following the ousters of Daud, Tarakai and Hafaezullah Amin, acted decisively. The President was whisked away to safety seconds after the first bomb landed.

The attacking warplanes had taken off from Baghram airport where the rear detachment of Tanai's mutineers were awaiting "second orders". These never came. Before that, shells fired by pro-Najib guns pounded into the ground floor of the defence ministry. Gen Tanai had been waiting there to hear of the fate of the first blow. The news was not good and the general could not issue the promised second set of orders. On hearing that a force of two dozen policemen in Jeeps followed by tanks was headed towards the coup headquarters, the defence minister managed to make good his escape - nobody knows how.

The Afghan Consul in Peshawar, Gul Aga, told the story from the other side. When more than a hundred men and officers collected at the defence ministry, it all seemed routine business and WAD took no special measures to check on what was going on. But in the Uyg, people were wondering why the unusual activity at Baghram airport had not been reported. The attack on the presidential palace, followed by an attack on the radio station, provided the answer and an assault on the defence ministry was ordered.

But who ordered Battalions 37 and 88 to move? Everybody in these units had been carefully briefed on what to do, yet General Ludzin remained completely ignorant of the mission with which the battalions had been entrusted. Ludzin is not among the seven politburo members who were given their marching orders last Tuesday.

An answer to this question will probably have to wait until the "revolutionary courts" start chopping heads.

March 15-21, 1990

The Friday Times



The Muslim 12/11/89



New Jalalabad offensive planned

TFT Special Report by Ahmed Rashid

PESHAWAR: — Huge quantities of arms and ammunition are being supplied to Mujahidin commanders on the outskirts of the Afghan cities of Khost and Jalalabad in preparation for a new military offensive. However, a majority of guerrilla leaders still refuses to accept the leadership of the fundamentalist Gulbuddin Hikmetyar and the communist rebel, Lt Gen Shuhrawaz Tanai, who organised the abortive coup in Kabul two weeks ago.

At Peshawar military airport, transport aircraft land and take off through the night as US and Saudi-supplied arms are flown in for the Mujahidin. Hundreds of trucks then transport them to the front. Mujahidin sources said that Pakistan and the US are bypassing the leaders of the 6 guerrilla parties in Peshawar and supplying arms directly to the field commanders outside Jalalabad and Khost. The expectations are that the new supplies will encourage the guerrillas to attack the two cities and that General Tanai's presence will persuade Afghan army troops to desert.

However, the 6 Mujahidin parties and the most important field commanders have completely rejected the Tanai-Hikmetyar alliance. The reasons are obvious. In a moving ceremony in Peshawar last week, the guerrillas commemorated the anniversary of the massacre of 25,000 civilians by the Kabul regime in the 1978 uprising in Herat city, which was cold bloodedly crushed by Soviet aerial bombardment. General Tanai was then commanding the Herat garrison.

"He has too much Afghan blood on his hands, and nobody believes his attempt now to pose as a peacemaker" said one guerrilla leader. Western diplomats and Mujahidin leaders say that Tanai, who is now operating with Hikmetyar's forces inside Afghanistan, has lost credibility with the Afghan army because of the destruction he wrought on Kabul during the coup and by his recent 'unholy' alliance with Hikmetyar. His ability to persuade Afghan army units to desert is still an open question.

The Mujahidin also fear that a narrowly based fundamentalist leadership is being forced upon them. In several interviews with a dozen guerrilla leaders and other Afghans, it transpired that a broad-based army coup in Kabul had been planned by them in league with the other guerrilla parties, all of whom have extensive contacts within the Afghan army. Such a coup, if successful, would have declared a cease-fire and opened talks with all Mujahidin forces. "But Tanai and Hikmetyar hijacked the broad-based coup, which was planned for later this month, to ensure their leadership over it", said one Mujahidin leader.

In Kabul, President Najibullah has arrested hundreds of army officers belonging to the Khalq faction in a large scale purge, which will clearly undermine his ability to face up to future guerrilla offensives. However, at the same time, he has also promoted many Khalqi officers who remained loyal to him, such as the new Defense Minister General Aslam Watanjar. Najibullah's own Parcham faction

remains a minority in the army's high command. On Kabul Radio, Najib comes across as confident as ever, cracking lewd jokes at the expense of the coup plotters and urging peace and national reconciliation. However, there is little doubt that the coup attempt has badly undermined his government and his gestures of peace will sound more hollow than before.

The Tanai-Hikmetyar alliance is politically narrowly based, commanding only minority support among the Afghans, but at their disposal are the Mujahidin's most committed fighters from Hikmetyar's *Hizbe Islami* party and huge stocks of arms. However, any battlefield success by them could also lead to further fragmentation of Afghanistan. The forces of commander Ahmed Shah Masud in the north, the Shua guerrillas in the west (who are backed by Iran) and the moderate pro-nationalists in the south of Afghanistan could set up their own provincial governments or even start talking to President Najibullah. "If it's a choice between Hikmetyar-Tanai and Najibullah, many Afghan nationalists will prefer to open talks with Najibullah", said an Afghan scholar based in Peshawar.

Bonapartists fail

By Mark Urban

... Like many commanders on both sides of Afghanistan's civil war, General Tanai spoke with several voices. I met him a year ago, just after the last Russian soldier had left Kabul, and asked him if it were true that the army was plotting to overthrow President Najibullah. "It is Western propaganda; it will not happen", he replied, smiling.

There is nothing ideological about General Tanai, or about Gulbuddin Hikmetyar, the self-seeking mujahedin leader he has linked up with. Nor, for that matter, is there anything ideological about President Najibullah. The three are Pathans, they are not trusted by their colleagues and they share a common ambition: to be boss of Afghanistan.

General Tanai and Mr Gulbuddin come from Pakhtia province near the Pakistani border. On the surface they would seem natural enemies. General Tanai is the leader of the Khalq faction of the Communist Party. Mr Gulbuddin is an Islamic extremist who wants to impose a fundamentalist government in Kabul. He has been fighting communists and "liberals" since he was a student at Kabul University in the late 1960s, where President Najibullah was a medical student and rival agitator. All three are opportunists.

In Marxist jargon, General Tanai from the beginning guilty of "Bonapartist tendencies". A popular soldier, he had a strong base in the armed forces and for a while even seemed to mimic Napoleon. At the rally that said good-bye to the Russians, he stood throughout with one hand thrust into the front of his greatcoat and the other behind his back.

Mr Gulbuddin is also a Bonapartist among the mulas of the mujahedin. He has only worked with the other guerrilla groups as long as it suited him. Over recent months he left the guerrilla alliance when it became clear US support was waning and that none of the mujahedin leaders would ever allow him to become leader. So he formed an alliance with the disaffected Khalq faction of the Communist Party to topple President Najibullah. Both General Tanai and Mr Gulbuddin probably believed that once in power they could

eliminate the other.

Instead, President Najibullah still rules. He has purged from power what remains of Khalqi members in the air force, the army, the government and the Politburo, leaving his Parcham faction in control. Politically he has strengthened his grip, militarily the situation is less clear. He is protected by the presidential guard that held central Kabul when General Tanai's supporters in the air force began bombing the city anticipating an uprising and mutiny. And the police militia, *Sandarmy*, once the private army of the Khalqis, was broken up before the Russians left. But the depth of General Tanai's support in the army and the air force puts in doubt their loyalty to President Najibullah.

Pakistan has moved rapidly to test this support. ISI, the Pakistani intelligence organisation, has once more put its support behind Mr Gulbuddin and his new alliance with General Tanai, and has called for a rapid guerrilla push on Jalalabad and Khost, provincial towns that have survived sieges in the past. General Tanai comes from near Khost and helped draw up the strategy for the defence of Jalalabad. At the moment he is in Pakistan, though the government claims not to know this.

Ms Bhutto, the Prime Minister of Pakistan who previously called for a negotiated end to the civil war, has swung in behind her generals who are calling for a fresh mujahedin offensive they hope will put their man Gulbuddin into power in Kabul. Ms Bhutto is giving her backing to Islamic fundamentalism in Afghanistan to try to outmanoeuvre her right-wing political opponents in Pakistan.

General Tanai is not a desk officer. He rose to prominence through military skill and tribal politics. The Russians spotted him and liked him. In the early 1980s he led Afghanistan's commando brigade after specialist training in the Soviet Union. He gained the reputation as a man who could turn a demoralised conscript rabble into a respectable force. Like many ambitious generals from this part of the world, he probably believed politics was as simple as soldiering.

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ABBREVIATIONS USED

AICMB	- Afghan Information Centre <u>Monthly Bulletin</u>
AIG	- Afghan Interim Government
BNA	- Bakhtar News Agency
CC	- Central Committee
CSM	- Christian Science Monitor
DVOA	- Democratic Youth Organization of Afghanistan
FRG	- Federal Republic of Germany
GDR	- German Democratic Republic
ICRC	- Int'l Committee of the Red Cross
KT	- Kabul Times
LAT	- Los Angeles Times
NGO	- Non-Governmental Organization
NWFP	- Northwest Frontier Province
NYT	- New York Times
OIC	- Organization of Islamic Conference
PDPA	- People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan
PSFO	- Peace, Solidarity & Friendship Organization
PT	- Pakistan Times
PVO	- Private Voluntary Organization
RC	- Revolutionary Council
ROA	- Republic of Afghanistan
SCMP	- South China Morning Post
UNGA	- United Nations General Assembly
UNGOMAP	- United Nations Good Offices Mission to Afghanistan & Pakistan
UNHCR	- United Nations High Commission for Refugees
WSJ	- Wall Street Journal

Line drawings from the 1982 Afghanistan Calendar of the Chicago Afghanistan Relief Committee.

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